United States v. Morris , 406 F. App'x 758 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4280
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CARLOS SANTANA MORRIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Danville. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior
District Judge. (4:08-cr-00040-JLK-1)
Submitted: December 8, 2010 Decided: January 3, 2011
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John Weber, III, WEBERPEARSON, PC, Roanoke, Virginia, for
Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, R. Andrew
Bassford, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Carlos Santana Morris appeals his convictions,
following a jury trial, for distribution of an unknown quantity
of cocaine (“Count Three”) and cocaine base (“Count Two” and
“Count Four”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C)
(2006); distribution of more than five grams of cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (2006) (“Count
Five”); use and carry of a firearm during and in relation to,
and possession of a firearm in furtherance of, a drug-
trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006)
(“Count Six”); and being a felon unlawfully in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006) (“Count
Seven”). Morris was sentenced to 230 months’ imprisonment,
consisting of 110 months on Counts Two, Three, Four, Five, and
Seven (concurrent), and 120 months on Count Six (consecutive). *
On appeal, Morris argues that (1) the district court
abused its discretion in permitting the Government to show
subtitled video recordings of the four controlled buys that
formed the basis for his indictment; (2) the evidence of his
guilt is legally insufficient; and (3) the district court abused
*
Morris does not assert any argument pertaining to the
sentence he received. Accordingly, that issue is not before the
court for review. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d
231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999).
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its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial. For the
reasons that follow, we reject these arguments and affirm.
Morris first assigns error to the admission of the
subtitled video recordings of the controlled buys. The use of
subtitles for video recordings is tantamount to a transcript of
the recording. This court reviews for abuse of discretion a
district court’s decision to allow a transcript to aid in the
presentation of recorded evidence. United States v. Collazo,
732 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (4th Cir. 1984).
We have reviewed the record and conclude there was no
abuse of discretion in admitting the subtitled recordings. The
officers who monitored the controlled buys and listened to the
recorded conversations in real-time each testified that the
transcription of those recordings was fair and accurate. Morris
did not make any objections to specific inaccuracies in the
subtitles, nor did he explore inaccuracies through cross-
examination. United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1107 (4th
Cir. 1995). Moreover, on appeal, Morris does not allege that
any of the subtitles are inaccurate. United States v. Pratt,
351 F.3d 131, 140 (4th Cir. 2003) (rejecting contention of error
based on admission of transcripts when defendant failed to
identify a “material variance” between the recordings and the
transcripts). Finally, the district court’s instructions to the
jury prevented any prejudice that may have resulted from any
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discrepancies between the audio and the subtitles. See United
States v. Brandon, 363 F.3d 341, 344-45 (4th Cir. 2004); Pratt,
351 F.3d at 140. Accordingly, we hold the district court did
not abuse its discretion in allowing the subtitled recordings.
Morris’ next argument, although framed in terms of the
sufficiency of the Government’s evidence, attacks the
credibility of the confidential informant (“CI”) used in the
four controlled buys. Morris suggests the CI’s testimony was
inherently suspect because he was an admitted drug user, he
worked as a paid informant, and he omitted relevant information
from his report to the police. However, “it is well established
that determinations of credibility are within the sole province
of the jury and are not susceptible to judicial review.” United
States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 594 (4th Cir.) (internal
quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3374 (2010).
The jury was apprised of the CI’s drug use and his financial
compensation by the police and was free to give his testimony
the weight it deemed appropriate in light of these
considerations. We simply will not review that credibility
determination on appeal.
Finally, Morris challenges the district court’s denial
of his motion for a new trial. This court reviews the denial of
a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 319 (4th Cir. 2009), cert.
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denied, 130 S. Ct. 3353 (2010). Morris’ motion was based on a
juror’s attempt to impeach the guilty verdict based on her
concern, expressed for the first time after the verdict was
returned, that the jury acted with undue haste. At best, the
motion asserted that an influence internal to the process
affected the jury’s deliberations, and such allegations are
insufficient to impeach a jury verdict. See Tanner v. United
States, 483 U.S. 107, 119-27 (1987); see also Robinson v. Polk,
438 F.3d 350, 360 & n.11 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that courts
may consider evidence relevant to whether “extraneous
prejudicial information” entered into the deliberative process).
Accordingly, we conclude the district court properly denied the
motion for a new trial.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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