United States v. Jaison R. Feliciana ( 2020 )

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4703
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
JAISON R. FELICIANA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga, District Judge. (1:18-cr-00113-AJT-JFA-1)
Argued: December 11, 2019 Decided: September 11, 2020
Before KING, HARRIS, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Reversed, vacated, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the opinion,
in which Judge King and Judge Harris joined.
ARGUED: Caroline Swift Platt, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Aidan Taft Grano, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Geremy C.
Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Maria N. Jacob, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.
G. Zachary Terwilliger, United States Attorney, Allison J. Garnett, Special Assistant
United States Attorney, Troy Edwards, Jr., Special Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
RUSHING, Circuit Judge:
A United States Park Police Officer stopped Jaison R. Feliciana for driving his
employer’s delivery truck on the George Washington Memorial Parkway (Parkway),
where commercial vehicles require permits. Feliciana did not possess the requisite permit,
but he did possess marijuana; he was charged for both violations. After the magistrate
judge denied his motion to suppress, Feliciana pleaded guilty to operating a commercial
vehicle without a permit and entered a conditional guilty plea to the marijuana charge,
reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The district court
affirmed. We conclude that the Government has not carried its burden to show that the
officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Feliciana or that the stop was a valid administrative
inspection. We therefore reverse the suppression ruling, vacate Feliciana’s marijuana
conviction, and remand.
I.
On the morning of October 28, 2017, Feliciana was driving a bakery delivery truck
on the Parkway. Officer Jonathan Alto of the U.S. Park Police observed the small box
truck and believed it was a commercial vehicle, which are prohibited from driving on the
Parkway without a permit. Based solely on his observation of “a commercial truck on the
Parkway,” Officer Alto stopped the truck. J.A. 60–61.
Officer Alto informed Feliciana that he stopped him for driving a commercial
vehicle on the Parkway, and Feliciana responded that he had thought that prohibition
applied only to larger trucks. While talking to Feliciana, Officer Alto smelled marijuana.
He mentioned the odor to Feliciana, who admitted that he had smoked marijuana earlier in
2
the day on his way to work. Officer Alto requested to see the permit allowing Feliciana to
operate a commercial vehicle on the Parkway, but Feliciana could not produce a permit
and appeared nervous. Officer Alto instructed Feliciana to exit the vehicle and observed
what appeared to be a pipe on the floorboard. When he asked Feliciana if the pipe was for
marijuana, Feliciana lunged toward the truck, at which point Officer Alto restrained him in
handcuffs. Ultimately, after searching the truck and Feliciana, Officer Alto found a small
bag of marijuana in Feliciana’s shoe.
Feliciana was charged with possession of marijuana and operating a commercial
vehicle on the Parkway without a permit, and he filed a motion to suppress the evidence
obtained in the traffic stop. The magistrate judge conducted a suppression hearing and
denied the motion. Feliciana then pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the
suppression ruling. See 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (authorizing magistrate judges to try
misdemeanors). On appeal, the district court held that the traffic stop was based on
reasonable suspicion that Feliciana was operating a commercial vehicle on a restricted
highway without a permit and that the stop was permissible as a warrantless administrative
inspection under New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), because the Parkway is a
pervasively regulated federal enclave. See 18 U.S.C. § 3402 (authorizing appeal to the
district court). The court further held that Officer Alto had probable cause to search
Feliciana’s shoe.
Feliciana now appeals to our Court. We review the factual findings underlying a
motion to suppress for clear error and the legal determinations de novo. United States v.
Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 233 (4th Cir. 2012). Because the magistrate judge denied the
3
suppression motion, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.
Id.II.
A traffic stop constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and thus must be
justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or some other exception to the
generally applicable warrant requirement. See Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1187
(2020); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). The government bears the burden
to justify a warrantless seizure. See United States v. McGee, 736 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir.
2013). Here, the Government contends that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable
suspicion that Feliciana lacked the required permit and, alternatively, that the stop was a
permissible administrative inspection under Burger.
A.
Reasonable suspicion to initiate a brief investigative traffic stop requires “a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity.” Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1187 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–
418 (1981)). Although it is a “commonsense, nontechnical” standard, Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 698 (1996), to support a finding of reasonable suspicion “the
detaining officer [must] ‘. . . either articulate why a particular behavior is suspicious or
logically demonstrate, given the surrounding circumstances, that the behavior is likely to
be indicative of some more sinister activity than may appear at first glance,’” United States
v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d
243, 248 (4th Cir. 2011)). In practice, this typically means that “an officer’s articulated
4
facts must in their totality serve to eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers
before reasonable suspicion will exist.” United States v. McCoy, 513 F.3d 405, 413 (4th
Cir. 2008).
Officer Alto testified that he stopped Feliciana’s vehicle because “[i]t was a
commercial truck on the Parkway.” J.A. 60; see also J.A. 61 (“I advised Mr. Feliciana the
reason he was stopped was for having a commercial vehicle on the Park Roadway.”).
National Park Service (NPS) regulations prohibit “commercial vehicles”—which include
but are not limited to “trucks, station wagons, pickups, passenger cars or other vehicles
when used in transporting movable property for a fee or profit . . . or used as an incident to
providing services to another person, or used in connection with any business”—from
driving on the Parkway except “when authorized by a permit” or other exception. 36
C.F.R. §§ 5.6(a), 7.96(f). The superintendent of a park area “shall issue permits” for
commercial vehicles to drive on park roads “when such use is necessary for access to
private lands situated within or adjacent to the park area,” and the superintendent also “may
grant permission to use park roads” in emergencies. Id. § 5.6(b), (c); see also id. § 1.6(a)
(authorizing the superintendent to issue permits). Use of park roads is also authorized
when “in connection with the operation of the park area.” Id. § 5.6(b).
Officer Alto did not articulate any reason to suspect that Feliciana did not possess
the requisite permit to drive a commercial vehicle on the Parkway. The entire factual basis
he offered for conducting the traffic stop was that he saw a vehicle requiring a permit on
the Parkway. But that fact by itself is wholly innocent. The Government elicited no
5
testimony concerning why Officer Alto or any other reasonable officer would think that
Feliciana’s truck in particular lacked a permit.
On appeal, the Government argues that permits are rarely granted therefore it is
reasonable to suspect that any commercial vehicle on the Parkway lacks a permit. Without
passing upon the theoretical viability of that argument, we find no evidence in the record
to support it. The record is bereft of information about how many permits are issued, how
many permit requests are denied, what types of vehicles typically receive permits, or even
how many regulations authorize the issuance of permits. While the government is not
required to rule out the possibility of innocent conduct to meet the reasonable suspicion
standard, Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 403 (2014), it must articulate some
particularized and objective basis for suspecting illegality.
We agree with Feliciana that this case is governed by Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648 (1979). There, a patrolman stopped a vehicle on a public highway solely to check the
driver’s license and registration, without having observed any traffic violation or
suspicious activity or any other reason to believe the car was being driven contrary to law.
Id. at 650–651. The Supreme Court held that, absent reasonable suspicion that a motorist
is unlicensed or an automobile is unregistered or that either is otherwise subject to seizure
for a violation of law, “stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check
his driver’s license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. at 663. So too here. Absent articulable suspicion that Feliciana lacked
the required permit, Officer Alto was not entitled to stop Feliciana’s vehicle at his
discretion to check whether Feliciana possessed a permit.
6
The Government directs our attention to Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020),
but that case provides no support for the stop here. In Glover, a patrolman stopped the
defendant’s pickup truck after a record check revealed that the driver’s license of the
truck’s registered owner had been revoked. Id. at 1187. Without any facts indicating
otherwise, the patrolman assumed that the truck’s driver was the registered owner. The
Supreme Court held that these facts gave rise to reasonable suspicion that the driver was
operating the truck without a license because the officer could draw the commonsense
inference that the registered owner was likely the driver of the vehicle. Id. at 1188–1190.
Here, unlike in Glover, Officer Alto offered no reason to believe Feliciana was operating
his truck without a permit. The mere existence of the permit requirement does not, by
itself, amount to reasonable suspicion that a particular driver failed to satisfy that
requirement. And unlike the inference in Glover, the incidence of permitted and
unpermitted commercial vehicles on the Parkway is not a matter of common sense, even
to local citizens and judges. So appeals to common sense cannot fill the evidentiary gap
here.
Alternatively, the Government contends that the grammatical structure of the
regulations allows us to assume that most commercial vehicles on the Parkway lack a
permit. The Government notes that Sections 5.6(b) and 7.96(f) are written as general
prohibitions with a permit exception. See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(f) (“Commercial vehicles
. . . are prohibited on park roads and bridges except . . . when authorized by a permit . . .
.”). From this, the Government argues that a law enforcement officer possesses reasonable
suspicion of illegal activity whenever he observes a commercial vehicle on park roads. But
7
the regulations’ structure cannot bear the evidentiary load the Government would place on
them. License and permit schemes may commonly be written in the negative—consider
the Virginia and Delaware driver’s license statutes, which provide that “[n]o person . . .
shall drive any motor vehicle on any highway” without first obtaining a driver’s license.
Va. Code § 46.2-300; see Del. Code tit. 21, § 2701(a); see also Va. Code § 46.2-341.7 (“No
person shall drive a commercial motor vehicle in the Commonwealth unless he has been
issued a commercial driver’s license . . . .”). Under the Government’s logic, the structure
of those statutes alone provides law enforcement reasonable suspicion to conduct
discretionary spot checks to ensure drivers possess a valid driver’s license. That reasoning
directly undermines Prouse, where the Court held that spot checks to ensure compliance
with Delaware’s driver’s license statute violated the Fourth Amendment. See Prouse, 440
U.S. at 659. We cannot infer from a permitting scheme’s mere existence that a particular
driver lacks the required permit.
None of this leaves an officer powerless to stop a commercial vehicle on the
Parkway if the officer actually possesses reasonable suspicion that the vehicle lacks the
required permit. Officers often base their suspicion in part on their practical experience
and specialized knowledge, which we credit when assessing the constitutionality of their
actions. See, e.g., McCoy, 513 F.3d at 413–414; United States v. McHugh, 349 Fed. App.
824, 827–828 (4th Cir. 2009). Indeed, we can imagine facts to which an officer might
testify that would support a particularized objective suspicion that a certain commercial
vehicle lacks the required permit. But before we can credit officer experience and
8
knowledge, “officers must apply their experience so that the courts can make informed
decisions on whether their suspicions are reasonable.” Williams, 808 F.3d at 253.
The district court here assumed that Officer Alto was “familiar with what private
lands could only be accessed through the GW Parkway and the frequency with which a
special permit would be issued for such access,” as well as with “the likelihood that a
commercial vehicle requiring a special permit was attempting to access private lands from
GW Parkway that are not otherwise accessible.” J.A. 203. This assumption was not based
on any facts in the record and, in any event, it is too general to fill the evidentiary gap.
Even if Officer Alto had testified he was familiar with the frequency of commercial vehicle
permits (which he did not), his testimony would not assist the Government if, for example,
he would have gone on to testify that permits were frequently granted to local shops like
the bakery for which Feliciana was driving. The Government did not elicit any testimony
about these details from Officer Alto, and we cannot assume his answers. As we have said
in a similar context, “[w]e do not question the experience of [this] officer[], but the
prosecution is obliged to present evidence articulating reasonable suspicion.” Williams,
808 F.3d at 253. The Government failed to carry its burden here.
B.
In the alternative, the Government argues that Officer Alto did not need reasonable
suspicion for the seizure because he stopped Feliciana to conduct a permissible warrantless
administrative inspection. A warrantless inspection of a pervasively regulated business
may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if three criteria are met. “First, there must
be a substantial government interest that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to which
9
the inspection is made.” Burger, 482 U.S. at 702 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Second, the warrantless inspections must be necessary to further the regulatory scheme.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Third, “the statute’s inspection
program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, must provide a
constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant,” that is, it must “advise the owner of the
commercial premises that the search is being made pursuant to the law and has a properly
defined scope,” and it must “limit the discretion of the inspecting officers.” Id. at 703(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
As these criteria indicate, we must first identify the regulatory scheme that
authorized Officer Alto to stop Feliciana’s vehicle without a warrant or suspicion before
we can evaluate whether that scheme and its execution here satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
The Government relies on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)
regulations governing the commercial trucking industry. In particular, 49 C.F.R.
§ 396.9(a) provides: “Every special agent of the [FMCSA] . . . is authorized to enter upon
and perform inspections of a motor carrier’s vehicles in operation and intermodal
equipment in operation.” The regulation goes on to require that the inspector use a
particular report to record the results of motor vehicle and intermodal equipment
inspections, which report covers equipment such as the parking brake, steering mechanism,
lighting devices and reflectors, tires, horn, wheels and rims, and so forth. 49 C.F.R.
§§ 396.9(b), 396.11. The driver must then deliver the report to the motor carrier or
equipment provider, who must examine the report and correct violations or defects. Id.§ 396.9(d).
10
While Section 396.9(a) appears to authorize warrantless inspections of a motor
carrier’s vehicles in operation, the problem for the Government is that Officer Alto did not
stop Feliciana pursuant to this or any other FMCSA regulation. He never suggested as
much to Feliciana during the stop or at the suppression hearing, and the Government does
not argue otherwise on appeal. As the Government admits in its brief, Officer Alto stopped
Feliciana “to determine whether [he] had the requisite permits to drive on the Parkway,”
as required by the NPS regulations. Response Br. 26.
The Government observes that other courts of appeals, citing the FMCSA
regulations and state statutes, have held that commercial trucking is a pervasively regulated
industry subject to Burger’s administrative inspection exception. See United States v.
Delgado, 545 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Maldonado, 356 F.3d 130,
135 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir.
2001); United States v. Fort, 248 F.3d 475, 480 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d 464, 468 (6th Cir. 1991). That may be true, but here it puts
the cart before the horse. In every case on which the Government relies, the officer actually
stopped or searched the defendant’s truck as part of an administrative inspection pursuant
to statutory or regulatory authority. See Delgado, 545 F.3d at 1198; Maldonado, 356 F.3d
at 132; Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d at 1209; Fort, 248 F.3d at 478; Dominguez-Prieto, 923
F.2d at 466. That is not the case here. Our analysis therefore ends before we reach the
question whether commercial trucking is a pervasively regulated industry, because Officer
Alto was not acting pursuant to commercial trucking regulations when he stopped
Feliciana’s vehicle.
11
In other words, the Government cannot justify the constitutionality of this traffic
stop by relying on a regulatory scheme that was not the basis for the stop. Doing so would
render Burger’s criteria for assessing constitutionality a farce. Each of those criteria is
rightly applied to “the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made.”
Burger, 482 U.S. at 702; see id. at 703 (focusing on the scope and limits of the particular
statute authorizing the inspection); LeSueur-Richmond Slate Corp. v. Fehrer, 666 F.3d 261,
264–265 (4th Cir. 2012) (same). For example, Burger asks whether “the statute’s
inspection program” “advise[s] the owner of the commercial premises that the search is
being made pursuant to the law and has a properly defined scope” and whether it “limit[s]
the discretion of the inspecting officers.” Burger, 482 U.S. at 703 (internal quotation marks
omitted). It makes no sense for us to assess whether Section 369.9(a) and related FMCSA
regulations satisfy these criteria in the abstract when they were not the basis for the stop
here.
Furthermore, an inspection pursuant to Section 369.9(a) may be conducted only by
a “special agent of the FMCSA,” and nothing in the record indicates that Officer Alto is
such an agent. 49 C.F.R. § 396.9(a); see id. Ch. III, Subch. B, App. B(3) (“Special agents
are [FMCSA] employees who are identified by credentials issued by the FMCSA
authorizing them to enforce [relevant statutes and regulations].”); see, e.g., Maldonado,
356 F.3d at 132 (noting that the patrolman in that case was also an agent of the FMCSA
authorized to conduct inspections under these regulations and to carry the requisite
inspection forms). Officer Alto testified that he was “certified as a federal commercial
vehicle inspector,” J.A. 59, but the Government does not suggest that credential, or any
12
other, qualified Officer Alto as a special agent of the FMCSA authorized to conduct
inspections pursuant to these regulations. And, despite the Government’s argument to the
contrary, it should go without saying that the officer conducting an administrative
inspection must be authorized by the relevant statute or regulation to do so. See Burger,
482 U.S. at 717 (noting that the state statute permitted “police officers . . . to conduct the
. . . inspection” at issue). The Government has failed to carry its burden to show that
Officer Alto was so authorized.
Unlike the Government, the district court focused its Burger analysis on NPS
regulations, finding that the Parkway “constitutes a ‘pervasively regulated’ federal enclave
subject to specific rules and regulations.” J.A. 202. Setting aside the question whether a
federal enclave could qualify as a “pervasively regulated business” under Burger’s
framework for analyzing warrantless inspections of commercial premises, 482 U.S. at 702,
neither the district court nor the Government has identified any regulation authorizing a
warrantless stop for a permit check under NPS regulations. The district court noted that
state traffic laws apply on the Parkway and that a Virginia regulation authorizes “[l]aw-
enforcement officers specifically designated by the superintendent [of the Virginia State
Police]” to inspect motor carrier vehicles and intermodal equipment in operation,
incorporating Section 396.9(a). 19 Va. Admin. Code § 30-20-230; see id. § 30-20-10
(defining “superintendent”). The Government, however, disavows reliance on state law,
Response Br. 24 n.10, and use of this state regulation suffers from infirmities similar to
those associated with Section 396.9(a): there is no evidence Officer Alto was designated
by the superintendent of the Virginia State Police to conduct such inspections or that those
13
inspections authorize enforcement of the federal NPS permit requirement. The
Government cites a statute generally authorizing park police officers to investigate federal
offenses and make arrests without warrants for federal offenses committed in their
presence, see 54 U.S.C. § 102701(a)(2), but that provision plainly does not authorize stops
or inspections to enforce park regulations without warrants or suspicion.
Nor can the combination of these regulatory schemes remedy their individual
deficits. The Government’s effort to combine the FMCSA regulations and NPS regulations
for its Burger analysis does not solve the basic problem that it has failed to identify any
statute or regulation “pursuant to which the [stop] [wa]s made.” Burger, 482 U.S. at 702.
Moreover, the NPS permit regulations are detached from the government’s interest in
regulating commercial trucking. Commercial trucks are swept within the ambit of the
permit regulations via the category of “commercial vehicles,” which also applies
nonexclusively to “station wagons, pickups, passenger cars or other vehicles.” 36 C.F.R.
§ 5.6(b). Sections 5.6(b) and 7.96(f) are no more commercial trucking regulations than are
any generally applicable traffic laws. In these circumstances, we reject the Government’s
effort to graft the two regulatory schemes together in order to satisfy Burger’s criteria.
Indeed, even if we accepted the Government’s regulatory mash-up, it would fail
Burger’s third requirement that the program “provide a constitutionally adequate substitute
for a warrant.” Burger, 482 U.S. at 703 (internal quotation marks omitted). One of the
basic functions of a warrant is to advise the property owner that the search is being
conducted pursuant to the law and has a properly defined scope. Id. To perform this
function, the statute or regulation “must be sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the
14
owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to
periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes.” Id. at 703 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see LeSueur-Richmond Slate Corp., 666 F.3d at 265. Even considering together
all of the various regulations cited by the Government, the driver of a commercial vehicle
on the Parkway would have no notice that he could be stopped for a suspicionless permit
check—the specific purpose of the stop at issue here. The regulations thus are no substitute
for a warrant in these circumstances.
III.
In sum, the Government has failed to show that Officer Alto possessed reasonable
suspicion of illegality when he stopped Feliciana’s truck or that he acted pursuant to an
administrative inspection scheme in conducting the stop. Because the initial traffic stop
violated the Fourth Amendment, any evidence obtained from it, including the marijuana
found in Feliciana’s shoe, should have been suppressed. United States v. Brown, 401 F.3d
588, 592 (4th Cir. 2005); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 694 (1982). We therefore
reverse the district court’s denial of Feliciana’s suppression motion, vacate his possession
conviction, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED, VACATED, AND REMANDED
15