United States v. Grooms , 405 F. App'x 744 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4727
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
NORMAN LEE GROOMS,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Norman K. Moon,
Senior District Judge. (3:91-cr-00005-nkm-mfu-1)
Submitted: November 24, 2010 Decided: December 23, 2010
Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Andrea L. Harris,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Christine Madeleine Lee,
Research and Writing Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for
Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Nancy S.
Healey, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Norman Lee Grooms appeals the eleven-month sentence
imposed on him upon revocation of his supervised release.
Grooms argues that his sentence is plainly unreasonable because
consideration of the relevant factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006) supports imposition of a sentence shorter than
eleven months. He also contends that the district court failed
to adequately explain its reasons for his sentence and did not
address factors supporting a downward variance. We affirm.
This court will affirm a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release if it is not plainly
unreasonable. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546
(4th Cir. 2010). The first step in this review requires a
determination of whether the sentence is unreasonable. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). “This
initial inquiry takes a more ‘deferential appellate posture
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion’ than
reasonableness review for guidelines sentences.” United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439) (applying “plainly unreasonable”
standard of review for probation revocation). Only if the
sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable does the
inquiry proceed to the second step of the analysis to determine
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whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. Crudup, 461 F.3d
at 438-39.
A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
advisory policy statement range based upon Chapter Seven of the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors applicable to supervised release revocation. See
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-40. A sentence is
substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper
basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence
imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
“A court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a
revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-
conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of
reasons for the sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547(internal quotation marks omitted).
We find that Grooms’ sentence is procedurally
reasonable. The district court engaged counsel in a discussion
concerning an appropriate sentence in light of Grooms’ past
history and his conduct leading to the instant supervised
release violation. The court concluded Grooms demonstrated an
unwillingness to follow the provisions of his supervised release
and it sentenced him accordingly.
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Grooms maintains his sentence did not rest on a proper
basis and relies principally on the district court’s
unwillingness to consider the lengthy sentence Grooms has
already served for his original offense. However, the district
court’s approach was the correct one. While it did not consider
Grooms’ original offense, it did consider the circumstances of
his instant violation in the context of the applicable
considerations enumerated in § 3553(a). We therefore find
Grooms’ sentence substantively reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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