United States v. Thompson , 394 F. App'x 10 ( 2010 )


Menu:
  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-4301
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    STACEY THOMPSON, a/k/a Stacy Thompson,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
    District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg.    Irene M. Keeley,
    District Judge. (1:09-cr-00125-IMK-1)
    Submitted:   August 26, 2010                 Decided:   September 1, 2010
    Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
    opinion.
    Brian J. Kornbrath, Federal Public Defender, Clarksburg, West
    Virginia, for Appellant.   Shawn Angus Morgan, Assistant United
    States Attorney, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Stacey Thompson appeals his conviction and sentence,
    following his guilty plea to one count of being a felon in
    possession of a firearm while on pretrial release, in violation
    of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1), 924(a)(2), 3147 (2006).                                    Thompson’s
    attorney filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), stating that in his opinion, Thompson’s appeal
    presents     no        meritorious         issues,    but        asking       this    court    to
    consider    whether        Thompson’s         plea    was       knowing        and    voluntary.
    Thompson was advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental
    brief, but has not filed a brief.                         The Government has moved to
    dismiss    the       appeal     on   the     basis    of       the    waiver     of    appellate
    rights contained in Thompson’s plea agreement.
    We     review    the       validity       of    an    appellate       waiver    de
    novo, United States v. Brown, 
    232 F.3d 399
    , 402-03 (4th Cir.
    2000),    and     will    uphold       a    waiver    of       appellate       rights    if    the
    waiver is valid and the issue being appealed is covered by the
    waiver.     United States v. Blick, 
    408 F.3d 162
    , 168 (4th Cir.
    2005).     A waiver is valid if the defendant’s agreement to the
    waiver was knowing and voluntary.                         United States v. Wessells,
    
    936 F.2d 165
    , 167 (4th Cir. 1991).
    To         determine       whether        a        waiver     is     knowing       and
    voluntary,        we     examine     “the      totality          of     the    circumstances,
    including the experience and conduct of the accused, as well as
    2
    the accused’s educational background and familiarity with the
    terms of the plea agreement.”                United States v. General, 
    278 F.3d 389
    ,   400   (4th   Cir.     2002)     (internal   quotation     marks
    omitted).       Generally, if the district court fully questions a
    defendant regarding the waiver of appellate rights during the
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy, the waiver is valid.                    Wessells,
    
    936 F.2d at 167-68
    .          Our review of the record discloses that
    Thompson’s appellate waiver was knowing and voluntary and should
    be enforced to preclude our review of any potential sentencing
    errors    pursuant    to   Anders.       The    waiver,   however,    does    not
    preclude our review of Thompson’s conviction.
    Because Thompson did not move in the district court to
    withdraw his guilty plea, any error in the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
    hearing is reviewed for plain error.               United States v. Martinez,
    
    277 F.3d 517
    , 525 (4th Cir. 2002). Our review of the record
    convinces us that the district court fully complied with the
    requirements of Rule 11 in accepting Thompson’s guilty plea, and
    ensured    that   Thompson’s      plea   was    knowing   and   voluntary     and
    supported by a sufficient factual basis.                See United States v.
    DeFusco, 
    949 F.2d 114
    , 116-20 (4th Cir. 1991).
    Accordingly,     we      deny    the    Government’s     motion    to
    dismiss in part and affirm Thompson’s conviction.                  We grant the
    motion to dismiss with regard to any potential sentencing error
    that may be revealed by our review pursuant to Anders.                         In
    3
    accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in
    this case and have found no meritorious issues.                               We therefore
    affirm Thompson’s conviction.                This court requires that counsel
    inform    Thompson,       in    writing,     of    the     right       to    petition   the
    Supreme     Court    of   the    United    States        for    further       review.     If
    Thompson requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
    that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
    in   this    court    for       leave   to       withdraw       from    representation.
    Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
    Thompson.       We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions      are     adequately       presented       in       the   materials
    before    the    court    and    argument        would    not    aid        the   decisional
    process.
    DISMISSED IN PART;
    AFFIRMED IN PART
    4