Ashley Cockman v. Circle K Stores Inc. ( 2020 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-1448
ASHLEY C. COCKMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CIRCLE K STORES INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
Statesville. Graham C. Mullen, Senior District Judge. (5:18-cv-00061-GCM)
Submitted: May 28, 2020 Decided: June 3, 2020
Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Todd J. Combs, COMBS LAW, PLLC, Mooresville, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Tracey T. Barbaree, Beth A. Moeller, MOELLER BARBAREE LLP, Atlanta, Georgia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ashley Carson Cockman appeals the district court’s order granting summary
judgment to Circle K Stores Inc., on Cockman’s claims of age discrimination under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2018) (ADEA), and
wrongful discharge under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422 (2019). We affirm.
“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Variety Stores,
Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 888 F.3d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 2018) (alterations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “‘if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). In making this determination,
“courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
refrain from weighing the evidence or making credibility determinations.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
“The ADEA prohibits employers from refusing to hire, discharging, or otherwise
discriminating against any person who is at least 40 years of age ‘because of’ the person’s
age.” * EEOC v. Balt. Cty., 747 F.3d 267, 272 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§§ 623(a)(1), 631(a)). To demonstrate a claim under the ADEA, Cockman either had to
provide direct evidence of discrimination or demonstrate a prima facie case of
discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-02 (1973);
*
North Carolina law applies the same standards as the ADEA. Rishel v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 854, 875 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (dismissing North Carolina
wrongful discharge claim because the ADEA claim failed).
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Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 333-35 (4th Cir. 2004) (applying McDonnell Douglas
framework to ADEA claims). Because Cockman failed to present direct evidence of age
discrimination, he had to proceed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework. To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under McDonnell
Douglas, Cockman had to demonstrate that: “(1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he
suffered an adverse employment action (such as discharge), (3) he was performing his job
duties at a level that met the employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of the adverse
employment action, and (4) his position remained open or was filled by a similarly
qualified applicant outside the protected class.” Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 742
(4th Cir. 2006).
If the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, then the burden shifts to the employer
to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action.
Dugan v. Albemarle Cty. Sch. Bd., 293 F.3d 716, 721 (4th Cir. 2002). If the employer
comes forward with such a reason, “the burden reverts to the plaintiff to establish that the
employer’s nondiscriminatory rationale is a pretext for intentional discrimination.”
Heiko v. Colombo Sav. Bank, 434 F.3d 249, 258 (4th Cir. 2006). To do so, the plaintiff
must “show that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence, thus
supporting an inference of discrimination, or offer other forms of circumstantial evidence
sufficiently probative of intentional discrimination.” Dugan, 293 F.3d at 721.
The district court held that Cockman failed to establish a prima facie case, stating
that the evidence and Cockman’s own admissions “overwhelmingly” showed that
Cockman was not meeting Circle K’s expectations under the Light of Day policy, which
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required every employee to treat other employees with respect. We agree with the district
court that the evidence that Cockman violated the policy is overwhelming. Multiple
coworkers and vendors complained to Circle K’s human resources department and to
Cockman’s supervisors, who counseled Cockman about his communications and the Light
of Day policy. Circle K warned Cockman that he was in violation of the policy and that
failure to improve could result in the termination of his employment. Despite this warning,
Cockman made derogatory comments regarding his supervisor one week later. In the face
of this evidence, Cockman failed to establish that he was meeting Circle K’s expectations.
We further conclude that the district court properly held that, in any event, Circle K had a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Cockman’s employment.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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