Marcus Thomas v. M. Younce , 604 F. App'x 325 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-7856
MARCUS DALE THOMAS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
M. YOUNCE, Unit Manager; A. MULLIN, LT; Building (LT) A; D.
BARTON, SGT, Building (SGT) A,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James P. Jones, District
Judge. (7:14-cv-00510-JPJ-RSB)
Submitted: May 29, 2015 Decided: June 16, 2015
Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Marcus D. Thomas, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Marcus Dale Thomas, a Virginia inmate, filed a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2012) complaint alleging that Defendant prison officials
were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious
harm when they ignored a doctor’s order directing that he be
assigned to a bottom bunk on the bottom tier for one year. As a
result of this deliberate indifference, Thomas alleged that he
fell down the stairs and injured his knee. Thomas sought
compensatory damages and, later, filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction. The district court denied the motion
for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint sua
sponte for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1) (2012). The court found that Thomas had not
established that Defendants’ deliberate indifference was the
cause of his injury or that the injury was sufficiently serious
to support a claim. Thomas appeals the district court’s order
denying his motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissing
his complaint and the order denying his motion for
reconsideration. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand
for further proceedings.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure
to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, accepting all well-
pled factual allegations in the complaint as true and drawing
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
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party. Slade v. Hampton Roads Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 248
(4th Cir. 2005). While a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings are to be
liberally construed, id. at 252, a pro se complaint must still
contain sufficient facts “to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level” and “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 570 (2007).
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment “protects inmates from inhumane treatment and
conditions while imprisoned.” Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d
756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). “Prison officials are, therefore,
obligated to take reasonable measures to guarantee inmate
safety.” Makdessi v. Fields, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL
1062747, at *5 (4th Cir. Mar. 12, 2015). “For a claim based on
a failure to prevent harm, the [prisoner] must [first] show that
he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk
of serious harm.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Next, the prisoner must establish that the prison official had
“a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” that is, “deliberate
indifference to [the] inmate[’s] health or safety.” Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
A prison official “is deliberately indifferent to a
substantial risk of harm to a [prisoner] when that [official]
knows of and disregards the risk.” Parrish ex rel. Lee v.
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Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted). However, “prison officials may not simply bury
their heads in the sand and thereby skirt liability” by claiming
that they were not aware of the risk. Makdessi, ___ F.3d at
___, 2015 WL 1062747, at *6. Finally, the prisoner must
establish that the prison official’s deliberate indifference
caused his injury. See Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748
F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating elements of deliberate
indifference to substantial risk of serious harm claim).
Thomas alleged that, after he showed Younce the doctor’s
order for the special bunk assignment on at least two occasions,
Younce refused to move him to a bottom bunk on the bottom tier.
Instead, Younce told Thomas that he did not have time to change
Thomas’ bunk assignment and gave him the choice of staying in
the top tier cell or being moved to segregation. It could be
reasonably inferred from Thomas’ complaint that Younce
deliberately denied Thomas’ request to be moved to a bottom bunk
on the bottom tier, in contravention of the doctor’s order. To
silence Thomas’ complaints, Younce threatened to place him in
segregation if he did not agree to stay in the top tier cell.
Accepting these allegations as true, as we must, we conclude
that Thomas alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that Younce
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was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious
harm to Thomas. *
We also conclude that the district court erred by finding
that Thomas placed himself at risk by not accepting Younce’s
offer to be moved to segregation. Thomas did not voluntarily
place himself at risk; rather, he refused Younce’s objectionable
offer to place him in segregation (presumably without committing
an infraction) in lieu of his staying on the top tier, where he
faced a substantial risk of serious injury. The court also
erred by concluding that Thomas stated no facts to support the
allegation that his medications played any role in causing his
fall, as Thomas specifically alleged that he was still sedated
from his medication when he caught his shower shoe on the stair
and fell. Finally, the court erred by finding that Thomas could
not state a claim because he failed to show that the injury to
his knee was serious. While “evidence of a serious or
significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the
challenged conditions” may aid a prisoner in making his
case, Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (internal quotation
marks omitted), a prisoner only need “show that he was
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
*
Of course, Younce is free to dispute these allegations and
raise legal challenges to Thomas’ complaint in a motion to
dismiss or for summary judgment.
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serious harm.” Makdessi, ___ F.3d at ___, 2015 WL 1062747, at
*5; cf. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38-39 (2010) (holding
that there is no de minimis injury threshold for excessive force
claim because focus is on prevention of prison officials’
malicious and sadistic use of force). Although Thomas may have
suffered a relatively minor injury to his knee, the risk of more
significant harm from a fall down the stairs (or out of an upper
bunk) is obvious.
Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the district court’s
orders dismissing Thomas’ claim that Younce exhibited deliberate
indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm when Younce
ignored a doctor’s order directing that Thomas be assigned to a
bottom bunk on the bottom tier for one year. However, we find
no error in the district court’s dismissal of the claims against
the remaining Defendants and the court’s denial of Thomas’
motion for a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, we affirm
those portions of the district court’s orders.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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