Stewart v. University of North Carolina System ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-1552
FENYANG AJAMU STEWART,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA SYSTEM; NORTH CAROLINA
AGRICULTURAL & TECHNICAL STATE UNIVERSITY; NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF AEROSPACE ASSOCIATES, INC.; WILLIAM EDMONSON,
NIA Distinguished Langley Professor, Full Professor, North
Carolina A&T State University; JOHN KELLY, Chairman;
ELECTRIC AND COMPUTER ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT, NORTH CAROLINA
A&T STATE UNIVERSITY; CATHY HOPKINS, Human Resources
Director, National Institute of Aerospace,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony J. Trenga,
District Judge. (1:15-cv-01487-AJT-JFA)
Submitted: November 29, 2016 Decided: December 12, 2016
Before WYNN, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Fenyang Ajamu Stewart, Appellant Pro Se. Matthew Thomas
Tulchin, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North
Carolina; Eve Grandis Campbell, O’HAGAN MEYER PLLC, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Fenyang Ajamu Stewart appeals the district court’s order
dismissing his civil rights complaint and its orders denying his
motions for reconsideration. Stewart’s complaint alleged claims
against two groups of defendants — the National Institute of
Aerospace Associates, Inc. (“NIA”) and Cathy Hopkins, NIA’s
Director of Human Resources (collectively, “NIA defendants”),
and the University of North Carolina System, North Carolina
Agricultural & Technical State University (“NC A&T”), William
Edmonson, and John Kelly (collectively, “North Carolina
defendants”). We vacate the district court’s order dismissing
Counts 2 through 4 of Stewart’s amended complaint as to the NIA
defendants, affirm the district court’s orders in all other
respects, and remand for further proceedings.
The district court concluded that Stewart’s claims against
the North Carolina defendants were barred by Eleventh Amendment
immunity. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of an
action under the Eleventh Amendment. Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys.,
773 F.3d 536, 542 (4th Cir. 2014). Stewart concedes that the
Supreme Court has found that such claims are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341
(1979). While Stewart contends that the Supreme Court erred in
so ruling, we are bound to follow Supreme Court precedent. Stop
Reckless Econ. Instability Caused by Democrats v. Fed. Election
3
Comm’n, 814 F.3d 221, 230-31 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, S.
Ct. , No. 16-109, 2016 WL 4001325 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2016).
Accordingly, we affirm the portions of the district court’s
order dismissing the North Carolina defendants, as well as the
district court’s orders denying Stewart’s motions for
reconsideration.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), accepting factual
allegations in the complaint as true and “draw[ing] all
reasonable inferences in favor of the [nonmoving party].”
Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Montgomery Cty., 684 F.3d
462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). To
survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint’s “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level” and sufficient “to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). A court may dismiss on the grounds
of a statute of limitations defense if the necessary facts
“clearly appear on the face of the complaint.” Waugh Chapel S.,
LLC v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 27, 728 F.3d
354, 360 (4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Stewart contends that the district court erred in
dismissing Counts 2 and 3 of the amended complaint, asserting
4
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012) against the NIA defendants,
because the federal four-year statute of limitations applies.
We agree. Generally, § 1981 claims are governed by the most
analogous state statute of limitations. James v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 370 F.3d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 2004). The district
court applied this general rule and found Virginia’s two-year
statute of limitations applicable. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-
243(A) (2015). However, if a claim is based on § 1981(b), which
covers “claims based on conduct occurring after the formation of
the contractual relationship,” then the federal four-year
statute of limitations applies. James, 370 F.3d at 421.
We conclude that Stewart’s claims in Counts 2 and 3 are
based on postformation conduct, and thus the four-year statute
of limitations applies. See Buntin v. City of Boston, 813 F.3d
401, 405 (1st Cir. 2015) (applying four-year statute of
limitations to retaliation claim under § 1981); White v. BFI
Waste Servs., LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 292 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding
that hostile work environment claims are subject to four-year
statute of limitations). Because these claims concern events
that occurred in 2012 and Stewart filed his complaint in October
2015, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing
these claims as time-barred.
Stewart next contends that the district court erred in
dismissing Count 4 of the amended complaint, which he alleges
5
was brought under § 1981(b), and not under Virginia law as the
district court concluded. We agree. Count 4 of Stewart’s claim
cited § 1981 and alleged that the NIA defendants did not pay him
an adequate stipend and removed him from his doctoral program on
the basis of his race. We conclude that the district court
should have analyzed the claim under § 1981 and not Virginia
law. Thus, we vacate the district court’s order dismissing
Count 4 against the NIA defendants, and remand for further
consideration of this claim.
Finally, Stewart contends that the district court erred in
dismissing his claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 to 1968 (2012). We
conclude that the district court correctly dismissed this claim,
as Stewart’s allegations of racial discrimination do not
constitute a predicate act of racketeering under RICO. US
Airline Pilots Ass’n v. Awappa, LLC, 615 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir.
2010) (“To state a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must allege
that the defendants engaged in, or conspired to engage in, a
pattern of racketeering activity.” (internal quotation marks
omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (defining racketeering
activity).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders, with
the exception of the court’s disposition of Counts 2 through 4
of Stewart’s amended complaint against the NIA defendants. As
6
to those claims, we vacate the district court’s dismissal and
remand for further proceedings. We further deny Stewart’s
motion to appoint counsel and to participate in oral argument.
By this opinion, we express no view on the merits of Stewart’s
claims against the NIA defendants. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
7