Mauro Palacio v. B. Sullivan ( 2020 )


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  •                                     UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 19-7800
    MAURO PALACIO,
    Petitioner - Appellant,
    v.
    B. SULLIVAN,
    Respondent - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
    Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:19-hc-02064-FL)
    Submitted: July 30, 2020                                          Decided: August 4, 2020
    Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
    Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Mauro Palacio, Appellant Pro Se.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Mauro Palacio seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing without prejudice
    his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
     (2018) petition. Upon review, we conclude that the appeal is moot.
    “The mootness doctrine is a limitation on federal judicial power grounded in the
    ‘case-or-controversy’ requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution.” United States v.
    Springer, 
    715 F.3d 535
    , 540 (4th Cir. 2013); see U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “Mootness
    is a jurisdictional question and thus may be raised sua sponte by a federal court at any stage
    of proceedings.” Springer, 715 F.3d at 540. “[A] case is moot when the issues presented
    are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the out-come.”
    Incumaa v. Ozmint, 
    507 F.3d 281
    , 285-86 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
    omitted). We lack jurisdiction over any portion of an appeal that becomes moot. 
    Id.
    In his petition, Palacio—a federal prisoner at the time—sought good conduct credits
    under the First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 
    132 Stat. 5194
     (2018). Palacio, however, is
    no longer incarcerated. Overserved prison time does not shorten a defendant’s term of
    supervision. United States v. Johnson, 
    529 U.S. 53
    , 59 (2000) (“The objectives of
    supervised release would be unfulfilled if excess prison time were to offset and reduce
    terms of supervised release. . . . Supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from
    those served by incarceration.”); United States v. Jackson, 
    952 F.3d 492
    , 498
    (4th Cir. 2020) (“Although custodial and supervised release terms are components of one
    unitary sentence, they serve different purposes. The conditions of a defendant’s supervised
    release are intended to provide the defendant with assistance in transitioning into
    2
    community life.” (internal citation omitted)). Therefore, even if Palacio were entitled to
    good conduct credits, his release from incarceration renders this claim moot. *
    Accordingly, we deny Palacio’s motion to appoint counsel and dismiss this appeal
    as moot. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
    decisional process.
    DISMISSED
    *
    Because Palacio’s petition is moot, the deficiencies in the petition cannot be cured
    by amendment. See Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 
    959 F.3d 605
    , 610-11 (4th Cir. 2020). Thus,
    the district court’s dismissal without prejudice is a final, appealable order.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-7800

Filed Date: 8/4/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/22/2020