United States v. Steven Helton , 782 F.3d 148 ( 2015 )


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  •                                PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 13-4412
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff − Appellee,
    v.
    STEVEN RUSSELL HELTON,
    Defendant − Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
    District of West Virginia, at Beckley.      Irene C. Berger,
    District Judge. (5:12-cr-00134-1)
    Argued:   December 11, 2014                 Decided:   April 2, 2015
    Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by published opinion.       Judge Wilkinson wrote the
    opinion, in which Judge Gregory and Judge Duncan joined. Judge
    Gregory wrote a separate concurring opinion.
    ARGUED: Jonathan D. Byrne, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
    DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Lisa Grimes
    Johnston, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West
    Virginia, for Appellee.   ON BRIEF: Mary Lou Newberger, Federal
    Public Defender, David R. Bungard, Assistant Federal Public
    Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston,
    West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II, United States
    Attorney, William B. King, II, Assistant United States Attorney,
    OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia,
    for Appellee.
    WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
    Appellant Steven Helton pled guilty to one count of knowing
    possession       of    child     pornography         in    violation          of    18    U.S.C.
    §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2252A(b)(2). He was sentenced to 60 months
    in prison followed by a lifetime term of supervised release.
    Helton    now    appeals.      The     question       presented        to    this    court      is
    whether,    given       the    facts    of     this    case,      a    lifetime          term   of
    supervised release is procedurally and substantively reasonable.
    For the following reasons, we think it is and now affirm.
    I.
    In October 2010, Sergeant D.C. Eldridge, a member of the
    West    Virginia       Internet       Crimes       Against     Children           Task    Force,
    determined       that     a      computer      near       Beckley,          West     Virginia,
    contained       several       child    pornography         videos       accessed         through
    peer-to-peer          software    that       the    Task     Force          was    monitoring.
    Sergeant Eldridge, with assistance from the FBI, identified the
    subscriber to the IP address associated with the computer as
    Barbie Helton of Beaver, West Virginia. On December 29, 2010,
    investigators executed a search warrant on the Helton residence
    where Ms. Helton lived with her son, Steven. As part of this
    initial     search,       Sergeant       Eldridge         discovered         several       files
    containing child pornography on Steven Helton’s computer.
    Defendant,        after     being      advised        of       his     constitutional
    rights, gave a recorded statement to law enforcement, explaining
    2
    that he regularly viewed adult and child pornography and would
    download,     view,     and    then    delete      images,    and     then   return    to
    download more images. Forensic investigators found a total of
    961 individual images of child pornography on the hard drive of
    the    computer,      although    only       42   were   actively     accessible      for
    viewing    at    the    time     of    the    search.    In    the    course    of    his
    interview, Helton admitted to downloading some of the images
    onto his iPod for personal use, but denied trading or sharing
    child pornography with any other users.
    Many     of    the     images     found      by   investigators         were   of
    prepubescent         minors    engaged       in   sexual      acts,    exhibition      of
    genitals, or bondage, and at least one depicted a child engaged
    in sadistic or masochistic acts. Helton explained that he had
    been sexually abused by his stepfather when he was a child, and
    that he had sought treatment in the past but had been unable to
    stop viewing child pornography. He also admitted that he had
    been caught viewing child pornography while he was a juvenile in
    foster care and that he had been removed from a foster family
    for sexually abusing a three-year old when he was thirteen years
    old.
    On June 12, 2012, a federal grand jury in the Southern
    District of West Virginia issued a two-count indictment against
    Helton    for    knowing      receipt    and      knowing     possession     of   child
    pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2), (a)(5)(B),
    3
    and 2252A(b)(1)-(2). Helton pled guilty to one count of knowing
    possession     of   child       pornography         in    violation       of   18    U.S.C.
    §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B)         and     2252A(b)(2).             The     maximum      term     of
    imprisonment      under   the     statute      is    ten     years.      See   18    U.S.C.
    §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), 2252A(b)(2). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), the
    court must impose a term of supervised release of at least five
    years and up to life for crimes under § 2252A.
    The    presentence        investigation            report,    prepared        by   the
    probation office, recommended a Guidelines range of 78 to 97
    months of imprisonment based on a total offense level of 28 and
    a criminal history category of I. The district court adopted the
    presentence investigation report, after thoroughly reviewing it
    at   the    sentencing     hearing.      See        J.A.    168-72.       It   noted     the
    statutory     maximum       and    walked       the        defendant       through       the
    Guidelines     calculations.        As    the        trial       judge     explained,     a
    violation of § 2252A(a)(5)(B) has a Base Offense Level of 18.
    See 
    id. at 170;
    see also U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(a)(1). A two-level
    enhancement was added for using a computer to search for and
    access child pornography. In addition, two levels were added for
    material that depicts a prepubescent minor under the age of 12
    and an additional four levels for material portraying sadistic
    or   masochistic    conduct.       Lastly,      a    five-level       enhancement        was
    added because the offense involved 600 or more images. Helton
    received      a     three-level          reduction           for         acceptance      of
    4
    responsibility, bringing his total offense level to 28. Because
    this was his first conviction, his criminal history category, as
    noted, was I.
    At the sentencing hearing, neither party objected to the
    Guidelines       calculation         included         in   the     presentence         report,
    although the defendant provided a comment by way of additional
    explanation that the majority of images were not sadistic or
    masochistic in nature. See J.A. 158-59.                           The sentencing judge
    noted objections from the defense regarding several of the more
    onerous conditions of supervised release and agreed to remove
    some of the more burdensome terms where not applicable to the
    nature     and    circumstances             of       Helton’s      offense.          She   also
    considered the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and heard
    argument from both the government and defense counsel regarding
    the appropriate sentence for Helton. See 
    id. at 172-91.
    Helton
    also made a statement directly to the court. See 
    id. at 198-99.
    At   the    conclusion          of    his    statement,           the    court       sentenced
    defendant    to     a    term    of    60    months        imprisonment,         a    downward
    departure    from       the   Guidelines         range,     and    a    lifetime      term   of
    supervised release, comprised of a number of conditions specific
    to the defendant, including treatment for both substance abuse
    and psychosexual mental health.                  This appeal followed.
    5
    II.
    This court reviews a sentence imposed by a district court
    for reasonableness. See United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    ,
    261 (2005). Sentencing is the province of the district court and
    in reviewing the chosen sentence, we consider only whether the
    sentencing judge abused her discretion rather than whether this
    court   would     impose   the   same   sentence    on     a    defendant    in   the
    appellant’s position. See Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51
    (2007). This court will affirm a sentence when it is “within the
    statutorily prescribed range and is reasonable.” United States
    v. Hughes, 
    401 F.3d 540
    , 547 (4th Cir. 2005). Defendant contests
    only his term of supervised release, arguing that the lifetime
    term is procedurally and substantively unreasonable and should
    be vacated.
    Even   though   the   Sentencing       Guidelines       are   now   advisory,
    district courts “must consult those Guidelines and take them
    into    account    when    sentencing.”       
    Booker, 543 U.S. at 264
    .   A
    sentence within the Guidelines range is presumed on appeal to be
    substantively reasonable. See Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 347 (2007). Here, the lifetime term of supervised release
    was within both the Guidelines range and the statutory maximum.
    See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b). However, that does
    not end the inquiry. For a sentence to be procedurally sound, a
    district judge must also consider the factors outlined in 18
    6
    U.S.C. § 3553(a) and “articulate the reasons for selecting the
    particular        sentence,    especially        explaining      why    [any]     sentence
    outside     of    the     Sentencing   Guideline         range     better      serves    the
    relevant sentencing purposes set forth in § 3553(a).” United
    States v. Green, 
    436 F.3d 449
    , 456 (4th Cir. 2006).
    A.
    Helton       contends     that    his      lifetime     term       of     supervised
    release is procedurally unreasonable because the district court
    did   not     adequately       explain      why     it     chose       that     particular
    sentence. However, we find that the sentencing judge carefully
    and thoroughly explained the sentence at length.
    The district court walked through the calculation of the
    Guidelines        range    carefully   at     the   sentencing         hearing,     during
    which neither party objected. It noted that defense counsel had
    asked for the court to consider that the majority of images did
    not depict sadistic or masochistic conduct, even though counsel
    did not object to the four-level enhancement for such images.
    See   J.A.       158.   The   court    considered         arguments      made     by    both
    parties      at    sentencing    concerning         the    § 3553(a)          factors    and
    discussed the application of the factors in fashioning Helton’s
    particular sentence.
    The district judge granted a downward departure from the
    recommended term of imprisonment of 78 to 97 months, sentencing
    Helton to 60 months in prison. See J.A. 199, 172. She explained
    7
    that the sentence of 60 months followed by a lifetime term of
    supervised release “provide[d] just punishment for the crime for
    which [Helton] pled guilty” because it both “reflect[ed] the
    seriousness      of   the      offense”     and         would    “deter      [Helton]         from
    committing      criminal       conduct        in     the    future.”         
    Id. at 206.
    Importantly, the judge further explained that given Helton’s age
    and lack of prior criminal convictions, a sentence of longer
    than 60 months “simply was not necessary,” 
    id., especially in
    light    of    “the   fact      that    [he       would]        be    required     to     be    on
    supervised release for life,” 
    id. at 207-08.
    Although Helton’s
    prison term is not directly at issue before this court, the
    judge made clear that the length of the prison term and the
    length of the supervised release term were linked. She was only
    comfortable      with     the     downward          departure          for   the     term       of
    imprisonment because she knew that Helton would be subject to a
    lengthy term of supervised release.
    The     judge   also     gave    full       and    fair        consideration       to    the
    § 3553(a)      factors    that,       she   explained,           require     the    court       to
    consider, among other factors, the “nature and circumstances of
    the     offense,”       “the     history           and     characteristics              of     the
    defendant,” and the need for the sentence imposed “to reflect
    the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
    and to provide just punishment for the offense,” as well as “to
    8
    provide the defendant with needed . . . medical care, or other
    correctional treatment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see also J.A. 173. *
    Although    the   court   must      base    the    sentence   on    an
    individualized   assessment,    it       need   not    “robotically     tick
    through” the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Johnson, 
    445 F.3d 339
    , 345 (4th Cir. 2006). In crafting the sentence, the
    *
    Defense counsel argued before this court that the district
    court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors focused primarily
    on “the severity of [Helton’s] conduct, which is explicitly off
    limits when it comes to consideration of the supervised released
    term.”    Oral    Arg.   at    13:35.    We    disagree   with    this
    characterization of the district court’s explanation. It is true
    that 18 U.S.C. § 3583, which provides “factors to be considered
    in including a term of supervised release,” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c),
    does not include “the need for the sentence imposed to reflect
    the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
    and to provide just punishment for the offense” or “the kinds of
    sentences    available,”    18   U.S.C.    § 3553(a)(2)(A),    (a)(3).
    Notably, however, the statute allows for consideration of the
    factors listed in § 3553(a)(1): “the nature and circumstances of
    the offense and the history and characteristics of the
    defendant.”    18   U.S.C.   § 3553(a)(1);    see   also   18   U.S.C.
    § 3583(c). Here, we do not agree that the district judge focused
    only on the severity of Helton’s conduct. While she did state
    that she chose the 60 month sentence followed by a life term of
    supervised release to “provide[] just punishment for the crime
    for  which    [Helton]   pled    guilty”   and   to   “reflect[]   the
    seriousness of the offense,” J.A. 206, she further noted that
    she had considered “the nature and circumstances of [Helton’s]
    offense, as well as [his] history and characteristics.” 
    Id. She specifically
    outlined how, in determining the proper sentence
    and the conditions of supervised release, she had balanced his
    youth and lack of criminal history against his admitted cycle of
    downloading and deleting child pornography, the period of months
    over which he had collected the images, his mental health
    history, and his admitted history of viewing child pornography
    and his sexual abuse of a three-year old child in foster care.
    See 
    id. at 207.
    9
    judge      took    note     of    both     individual      characteristics             of    the
    defendant and the particular offense conduct in this case. She
    considered        that    Helton    was    only    “21   years     old   and       appearing
    [before the court] on [his] first criminal conviction.” J.A.
    206. The court also considered Helton’s extensive “mental health
    issues and [his] admissions to having viewed child pornography
    as   a    child”    in     determining      “the    need     for      this       sentence     to
    provide [Helton] with medical care and corrective treatment in
    the most effective manner.” 
    Id. at 207.
    On the other hand, the judge explained that while “only 42
    image      files    of     child     pornography         were    located          in   active
    folders,” the defendant had “engaged in repetitive cycles of
    downloading images, deleting them, and then searching for more,”
    over the course of seven months, which is exactly the “type of
    conduct [that] provides the market for child pornography which .
    . . often results in the abuse of minors.” 
    Id. at 206-07.
    She
    also took notice of his admission that he had “sexually abused a
    three-year-old” when he was previously in foster care. 
    Id. at 207.
    Furthermore,       the    judge    took    into     account         a    number     of
    individualized           considerations      in    shaping      the    conditions           that
    attach to defendant’s term of supervised release. Considering
    the defendant’s admission to significant alcohol and marijuana
    use, 
    id. at 197,
    and noting that he did not have “a low risk of
    10
    future     substance       abuse,”      
    id. at 200,
          she   required        him    to
    participate in a substance abuse treatment program. She also
    required Helton to “submit to a psychosexual evaluation by a
    qualified mental health professional,” “complete [any resulting]
    treatment      recommendations,”           and           “take      all        medications      as
    prescribed.” 
    Id. at 201.
    She also imposed a number of conditions
    regarding his status as a sex offender and limiting his ability
    to interact with minors. 
    Id. at 201-04.
    However, the district court also, in response to a request
    from defense counsel, removed several of the more onerous terms
    of supervised release, finding them unnecessarily harsh in light
    of the circumstances of the case. 
    Id. at 165-68.
    The judge noted
    that the “terms and conditions of supervised release should have
    some reasonable basis given the facts and circumstances of the
    offense such that they accomplish the purposes that are intended
    by supervised release.” 
    Id. at 166.
    Finding that there was “no
    basis    in    this      particular       case,”             she    declined       to     require
    “defendant      to    carte     blanche       afford          access      to    his     financial
    information”         unless    there    “is    some          indication         that    there    is
    something      [such      as   a   computer         or       cell    phone      with     internet
    capacity] purchased that should not have been.” 
    Id. She also
       declined     to    impose          a    condition        preventing       the
    defendant from purchasing cameras, explaining that there was “no
    evidence      in   this    case    that       the    defendant            took    pornographic
    11
    photos or videos of children.” 
    Id. at 167-68.
    Despite objection
    from defense counsel, she kept in place the condition preventing
    defendant from purchasing or owning a cell phone with internet
    capability, explaining that it was “appropriate given the facts
    and circumstances of this case.” 
    Id. at 167.
    Defense counsel
    repeatedly requested a fifteen year term of supervised release,
    but the judge rejected that in favor of a longer term coupled
    with a downward departure in the length of Helton’s term of
    imprisonment. See 
    id. at 176,
    190, 208.
    In light of this lengthy explanation, we find no procedural
    error in what the district court did. The Guidelines range was
    properly calculated. The term of supervised release was within
    the     Guidelines       range   and     within    the     permissible        statutory
    authorization. The defendant received a downward departure in
    his prison term, which was clearly linked to a longer term of
    supervised release. The defendant wants additional explanation,
    specific to the term of supervised release, but we find the
    district    court        satisfactorily     explained         both   pieces    of    the
    sentence at great length.
    We do not dispute that there must be sufficient explanation
    for a sentence to be procedurally reasonable. But we take no
    issue    with     what    the    district      court   did     here.   We     find   the
    district    court’s       thorough      explanation      sufficient    on     both   the
    sentence     as    a     whole    and    the    term     of    supervised      release
    12
    specifically.         To    require       more    explanation            would   unnecessarily
    intrude upon the district court’s primary and unique role in the
    sentencing process.
    B.
    Helton also contends that his lifetime term of supervised
    release is substantively unreasonable because it is longer than
    necessary to further the goals of supervised release itself and
    was not justified by Helton’s offense. See Appellant’s Br. at
    12.   We   disagree.         A   lifetime         term       of    supervised         release     is
    authorized       by    statute       and     within          the    Sentencing        Guidelines
    range.     See    18       U.S.C.    §     3583(k)      (“[T]he          authorized      term     of
    supervised release for any offense under section                                 . . . 2252A .
    . . is any term of years not less than 5, or life.”); see also
    U.S.S.G.     §    5D1.2       (“[T]he       length       of       the    term    of   supervised
    release . . .          may be up to life, if the offense is . . . a sex
    offense.”).        Furthermore,             the       U.S.         Sentencing         Commission
    specifically          included       an     advisory          policy       statement        in    the
    Guidelines       Manual       that       suggests       it    is     the    judgment        of    the
    Sentencing       Commission         that    in    the    case       of     sex   offenses        “the
    statutory maximum term of supervised release is recommended.”
    District courts are permitted to consider a wide variety of
    information during the course of a sentencing proceeding. See
    Alleyne    v.    United       States,       133    S.    Ct.       2151,    2163      n.6    (2013)
    (“[J]udges       may        exercise       sentencing             discretion       through        ‘an
    13
    inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind
    of information [they] may consider, or the source from which it
    may come.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
    Tucker,    
    404 U.S. 443
    ,    446   (1972)).       Here,     the    district     judge
    considered       the   defendant’s      lengthy        history    of     viewing     child
    pornography,       his    admitted      repetitive        pattern       of    downloading
    material, deleting it, and seeking out more. She also considered
    that he admitted to abusing a three-year old when he was a minor
    in foster care and that he had sought help for his compulsion to
    view child pornography but had been unable to stop.
    Furthermore,         the     district        court     granted          defendant     a
    downward variance in his prison term, remarking that she was
    comfortable doing so because he would be subject to a lengthy
    term of supervised release. It would be almost unprecedented to
    credit a defendant’s challenge to a sentence as substantively
    unreasonable when the district court actually reduced the term
    of   imprisonment         below     the      recommended         Guidelines         range.
    Moreover,    the       court     modified        the   conditions        of    supervised
    release, alleviating some of the more burdensome requirements
    that she thought inappropriate for Helton given the offense and
    circumstances of this case and this defendant.                         Helton can still
    petition    for    a     modification       or    termination       of       his   term   of
    supervised    release      at    any    time     after    one    year    of    supervised
    release, provided it is justified by his conduct and in the
    14
    interest     of    justice.    See     18    U.S.C.    §     3583(e)(1);     U.S.S.G.
    §   5D1.2   n.5.     Given    these    circumstances,        we     cannot   find   the
    district    court’s     conclusion         unreasonable      that    a   lifetime    of
    supervised release was necessary to deter defendant, protect the
    public from additional crimes by him, and provide him with the
    mental health care and necessary corrective treatment he needs.
    Trial courts have significant discretion in the sentencing
    process, and we see nothing in this case to suggest that this
    discretion     was    abused    in     a    manner    that    would      render     this
    sentence     substantively        or        procedurally       unreasonable.         The
    judgment is accordingly affirmed.
    AFFIRMED
    15
    GREGORY, Circuit Judge, concurring in the majority opinion:
    I commend the district court’s exercise of its discretion
    in fashioning Steven Helton’s sentence in this very difficult
    case.         Five years in prison is well enough for the 21 year-old
    with         no   prior    criminal       convictions,          who    was    physically       and
    sexually          abused    by    his    stepfather,        who       grew    up    in    multiple
    foster care homes since the age of six, and who was caught with
    42 image files of child pornography on his computer. 1                                   J.A. 195,
    206. 2       And, as the majority notes, the district court imposed the
    supervised release portion of Helton’s sentence in conjunction
    with a downward variance from the applicable advisory Guideline
    range.            The     district       court     displayed          courage       in     varying
    downward,          and      in    crafting        an      appropriate,         individualized
    sentence.
    I.
    The      district       court    chose       a   sentence       of    60    months     of
    imprisonment followed by a lifetime term of supervised release
    for      Helton’s          knowing       possession        of     child       pornography       in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(5)(B) and 2252A(b)(2).                                     Helton
    1
    As the majority notes, only 42 of the 961 image files
    recovered by forensic investigators from Helton’s computer were
    actively accessible for viewing. It appears the remaining files
    were thumbnail-sized images automatically generated by the
    Windows operating system.
    2
    Citations to the J.A. refer to the parties’ Joint Appendix
    filed in this case.    Specifically, the facts referenced herein
    are contained in the sentencing hearing transcript.
    17
    appeals only the supervised release portion of his sentence.                        I
    agree with the majority that the district court committed no
    procedural error by adequately explaining why it thought this
    particular       punishment        sufficient      to    meet     the     goals     of
    sentencing.
    As is well known, reasonableness includes both procedural
    and substantive components.                See United States v. Carter, 
    564 F.3d 325
    ,     328   (4th    Cir.   2009).        “Procedural     errors     include
    ‘failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines
    range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider
    the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
    erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
    sentence – including an explanation for any deviation from the
    Guidelines range.’”           
    Id. (quoting Gall
    v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007)).           Above all, the district court “must make
    an   individualized        assessment      based    on   the    facts    presented.”
    
    Gall, 552 U.S. at 50
    .          In other words, the district court should
    “consider every convicted person as an individual and every case
    as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate,
    sometimes      magnify,      the   crime    and    the   punishment      to   ensue.”
    
    Carter, 564 F.3d at 328
    .
    Among    the   human    failings      the    district     court    took    into
    account at sentencing was that Helton’s father abandoned him as
    a baby.        J.A. 195.      His mother suffered various mental health
    18
    problems.              J.A.    195.       When    Helton       was       six    years       old,    his
    stepfather physically and sexually abused him and his sister.
    J.A.       195.         Both     were    placed       with     an    aunt       who        drank    and
    physically abused the children.                         J.A. 195.              Helton was then
    removed       to       foster     care,       where    he    was     found        viewing       child
    pornography.             J.A. 195.           It was during this time that Helton
    also admits he sexually abused a minor child.                                  J.A. 195.           When
    he was fourteen, Helton attended a mental health/sex offender
    treatment facility for two and a half years.                                   J.A. 195.           Next,
    he   moved        to    a     facility       called    the   Burlington           United      Family
    Methodist         Services,       and    things       started       to    look       up;    while    at
    Burlington,            Helton     obtained       his     GED     and       even       enrolled       in
    Fairmont      State           College.        J.A.     195-97.           He    withdrew        before
    completing         the        first    semester,       however,          and    at    the     age    of
    eighteen returned to his mother’s home. 3                           J.A. 196-7.            He became
    his disabled mother’s caretaker and began abusing alcohol and
    other drugs himself.                   J.A. 196-97.          He was nineteen when the
    police caught him in possession of child pornography.
    It     is       against        this    backdrop       that        the    district           court
    emphasized that it was careful to sentence Helton “only for the
    3
    According to Helton, upon matriculating he was                                 told he had
    not completed the requisite financial aid forms.                                      Without any
    adult assistance to navigate the system, and having                                   “graduated”
    from foster care, he was forced to withdraw from                                      college and
    return to his mother’s residence.
    19
    offense to which [he] pled guilty.”                  The court explained that it
    chose a sentence “sufficient to protect the public . . . and to
    avoid    unwarranted       disparities        in    sentencing      of    defendants      of
    similar backgrounds and similar violations.”                        In doing so, the
    court balanced Helton’s age and lack of criminal convictions
    against    his      engaging     in    “repetitive      cycles      of    downloading,”
    which “provides the market for child pornography” and “often
    results in the abuse of minors.”                   In the end, the district court
    decided    “a       sentence    of    incarceration        longer    than       60    months
    simply    is    not    necessary       to    meet    the   goals     of    sentencing,”
    especially in consideration of the lifetime term of supervised
    release.        The    court    further      “considered      the    need       for    th[e]
    sentence       to     provide        . . .    medical       care     and        corrective
    treatment,”         leading     to    the     special      conditions          of    release
    including participation in medical evaluations and treatment.
    There      is    no   doubt      that   this    explanation,         following      the
    district        court’s        painstaking          recollection          of        Helton’s
    unfortunate childhood, was sufficiently individualized to meet
    the requirements of procedural reasonableness.
    II.
    Helton’s appeal of the substantive reasonableness of his
    lifetime term of supervised release is a closer question.                                 As
    the majority rightly recognizes, a district court enjoys wide
    20
    discretion in sentencing.               The district court “is in a superior
    position to find facts and judge their import,” United States v.
    Diosdado-Star, 
    630 F.3d 359
    , 366 (4th Cir. 2011), but appellate
    courts nevertheless play an important role in reviewing whether
    an   abuse      of    that       discretion        has    occurred.          In    reviewing
    substantive reasonableness, we measure the sentence against the
    statutory sentencing factors while “tak[ing] into account the
    totality of the circumstances.”                    
    Gall, 552 U.S. at 51
    ; see also
    United    States      v.   Montes-Pineda,           
    445 F.3d 375
    ,   378    (4th     Cir.
    2006).
    Helton’s         burden      on   appeal      is     a    difficult     one       to   meet
    considering that a lifetime term of supervised release is indeed
    within    the    advisory         Guidelines        range      and    the    maximum        term
    authorized       by    statute.            See      U.S.S.G       § 5D1.2;        18    U.S.C.
    § 3583(k).       Ultimately the district court was faced with the
    history and characteristics of someone who admitted to having
    previously      abused       a    child    and      who       furthermore     reverted           to
    viewing    child      pornography         after     having      completed     years         of    a
    residential sex offender treatment program.                            J.A. 195.            While
    there is a continuing debate on the linkage between possession
    of child pornography and sexual abuse of minors, it was not
    improper for the district court to consider the need “to afford
    adequate deterrence,” 
    id. § 3553(a)(2)(B),
    and “to protect the
    public       from      further         crimes        of        the     defendant,”           
    id. 21 §
    3553(a)(2)(C).     In the totality of the circumstances, it is
    fair to say that Helton will benefit not from more time in
    prison, but from long-term supervision and compliance with drug
    dependency and psychosexual treatment programs.          Therefore, even
    though I regret that Helton can see no redemptive light at the
    end of his long road to recovery, I cannot say the district
    court abused its discretion.
    It is this same ambivalence, however, about offenders like
    Helton never being able to fully rejoin society as rehabilitated
    individuals that leads me to warn against undue deference to
    what are only advisory Guidelines.          When we begin to accept
    these   Guidelines    as   irrefutable    truths,   we   tend   to     give
    ourselves to overgeneralizations like that made by the majority
    when it writes:      “It would be almost unprecedented to credit a
    defendant’s   challenge      to   a      sentence   as     substantively
    unreasonable when the district court actually reduced the term
    of imprisonment below the recommended Guidelines range.”             To the
    contrary, it can be unreasonable for a twenty-one year old with
    no prior criminal convictions to spend five years in prison even
    when the Guidelines advocate for a minimum term of six and a
    half years.   And it can be unreasonable for that young man to
    have to ask his probation officer for permission to purchase a
    toy when, some great day later in his lifetime of supervision by
    the government, he becomes a grandparent.
    22
    The child pornography Guideline has been recognized as an
    “eccentric Guideline of highly unusual provenance which, unless
    carefully     applied,       can   easily    generate        unreasonable    results.”
    United States v. Dorvee, 
    616 F.3d 174
    , 188 (2d Cir. 2010).                           For
    example, a defendant convicted of distributing child pornography
    over the Internet but who has never had any contact with a minor
    can receive a greater sentence than an individual who seeks out
    a   minor   online,     arranges      a   meeting,      and    actually     abuses   the
    child.      See 
    id. at 176,
    187.                 The Guideline also frequently
    punishes first time offenders with the same severity as more
    culpable     offenders.        This    is   because         several   of   the   § 2G2.2
    enhancements of a defendant’s base offense level are broadly
    defined and present in nearly all Internet child pornography
    cases, like an enhancement for using a computer.                            See, e.g.,
    United States v. Burns, No. 07 CR 556, 
    2009 WL 3617448
    , at *7
    (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2009) (“[M]ost of the enhancements provided
    for   in    § 2G2.2    are    of   little        use   in    distinguishing      between
    offenders.”).         Statistics show that in non-production cases in
    fiscal year 2013, a two-level enhancement for using a computer
    applied in 95% of cases, a two-level enhancement for involvement
    of a child victim under the age of 12 (that is, a prepubescent
    minor) applied in 96% of cases, and a five-level enhancement for
    23
    600 or more images applied in 79% of cases. 4         Such realities have
    led the Sentencing Commission to conclude that § 2G2.2 “places a
    disproportionate emphasis on outdated measures of culpability,”
    resulting   in “penalty    ranges    [that]    are   too    severe   for   some
    offenders and too lenient for other[s].” 5
    These limitations are the result of the Guideline having
    been “developed largely pursuant to congressional directives,”
    as opposed to the Sentencing Commission’s expertise.                    United
    States v. Grober, 
    624 F.3d 592
    , 608 (3d Cir. 2010); see also 
    id. (“[T]o say
    that the final product is the result of Commission
    data,    study,   and    expertise    simply    ignores      the     facts.”).
    Congress    has   been   “particularly    active”      in     directing    the
    Commission to increase base offense levels and impose various
    enhancements, which has resulted in a dramatic rise in penalties
    over the years. 6   These changes have taken place in the face of
    4
    U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Use of Guidelines and Specific
    Offense     Characteristics     40-41   (2013),    available    at
    http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publica
    tions/federal-sentencing-statistics/guideline-application-
    frequencies/2013/Use_of_Guidelines_and_Specific_Offense_Characte
    ristics_Guideline_Calculation_Based_Revised.pdf.
    5
    U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Federal Child Pornography Offenses
    xvii       (2012),      available     at      http://www.ussc.gov/
    sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports
    /sex-offense-topics/201212-federal-child-pornography-offenses/
    Full_Report_to_Congress.pdf [hereinafter Report to Congress].
    6
    U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, The History of the Child
    Pornography      Guidelines      1    (2009),     available     at
    http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publica
    (Continued)
    24
    resistance by the Commission, and in the form of Congress taking
    the   unprecedented       step    of   directly    amending    the   Guidelines. 7
    Thus,   like   the    former       crack     cocaine   Guidelines,      the   child
    pornography    Guideline         “do[es]    not   exemplify   the    Commission’s
    exercise of its characteristic institutional role,” which is to
    propose penalties “base[d on] its determinations on empirical
    data and national experience, guided by a professional staff
    with appropriate expertise.”                Kimbrough v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 85
    , 108-09 (2007).             For, what the data actually shows is
    that 70% of district court judges in 2010 thought the Guideline
    too severe for crimes of possession. 8              And, in fiscal year 2013,
    district courts imposed a sentence below the Guideline range in
    718 of 1,626 non-production cases. 9
    This is why, when we talk about the slippery concept of
    reasonableness,      we   should       be   cautious   of   presuming    that   the
    tions/research-projects-and-surveys/sex-offenses/20091030_
    History_Child_Pornography_Guidelines.pdf.
    7
    See Melissa Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child
    Pornography   Sentencing:   Empirical   Validity   or   Political
    Rhetoric?, 22 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 545, 556 (2011).
    8
    U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Results of Survey of United States
    District Judges January 2010 Through March 2010, Question 8
    (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/
    pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/
    surveys/20100608_Judge_Survey.pdf.
    9
    U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 2013 Sourcebook of Federal
    Sentencing     Statistics,     Table      28,    available     at
    http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/annual-reports-
    sourcebooks/2013/sourcebook-2013; see also 
    id. app. A
    (defining
    “Below Guideline Range with Booker/18 U.S.C. § 3553”).
    25
    child       pornography       Guideline      –     as       well    as    the       Guideline    for
    supervised          release     of   child       pornography             offenders      –     always
    provides a reasoned departure point from which to calculate a
    sentence.          Like much of the judiciary, the Commission does not
    view    the     Guideline         this     way        for    a     defendant         like     Helton
    convicted of a non-production offense.                             In fact, the Commission
    has    asked       Congress     to   give     it      the    authority          to    amend    those
    provisions resulting from the legislature’s directives. 10                                        It
    believes       these      amendments        necessary            “to     better      promote     the
    purposes       of    punishment       by     accounting            for    the       variations   in
    offenders’          culpability      and     sexual          dangerousness.” 11               Though
    recommended          in   2012,      these       changes         are     still       forthcoming.
    Luckily, in the meantime, there are judges like Judge Berger who
    understand         that   the     totality       of     the        circumstances        sometimes
    requires       a     below-Guideline          term          to     ensure       a    sentence     is
    substantively reasonable.
    10
    See Report to Congress, supra note 5, at 322.
    11
    
    Id. at xvii.
    The Commission is also considering revising
    § 5D1.2    so  that,   as   opposed   to   its   current blanket
    recommendation of the statutory maximum for child pornography
    offenders, it would actually “provide[] guidance to judges to
    impose a term of supervised release . . . that is tailored to
    [an] individual offender’s risk and corresponding need for
    supervision. 
    Id. at xix.
    26
    III.
    We measure our humanity by the justice we mete to those
    thought least deserving.        I join the majority in affirming the
    district court, which I believe did an admirable job crafting an
    individualized sentence.       Perhaps in the future, our Guidelines
    will evolve to become truly proportional to the severity of our
    crimes.    And perhaps then, a district court will not be in the
    lamentable    position   of   having    to   balance   the   need   to   depart
    downward     from   an   excessive     Guideline   term      with   an   entire
    lifetime of supervision.
    27