United States v. Glisson , 405 F. App'x 714 ( 2010 )


Menu:
  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-4290
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    JOYCE GAYNELL GLISSON,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Charleston.    Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
    District Judge. (2:09-cr-00459-PMD-2)
    Submitted:   November 9, 2010             Decided:   December 16, 2010
    Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished
    per curiam opinion.
    Guy J. Vitetta, VITETTA LAW GROUP, Daniel Island, South
    Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States
    Attorney, Alston C. Badger, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Joyce Gaynell Glisson pleaded guilty to embezzlement
    from a federally-insured bank, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 656
    (2006).       After Glisson embezzled the funds from her employer,
    Citizen’s Bank, she obtained a loan from a third party, Robert
    Player, and used that money to repay some of the embezzled funds
    to the bank.         The district court sentenced Glisson to fifteen
    months of imprisonment and ordered that she pay restitution to
    the   bank    and   to    Player.       Glisson    appeals,       arguing    that   the
    district court erred in ordering restitution to the third party.
    For   the    reasons      that   follow,   we     affirm    the    conviction,      but
    vacate      the   order    of    restitution      with    instructions       that   the
    district court modify the order.
    Glisson first argues that the district court erred in
    awarding restitution to Player as he was not a victim of her
    offense.      We review a restitution order for abuse of discretion.
    United States v. Hoyle, 
    33 F.3d 415
    , 520 (4th Cir. 1994).                         Under
    the   Mandatory      Victims      Restitution       Act     (“MVRA”),       18   U.S.C.
    §§ 3663A-3664        (2006),      the    district        court    must    order     the
    defendant to make restitution to victims of an offense against
    property.         18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a), (c)(1)(A)(ii).                   A victim is
    defined as
    [A] person directly and proximately harmed as a result
    of the commission of an offense for which restitution
    may be ordered including, in the case of an offense
    2
    that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or
    pattern of criminal activity, any person directly
    harmed by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the
    course of the scheme, conspiracy or pattern.
    18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2).                  Moreover, the MVRA “‘authorize[s] an
    award of restitution only for the loss caused by the specific
    conduct    that       is    the    basis        of       the    offense            of    conviction.’”
    United States v. Blake, 
    81 F.3d 498
    , 506 (4th Cir. 1996).
    Here, the offense of conviction was embezzlement under
    § 656.      Section         656    makes       it    a    crime      for       an       employee         of    a
    federally-insured bank to embezzle, abstract, or misapply any
    funds of the bank.            
    18 U.S.C. § 656
    .
    For a violation of § 656 to be proved, the Government
    must show, in addition to the status of both the bank
    and the defendant, that the defendant acted willfully,
    that [she] misapplied [or embezzled] funds, . . .
    belonging to or intrusted to the custody of the bank
    and that [she] did so with the intent to injure or
    defraud the bank.
    United States v. Duncan, 
    598 F.2d 839
    , 858 (4th Cir. 1979).
    Accordingly, as Glisson’s embezzlement was complete prior to her
    obtaining       funds       from    Player,          and       as    embezzlement                 does    not
    contain    as    an     element       a    scheme,          conspiracy,                 or   pattern          of
    criminal activity, see Blake, 
    81 F.3d at 506
     (“the act that
    harms    the     individual         must       be       either       conduct            underlying            an
    element    of    the        offense       of    conviction,              or    an       act       taken       in
    furtherance      of     a    scheme,       conspiracy,              or    pattern            of    criminal
    activity    that      is     specifically            included        as       an    element         of    the
    3
    offense   of    conviction”),        Player     was   not     a   victim    within     the
    meaning of the MVRA.
    However, the Government correctly argues that Player
    is entitled to restitution under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3664
    (f)(1) (2006).
    If a victim has received compensation from insurance
    or any other source with respect to a loss, the court
    shall order that restitution be paid to the person who
    provided or is obligated to provide the compensation,
    but the restitution order shall provide that all
    restitution of victims required by the order be paid
    to the victims before any restitution is paid to such
    a provider of compensation.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3664
    (f)(1).              Here, as Player compensated Citizen’s
    Bank for some of the loss resulting from Glisson’s embezzlement,
    the district court properly awarded restitution to Player.                             See
    United States v. Smith, 
    395 F.3d 316
    , 319 (4th Cir. 2005) (this
    court   may    affirm    on    any    grounds     apparent        from    the    record).
    However, as the statute unambiguously directs that victims be
    paid the full amount of restitution to which they are due before
    restitution     is    paid    to     persons    who    provide         compensation     to
    victims for their loss, the order of restitution should have
    specified that the restitution must be fully paid to Citizen’s
    Bank before any restitution is paid to Player.
    Glisson next argues that the court erred in failing to
    examine   the    statutory      factors        regarding      her      ability    to   pay
    before ordering restitution.              We disagree.              Under § 3663A(d),
    the   district       court    must    issue     an    order       of   restitution      in
    4
    accordance with § 3664.        18 U.S.C. § 3663A(d).                 Section 3664(a)
    provides that, for restitution orders, the court shall order
    that   the   probation     officer    must     include       information          in   the
    presentence     report     sufficient        for     the     court    to    determine
    restitution, including, “to the extent practicable, a complete
    accounting of the losses to each victim, any restitution owed
    pursuant to a plea agreement, and information relating to the
    economic circumstances of each defendant.”                 
    18 U.S.C. § 3664
    (a).
    Moreover, although a district court must make factual
    findings     with   regard   to    the      statutory      factors,        see     United
    States v.     Davenport,     
    445 F.3d 366
    ,     373     (4th    Cir.       2006),
    overruled on other grounds, Irizarry v. United States, 
    553 U.S. 708
     (2008), “[t]he district court may satisfy this requirement
    by announcing its findings on the record or by adopting adequate
    proposed     findings    contained       within       a    presentence           report.”
    Blake, 
    81 F.3d at 505
     (citation omitted).                    Here, the probation
    officer included the necessary information in the presentence
    report, and the district court explicitly adopted those findings
    at the sentencing hearing.         Therefore, the court did not fail to
    consider the statutory factors prior to awarding restitution.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
    court in part, but also vacate the judgment in part and remand
    with instructions that the district court modify the order of
    restitution to provide that Citizen’s Bank be paid in full prior
    5
    to restitution being paid to Player.       We dispense with oral
    argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
    presented in the materials before the court and argument would
    not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED IN PART;
    VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-4290

Citation Numbers: 405 F. App'x 714

Judges: Wilkinson, Niemeyer, Wynn

Filed Date: 12/16/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024