United States v. Andrew Jones ( 2023 )

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4263 Doc: 40 Filed: 03/23/2023 Pg: 1 of 3
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4263
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANDREW PATRICK JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, Chief District Judge. (1:21-cr-00091-MR-WCM-1)
Submitted: March 21, 2023 Decided: March 23, 2023
Before WYNN and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Richard L. Brown, Jr., LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD L. BROWN, JR.,
Monroe, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4263 Doc: 40 Filed: 03/23/2023 Pg: 2 of 3
PER CURIAM:
Andrew Patrick Jones pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to
possession of a stolen firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(j), 924(a)(2); possession
with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A). The district court sentenced Jones to concurrent terms of 60 months on the
first two counts and a consecutive 60-month term on the third count, for a total sentence of
120 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal
but questioning whether the sentencing enhancement authorized by U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) (2018) inequitably permits double counting on
convictions for possession of a stolen firearm. The Government has declined to file a
response brief. In his pro se supplemental brief, Jones raises as issues claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel and police misconduct during his arrest.
Our review of the plea colloquy confirms that the magistrate judge complied with
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 and properly concluded that Jones’ plea was knowing, voluntary, and
supported by a sufficient factual basis. As for Jones’ sentence, we “review a sentence for
reasonableness ‘under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard[]’ . . . whether the
sentence is ‘inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range.’” United
States v. McCoy, 804 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). This review encompasses the sentence’s procedural and substantive
reasonableness. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. After reviewing the record, we conclude that Jones’
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sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable and that his claim of double
counting is unfounded.
We typically will not review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel made on
direct appeal, United States v. Maynes, 880 F.3d 110, 113 n.1 (4th Cir. 2018), “[u]nless an
attorney’s ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the face of the record,” United States v.
Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 2016). We find that no ineffective assistance of counsel
conclusively appears in the record. Likewise, we conclude that Jones’ claims of police
misconduct are not of the sort that would invalidate Jones’ guilty plea. See United States
v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 469-70 (4th Cir. 2013) (concluding that plea was involuntary when
“law enforcement officer intentionally l[ied] in a[n] affidavit that formed the sole basis for
searching the defendant’s home” and defendant discovered lie after plea).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Jones, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Jones requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Jones.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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