United States v. Cleveland Griffin ( 2020 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-7182
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CLEVELAND LAQUINCY GRIFFIN, a/k/a Q,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:07-cr-00926-JFA-1)
Submitted: August 31, 2020 Decided: September 15, 2020
Before MOTZ, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Cleveland Laquincy Griffin, Appellant Pro Se. Kathleen Michelle Stoughton, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Cleveland Laquincy Griffin appeals the district court’s order denying relief on
Griffin’s motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to section 404 of the First Step Act of
2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. Although the district court agreed that
Griffin’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine
base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), was a covered offense under
§ 404(a) of the First Step Act, the district court explained that the Fair Sentencing Act of
2010 did not change Griffin’s career offender Sentencing Guidelines range. The district
court, which did not have the benefit of our recent decision in United States v. Chambers,
956 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 2020), declined to consider Griffin’s argument for a lower sentence
based on his postsentencing efforts at rehabilitation and his argument that, under current
sentencing law, he is no longer a career offender.
We held in Chambers that that “the First Step Act does not constrain [district] courts
from recognizing Guidelines errors” and that “any Guidelines error deemed retroactive . . .
must be corrected in a First Step Act resentencing” 956 F.3d at 668. A district court
conducting a resentencing under § 404 of the First Step Act also has the discretion to vary
from the defendant’s Guidelines range to reflect postsentencing conduct. Id. at 674. We
therefore vacate the district court’s order and remand to allow the court to address Griffin’s
arguments on the merits. We express no opinion on the merits of Griffin’s First Step Act
motion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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