Edward Gelin v. Kyle Shuman ( 2021 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-1141
EDWARD GELIN; DEBORAH GELIN, as personal representatives of the Estate
of Ashleigh Gelin, and for themselves,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
KYLE SHUMAN, individually and as an agent/employee of Baltimore County,
Maryland; ROSELOR SAINT FLEUR, individually and as an agent/employee of
Baltimore County, Maryland; VICTORIA TITUS, individually and as an
agent/employee of Baltimore County, Maryland; JENNIFER SEVIER, individually
and as an agent/employee of Baltimore County, Maryland; DIANE BAHR,
individually and as an agent/employee of Baltimore County, Maryland,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
JAY R. FISHER, Sheriff of Baltimore County, individually and in his representative
capacity; JOHN DOE 1-10; CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC; BALTIMORE
COUNTY, MARYLAND; JOHN AND JANE DOES, 1-8; MICHAEL
SALISBURY, II, individually and in his official capacity; MICHELLE RAWLINS,
individually and in her official capacity; NICHOLAS QUISGUARD, individually
and in his official capacity; MYESHA WHITE, individually and in her official
capacity; JOSEPH LUX, individually and his official capacity; GREGORY
LIGHTNER, individually and in his official capacity; CARL LUCKETT,
individually and in his official capacity; DEBORAH J. RICHARDSON, Director of
Baltimore County Detention Center, individually and as an agent/employee of
Baltimore County, Maryland,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
George L. Russell, III, District Judge; Albert David Copperthite, Magistrate Judge.
(1:16-cv-03694-ADC)
Submitted: January 14, 2021 Decided: January 26, 2021
Before THACKER and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Steven R. Freeman, Lee B. Rauch, FREEMAN RAUCH, LLC, Towson, Maryland, for
Appellants. Eric M. Rigatuso, Lauren E. Marini, ECCLESTON & WOLF, P.C., Hanover,
Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Edward Gelin and Deborah Gelin (the “Gelins”), individually and as personal
representatives of the Estate of Ashleigh Gelin, appeal from the district court’s August 1,
2018 memorandum order granting Appellees’ motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(m), 12(b)(5), and from the magistrate judge’s April 9, 2019 memorandum opinion and
order denying the Gelins’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion. * On January 31, 2020, the
magistrate judge entered an order granting the Gelins’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) motion and
certifying the August 1, 2018 memorandum order and the April 9, 2019 memorandum
opinion and order as a final judgment. Because the January 31, 2020 certification order
entered pursuant to Rule 54(b) is deficient in two significant respects, we dismiss this
appeal.
We have an independent duty to confirm that a Rule 54(b) certification is proper
and that we may exercise appellate jurisdiction predicated thereon. Braswell Shipyards,
Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1334-35 (4th Cir. 1993). We generally review a Rule
54(b) certification for abuse of discretion. MCI Constructors, LLC v. City of Greensboro,
610 F.3d 849, 855 (4th Cir. 2010).
We have explained that “a Rule 54(b) certification involves two steps.” Braswell
Shipyards, Inc., 2 F.3d at 1335. “First, the district court must determine whether the
judgment is final.” Id. A judgment is final for Rule 54(b) purposes when it constitutes “an
*
After the district court entered the August 1, 2018 memorandum order, the parties
consented to proceed before the magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
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ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims
action.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Second, the district court must determine
whether there is no just reason for the delay in the entry of judgment.” Id. In determining
whether there is no just reason for delaying the entry of judgment, we have instructed
district courts to assess a number of factors. Id. at 1335-36. When conducting the two-step
certification process under Rule 54(b), a district court is obliged to state the findings that
support certification on the record or in the certification order. Id. at 1336.
In these proceedings, the magistrate judge’s Rule 54(b) certification order is
significantly deficient in two respects. First, the certification order does not contain an
express determination that there is no just reason for delaying the entry of judgment. The
language of Rule 54(b) and our precedent interpreting the Rule are clear, however, that the
magistrate judge was required to make such an express determination before certification.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (“[T]he court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or
more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there
is no just reason for delay.”); Braswell Shipyards, Inc., 2 F.3d at 1335 (ruling that district
court “must determine” that there is no just reason for delaying entry of judgment). Second,
contrary to our precedents, the certification order does not contain any findings or rationale
in support of the Rule 54(b) certification. See Culosi v. Bullock, 596 F.3d 195, 203-04 (4th
Cir. 2010); Braswell Shipyards, Inc., 2 F.3d at 1336.
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In light of the defects in the Rule 54(b) certification order, we dismiss the appeal.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
DISMISSED
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