United States v. Cordario Crowder ( 2020 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-4006
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CORDARIO ARTEZ CROWDER, a/k/a Tony Crowder,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, Chief District Judge. (3:19-00027-GMG-RWT-1)
Submitted: September 22, 2020 Decided: September 24, 2020
Before NIEMEYER, KEENAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Tracy Weese, Shepherdstown, West Virginia, for Appellant. Kimberly DeAnne Crockett,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Cordario Crowder pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to conspiracy
to commit false statement during the purchase of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 371, 922(a)(6). The district court sentenced Crowder to 60 months’ imprisonment. On
appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal and reviewing the relevant
proceedings. Although notified of his right to do, Crowder has not filed a pro se
supplemental brief. The Government declined to file a brief and did not move to enforce
the appellate waiver in Crowder’s plea agreement. ∗ We affirm the district court’s
judgment.
Prior to accepting a guilty plea, a court must conduct a plea colloquy in which it
informs the defendant of, and determines that the defendant understands, the nature of the
charge to which he is pleading guilty, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the
various rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United
States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016). The court also must ensure that the
defendant’s plea is voluntary, supported by a sufficient factual basis, and not the result of
force, threats, or extrinsic promises. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2)-(3); Williams, 811 F.3d at
622; see also United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991). Our review
∗
Because the Government has not moved to enforce the appellate waiver, we can
conduct a full review pursuant to Anders. See United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263,
271 (4th Cir. 2007).
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of the record establishes that the magistrate judge conducted a thorough and complete Rule
11 colloquy and that Crowder’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.
We review a sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Under this standard, a sentence is reviewed for both
procedural and substantive reasonableness. Id. at 51. In determining procedural
reasonableness, we consider, among other things, whether the district court properly
calculated the defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines range. Id. If a sentence is free of
“significant procedural error,” then we review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing]
into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. “Any sentence that is within or below
a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” United States v.
Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).
At sentencing, the district court adopted Crowder’s correctly calculated advisory
Guidelines range, provided an opportunity for the parties to argue for an appropriate
sentence, and afforded Crowder an opportunity to allocute. The court heard and considered
but ultimately rejected counsel’s arguments for a downward departure in light of Crowder’s
extensive criminal history. Finally, in explaining the sentence, the court weighed the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors it deemed most relevant, particularly Crowder’s personal history,
the serious nature of the offense, and the protection of the public from further crimes. We
conclude that Crowder has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness that we afford
his within-Guidelines-range sentence. Thus, Crowder’s sentence is procedurally and
substantively reasonable.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious issues for review. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
We deny counsel’s motion to withdraw at this juncture. This court requires that counsel
inform Crowder, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States
for further review. If Crowder requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served
on Crowder.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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