Marsha Ferira v. State Farm Fire and Casualty ( 2020 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-1716
MARSHA A. FERIRA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Charleston. Richard Mark Gergel, District Judge. (2:18-cv-00412-RMG)
Submitted: February 27, 2020 Decided: March 24, 2020
Before KING, KEENAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Andrew K. Epting, Jr., Jaan G. Rannik, ANDREW K. EPTING, JR., LLC, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Charles R. Norris, NELSON MULLINS RILEY &
SCARBOROUGH LLP, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Marsha A. Ferira appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to
her home insurance carrier, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“State Farm”), on her
complaint seeking reimbursement for the cost of replacing the roof of her house. On
appeal, Ferira argues that her homeowner’s policy covered certain storm-related damages
to her roof and, in any event, that State Farm should be estopped from denying coverage
based on misleading statements made by one of its claims adjustors. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
“We review de novo a district court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary
judgment, construing all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the
nonmoving party.” Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 886 F.3d 346, 353 (4th Cir.
2018). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
By its terms, Ferira’s insurance policy did not cover any loss consisting of wear,
tear, deterioration, or rot. On this point, the record is replete with evidence that parts of
the roof had deteriorated or rotted, and, indeed, Ferira concedes that rot was discovered
during an inspection of her roof. Nevertheless, Ferira points to the deposition of State
Farm’s corporate designee, who testified that, if an insured suffers a loss for which there is
a covered cause and an excluded cause, the insured is entitled to partial coverage. Based
on this understanding of the policy, Ferira maintains that she needed to prove only that the
storm was a cause—rather than the cause—of the damage to her roof. We cannot agree.
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Under the operative state law, a court interpreting a contract may look to extrinsic
evidence only if the contract is ambiguous—i.e., if “its terms are capable of having more
than one meaning when viewed by a reasonably intelligent person who has examined the
entire agreement.” Progressive Max Ins. Co. v. Floating Caps, Inc., 747 S.E.2d 178, 184
(S.C. 2013). Conversely, if a contract’s language is plain and unambiguous, then outside
evidence is inadmissible to aid the agreement’s construction. Id.
We do not discern, and Ferira makes no attempt to identify, any ambiguity in the
relevant provision of the insurance policy. As a result, “no statements regarding the terms
of [the policy] may be used to vary [its] otherwise clear meaning.” Callawassie Island
Members Club, Inc. v. Dennis, 821 S.E.2d 667, 672 (S.C. 2018). Thus, applying the
policy’s plain language, we conclude that the existence of roof rot and other deterioration
precluded Ferira from recovering under the policy for the damage to her roof.
Alternatively, Ferira asserts that, based on a claims adjustor’s misguided assurance
that her roof would be covered, State Farm cannot now disclaim liability for the cost of
replacing her roof. “To claim equitable estoppel, a party must show: (1) a lack of
knowledge and the means of knowledge of truth as to facts in question; (2) justifiable
reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped; and (3) prejudicial change in the position
of the party claiming estoppel.” Clear Channel Outdoor v. City of Myrtle Beach, 642
S.E.2d 565, 568 (S.C. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Several days after the claims adjustor allegedly misadvised Ferira that her roof
would be covered, State Farm sent her a letter and coverage estimate indicating that the
roof damage was an excluded loss. In spite of this disclaimer, Ferira proceeded to replace
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her roof, then requested reimbursement from State Farm, which refused to approve her
claim. Given that State Farm’s subsequent written communications with Ferira flatly
contradicted the claims adjustor’s purported guarantee of coverage, we conclude that any
reliance on the claims adjustor’s misstatement was unreasonable, thus defeating Ferira’s
claim of equitable estoppel.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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