Sharon Davis v. Town of Tazewell, Virginia ( 2021 )


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  •                                     UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 19-2371
    SHARON LYNN DAVIS,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    TOWN OF TAZEWELL, VIRGINIA,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
    Abingdon. James P. Jones, District Judge. (1:18-cv-00030-JPJ-PMS)
    Submitted: December 28, 2020                                      Decided: January 21, 2021
    Before MOTZ, KING, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Thomas E. Strelka, L. Leigh R. Strelka, N. Winston West, IV, STRELKA LAW OFFICE,
    PC, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. W. Bradford Stallard, Karissa H. Range, PENN,
    STUART & ESKRIDGE, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    In 2015, the Town of Tazewell, Virginia (“the Town”), hired Sharon Lynn Davis
    for the position of Town Treasurer. Less than two years later, the Town Manager, Todd
    Day, demoted Davis, prompting her to resign. According to Davis, her demotion and
    constructive discharge resulted from Day’s discriminatory animus toward women, as
    evidenced by, among other things, her lower salary relative to another department head,
    Travis Barbee. The Town, on the other hand, considered the demotion justified based on
    Davis’ frequent salary complaints and her unauthorized decision to leave early from an
    important meeting.
    Following her resignation, Davis commenced this action against the Town, alleging
    gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
    1964, as amended (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. The district court granted
    summary judgment to the Town, and, for the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    “We review de novo a district court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary
    judgment, construing all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the
    nonmoving party.” Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 
    886 F.3d 346
    , 353 (4th Cir.
    2018). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
    dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
    2
    Under the familiar McDonnell Douglas ∗ framework, a plaintiff alleging
    discrimination bears “the initial burden of proving . . . her prima facie case by a
    preponderance of the evidence.” Abilt v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 
    848 F.3d 305
    , 315 (4th
    Cir. 2017). If the plaintiff makes this showing, “[t]he burden of production then shifts to
    the employer to . . . provide some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
    employment action.” Sharif v. United Airlines, Inc., 
    841 F.3d 199
    , 203 (4th Cir. 2016)
    (internal quotation marks omitted). If the employer satisfies this requirement, “the plaintiff
    resumes the burden of persuading the factfinder that the employer’s proffered explanation
    is merely a pretext for discrimination.” 
    Id.
    “To establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, a plaintiff must show:
    (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse
    employment action; and (4) that similarly-situated employees outside the protected class
    received more favorable treatment.” Gerner v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 
    674 F.3d 264
    , 266 (4th
    Cir. 2012) (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). Under the fourth prong, “the
    plaintiff must provide evidence that the proposed comparators are not just similar in some
    respects, but similarly-situated in all respects.” Spencer v. Virginia State Univ., 
    919 F.3d 199
    , 207 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 
    140 S. Ct. 381
     (2019).
    Relevant considerations include “whether the employees (i) held the same job description,
    (ii) were subject to the same standards, (iii) were subordinate to the same supervisor, and
    (iv) had comparable experience, education, and other qualifications—provided the
    ∗
    McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
     (1973).
    3
    employer considered these latter factors in making the personnel decision.” 
    Id.
     (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    Relying on Barbee as her sole comparator, Davis underscores that she received a
    much lower salary than Barbee, even though they occupied equivalent positions in the
    Town’s chain of command. But unlike Davis, Barbee had previously worked in local
    government, an experience that Day found highly desirable. In addition, Barbee enjoyed
    substantial leverage in the hiring process, as he filled a position that had been vacant for
    roughly six months, thereby allowing him to request a highly competitive salary.
    Conversely, Davis, who overlapped with the outgoing Town Treasurer, felt that she could
    not negotiate her salary because the Town had been considering another candidate. Thus,
    in light of the candidates’ prior experience, the competition for their respective positions,
    and the opportunity—or lack thereof—to negotiate compensation, we conclude that Davis
    was not similarly situated to Barbee. Consequently, Davis cannot establish a prima facie
    case of gender discrimination.
    Turning to Davis’ retaliation claim, “[a] prima facie case of retaliation requires
    proof that: (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse
    employment action, and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity
    and the adverse action.” Ray v. Int’l Paper Co., 
    909 F.3d 661
    , 669 (4th Cir. 2018).
    According to Davis, Day demoted her because she registered a genuine grievance
    concerning gender-based pay disparity. Davis, however, fails to identify any evidence
    substantiating her claim that, in complaining to Day, she intimated her belief that he was
    engaging in unlawful discrimination. And although Davis suggests otherwise, we cannot
    4
    agree that gender bias is part and parcel of any employment dispute involving unequal
    treatment of coworkers who happen to be of the opposite sex. Thus, because Davis has not
    shown that she tied her salary complaints to accusations of gender discrimination, we
    conclude that she fails to establish that she engaged in a protected activity, thereby
    defeating her retaliation claim.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
    argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
    before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-2371

Filed Date: 1/21/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/21/2021