United States v. Angelo Lynch ( 2021 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4774
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANGELO NATHANIEL LYNCH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge. (5:18-cr-00291-BO-1)
Submitted: December 22, 2020 Decided: January 7, 2021
Before WILKINSON, HARRIS, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard Croutharmel, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr.,
United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Angelo Nathaniel Lynch appeals the 144-month sentence imposed by the district
court following his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846; possession with intent
to distribute and distribution of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1);
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c); and possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Lynch
contends that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to
adequately explain the sentence or address Lynch’s nonfrivolous argument for a lower
sentence based on his age and serious health problems. We agree and therefore vacate the
district court’s judgment.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This review entails
consideration of both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at
51. In assessing procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the district court properly
calculated the defendant’s advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, afforded the parties an
opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49-51.
When rendering a sentence, the district court must make an individualized
assessment based on the facts presented and must state in open court the
particular reasons supporting its chosen sentence. The district court must
address the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a particular sentence,
and if the court rejects those arguments, it must explain why in a sufficiently
detailed manner to allow [us] to conduct a meaningful appellate review.
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United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019). “There is no mechanical
approach to our sentencing review,” and “the adequacy of the sentencing court’s
explanation depends on the complexity of each case.” United States v. Ross, 912 F.3d 740,
744 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 206 (2019).
“We cannot assume that a sentencing court truly considered the parties’
nonfrivolous arguments or the defendant’s individual characteristics when the record fails
to make it patently obvious.” Provance, 944 F.3d at 218 (internal quotation marks
omitted). In conducting this review, we do “not evaluate a court’s sentencing statements
in a vacuum” but rather “look at the full context, including the give-and-take of a
sentencing hearing.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 213 (4th Cir. 2020); see
Provance, 944 F.3d at 218 (“Engaging counsel in a discussion about the merits of an
argument in favor of a particular sentence . . . may be sufficient to permit a reviewing court
to infer that a sentencing court gave specific attention to a defendant’s argument.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). But we are not permitted to guess at the district court’s rationale
by “searching the record for statements that might explain a sentence.” Provance, 944 F.3d
at 219 (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted); see Ross, 912 F.3d at 745.
Lynch was 57 at the time of sentencing and suffered from several serious health
problems. He asked the district court to impose a below-Guidelines sentence of 48 months
for the drug offenses and 60 months for the firearm offense. The Government correctly
notes that Lynch’s arguments were brief, and that the district court recommended that
Lynch receive health care in prison. But we agree with Lynch that the full context of the
sentencing hearing in this case does not demonstrate that the district court actually
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considered Lynch’s nonfrivolous argument that a sentence within the Guidelines range was
too high in light of his age and health. Because we may not guess at the district court’s
rationale for rejecting this argument, we are prevented from conducting meaningful
appellate review. Further, although the Government contends that any procedural error
was harmless, we conclude that the Government has failed to demonstrate “that the error
did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence” on Lynch’s sentence. See
United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 2010).
We therefore vacate the sentence and remand the case for resentencing. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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