Charles Shirley v. Christopher Staubs ( 2020 )


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  •                                      UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 20-6210
    CHARLES J. SHIRLEY,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    CHRISTOPHER STAUBS, in his personal capacity,
    Defendant Appellee,
    and
    LOUDON COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE; STACY L. MCCAFFERY,
    Defendants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
    Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, Chief District Judge. (3:19-cv-00041-GMG)
    Submitted: July 6, 2020                                           Decided: July 17, 2020
    Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Charles J. Shirley, Appellant Pro Se.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Charles J. Shirley appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his complaint
    against Christopher Staubs without prejudice for failure to perfect service. * On appeal,
    Shirley contends that the Marshal Service did not make reasonable efforts to locate Staubs
    and, as such, his failure to serve Staubs should be excused. We vacate and remand for
    further proceedings.
    Shirley is responsible for timely service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1). A plaintiff
    proceeding in forma pauperis may request that service be made by a Marshal. The district
    court must order the Marshal to do so if the defendant is proceeding in forma pauperis.
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3); Richardson v. Clipse, 
    602 F.3d 605
    , 608 (4th Cir. 2010) (in forma
    pauperis plaintiffs must rely upon the court and the Marshal to effect service). “If a
    defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court — on motion
    or on its own after notice to the plaintiff — must dismiss the action without prejudice
    against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.” Fed. R. Civ.
    P. 4(m). “[I]f the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time
    for service for an appropriate period.”
    Id. We review
    a dismissal for insufficient service
    of process for abuse of discretion. Shao v. Link Cargo (Taiwan) Ltd., 
    986 F.2d 700
    , 708
    (4th Cir. 1993).
    *
    Shirley’s complaint was also dismissed against other defendants and against
    Staubs in his official capacity. Shirley does not challenge these dismissals on appeal.
    2
    A plaintiff's pro se status is not sufficient to establish good cause. Rather, we can
    find good cause to extend the service deadline only if the plaintiff made reasonable and
    diligent efforts to effect service within the 90–day period.       In some instances, an
    inmate-plaintiff may only be required to properly identify the defendant, and the Marshal
    Service must make reasonable efforts to obtain a current address. See Sellers v. United
    States, 
    902 F.2d 598
    , 602 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Richardson v. Johnson, 
    598 F.3d 734
    ,
    738-40 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that Marshal was responsible for serving defendant if such
    could be done with “reasonable effort”).
    Here, Shirley responded to every court inquiry and provided the Marshal Service
    with allegedly the only address Shirley could obtain—Staubs’ place of employment. The
    Marshal Service sent certified mail to Staubs at his place of employment, without requiring
    Staubs’ (or his agent’s) personal signature, as required by West Virginia law. See W. Va.
    R. Civ. P. 4. When it became clear that Staubs had left his employment, it does not appear
    that the Marshal Service made any further inquiry or conducted any further research to
    determine Staubs’ address. The district court made no findings regarding whether Shirley
    established good cause for his failure to time serve Staubs; whether, as an inmate, Shirley
    was barred (as he alleged) from obtaining Staubs’ home address; or whether the Marshal
    Service could have served Staubs with reasonable effort. Instead, the court dismissed the
    complaint, finding only that Shirley had failed to serve Staubs.
    We find the district court abused its discretion, and we, thus, vacate the district
    court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We dispense
    3
    with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
    materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    VACATED AND REMANDED
    4