Enovative Technologies, LLC v. Gabriel Leor ( 2021 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-1911
ENOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GABRIEL REUVEN LEOR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
James K. Bredar, Chief District Judge. (1:14-cv-03956-JKB)
Submitted: February 11, 2021 Decided: February 22, 2021
Before NIEMEYER and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gabriel Reuven Leor, Appellant Pro Se. Lori Vaughn Ebersohl, APATOFF PETERS
EBERSOHL, Falls Church, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gabriel Reuven Leor appeals from the district court’s July 24, 2020 order denying
his motion to purge his civil contempt. On appeal, Leor primarily contends that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the civil contempt orders against him.
Enovative Technologies, LLC (“Enovative”) asks us to dismiss Leor’s appeal based on the
fugitive disentitlement doctrine. Enovative also requests a prefiling injunction against Leor
and an award of attorney’s fees. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss Leor’s appeal,
deny Enovative’s prefiling injunction request, and deny without prejudice Enovative’s
attorney’s fees request.
Pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, we possess the discretion to dismiss
the appeal of a defendant who is a fugitive during the pendency of the appeal.
Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 239 (1993). The doctrine applies to
appeals in both civil and criminal proceedings. Jaffe v. Accredited Sur. & Cas., 294 F.3d
584, 597 (4th Cir. 2002). Generally, in order to dismiss an appeal in a civil case based on
the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, there must be “a substantial nexus between a litigant’s
fugitive status and the issue before the court.” Id.Other federal courts of appeals have concluded that the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine may be used to dismiss an appeal from a party in a civil case who is a fugitive and
whose fugitive status stems from an arrest warrant issued after a civil contempt finding in
the same proceedings. See Pesin v. Rodriguez, 244 F.3d 1250, 1253 (11th Cir. 2001);
Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Finkelstein, 111 F.3d 278, 280-82 (2d Cir. 1997).
Notably, several of our sister circuits have applied the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to
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dismiss a civil defendant’s appellate challenge to a district court’s subject matter
jurisdiction to enter a civil contempt order. See, e.g., Goya Foods, Inc. v. Unanue-Casal,
275 F.3d 124, 128-31 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Barnette, 129 F.3d 1179, 1185-86
(11th Cir. 1997).
Here, Leor contends that he is not a fugitive within the meaning of the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine. We disagree. The district court entered two civil contempt orders
against Leor and issued a bench warrant for Leor’s arrest. Leor—a United States citizen
who resided in this country until the time that this litigation was initiated—has remained
overseas avoiding arrest pursuant to that warrant. * Leor is thus a fugitive for purposes of
the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. See Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 366, 366 (1970)
(per curiam); In re Kupperstein, 943 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 2019). Furthermore, because
Leor’s fugitive status stems from civil contempt orders and an arrest warrant entered in this
litigation, we are satisfied that the requisite “substantial nexus” exists. Jaffe, 294 F.3d at
597; see Goya Foods, Inc., 275 F.3d at 128-31; Pesin, 244 F.3d at 1253; Finkelstein, 111
F.3d at 280-82. Accordingly, we exercise our discretion to dismiss this appeal based on
the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.
*
At the initiation of these proceedings, Leor represented to the district court that he
was on vacation in Thailand and that he planned to return to the United States. Leor has
not returned to the United States. Leor later complained to the district court about
restrictions on his travel to the United States while a warrant for his arrest is outstanding,
which suggests that he wishes to return to this country but refuses to do so based on the
arrest warrant.
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With respect to Enovative’s remaining requests, we decline to enter a prefiling
injunction against Leor at this time. See Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812,
818 (4th Cir. 2004) (specifying factors to be considered before imposing prefiling
injunction). We also deny without prejudice Enovative’s request for attorney’s fees.
Enovative’s attorney’s fees request does not comply with Fourth Circuit Local Rule 46(e),
which requires an application for an award of attorney’s fees to include “a detailed
itemization of the amounts requested.”
In sum, we dismiss the appeal, deny Enovative’s request for a prefiling injunction,
and deny without prejudice Enovative’s request for attorney’s fees. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
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