United States v. Shaniquawa Hill ( 2023 )

USCA4 Appeal: 21-4716 Doc: 35 Filed: 03/29/2023 Pg: 1 of 4
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-4716
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHANIQUAWA LATIFAH HILL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, Senior District Judge. (3:21-cr-00064-HEH-1)
Submitted: January 3, 2023 Decided: March 29, 2023
Before WYNN, THACKER AND RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Mary E. Maguire, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States
Attorney, Angela Mastandrea-Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Shaniquawa Hill (“Appellant”) pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and was sentenced to 75
months imprisonment. Appellant challenges the district court’s imposition of a two-level
enhancement for an offense involving three to seven firearms pursuant to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A). Specifically, Appellant challenges
(1) the admissibility and reliability of Appellant’s uncorroborated post-Miranda statements
pertaining to three additional firearms (other than the firearm of conviction); and (2) the
Government’s failure to recover and/or examine any of the four separate and additional
firearms the district court attributed to Appellant (other than the firearm of conviction).
As an initial matter, “[f]ederal courts historically have exercised . . . broad
discretion to consider all relevant information at an initial sentencing hearing, consistent
with their responsibility to sentence the whole person before them.” Concepcion v. United
States, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2398 (2022). Turning first to Appellant’s challenge to her own
prior statements, “[i]t is well established that, at sentencing, the district court ‘may consider
relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence
applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to
support its probable accuracy.’” United States v. Pineda, 770 F.3d 313, 318 (4th Cir. 2014)
(U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)); see also Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3) (stating that the rules of evidence
are inapplicable to sentencing proceedings). And, even where the rules of evidence do
apply, statements against interest -- supported by corroborating circumstances clearly
indicating the statements’ trustworthiness -- serve as an exception to the rule against
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hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 804(3)(A)–(B). Therefore, we need not assess the admissibility of
Appellant’s prior statements. Rather, we review whether the district court abused its
discretion in determining that the statement was sufficiently reliable to be considered at
sentencing. See United States v. Gilliam, 987 F.2d 1009, 1014 (4th Cir. 1993).
The Government bears the burden of proving the applicability of a sentencing
enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Bullard, 301 F.
App’x 224, 226 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating that “[a]t sentencing, the Government bears the
burden of proving the facts necessary to show that enhancements are warranted by a
preponderance of the evidence”). Here, Appellant provided a post-Miranda statement to
law enforcement where she detailed the (1) number of firearms she discharged; (2) type of
firearms; (3) location where she discharged the firearms; and (4) manner in which the
firearms were discharged. J.A. 88–89. Based upon the level of detail and context
surrounding Appellant’s statement, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that Appellant’s post-Miranda statement bore an indicium of reliability. See
United States v. Blue, 536 F. App’x 353, 355 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that the
district court did not err in crediting defendant’s post-arrest statement to support drug
quantities for purposes of sentencing). Moreover, Appellant’s statement was corroborated
by text messages wherein she sought to acquire firearms, photographs of Appellant with
objects identified by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives as actual
firearms, and Appellant’s possession of a Taurus PT111 G2A 9mm firearm on the date of
her arrest. See United States v. Cummings, 337 F. App’x 313, 315 (4th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (holding that the district court did not err in utilizing post-arrest statements for
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purposes of determining defendant’s appropriate offense level where those statements have
established reliability).
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a two-level
enhancement per U.S.S.G. § 2k2.1(b)(1)(A) for an offense involving three to seven
firearms. We need not reach the merits of Appellant’s challenge to the four remaining
firearms because attributing the three firearms detailed in Appellant’s post-Miranda
statement to Appellant, plus the firearm of conviction, * is sufficient to warrant a two-level
enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1).
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s imposition of a two-level enhancement
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1) is
AFFIRMED.
*
As the Taurus PT111 G2A firearm is a 9mm, it is conceivable that this is the “9”
Appellant admitted to discharging at her grandfather’s home the day prior to her arrest.
However, this does not impact the two-level enhancement as, even assuming duplication
on this firearm, there remain three firearms attributable to Appellant.
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