United States v. Lewis ( 2007 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-4907
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    SCOTT A. LEWIS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
    District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr.,
    District Judge. (2:05-cr-00255)
    Submitted:   February 12, 2007             Decided:   March 6, 2007
    Before NIEMEYER, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
    Appellate Counsel, David R. Bungard, Assistant Federal Public
    Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant.    Charles T.
    Miller, United States Attorney, R. Booth Goodwin II, Assistant
    United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Scott A. Lewis pled guilty to mailing, transporting, or
    shipping child pornography in interstate commerce by computer, in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. §         2252A(a)(1) (2000) and was sentenced to
    ninety-seven months in prison, to be followed by a supervised
    release term of life.        Lewis now appeals his sentence.           We affirm.
    Lewis     contends    that      his    sentence--especially         the
    supervised release term of life--is unreasonable.                     We review a
    sentence imposed after United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    (2005),     to   determine    whether      the     sentence   is   “within      the
    statutorily      prescribed   range    .   .   .   and   reasonable.”      United
    States v. Hughes, 
    401 F.3d 540
    , 546-47 (4th Cir. 2005).                         “[A]
    sentence     within    the    proper       advisory      Guidelines     range    is
    presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Johnson, 
    445 F.3d 339
    ,
    341 (4th Cir. 2006). “[A] defendant can only rebut the presumption
    by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
    against the [18 U.S.C.A.] § 3553(a) [West 2000 & Supp. 2006]
    factors.”     United States v. Montes-Pineda, 
    445 F.3d 375
    , 379 (4th
    Cir.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), petition for
    cert. filed,          U.S.L.W.      (U.S. July 21, 2006) (No. 06-5439).
    Here, Lewis’ ninety-seven-month prison term falls within
    the statutorily prescribed range of five to twenty years, see 18
    U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) (2000), and within the properly calculated
    guideline range of 97-121 months.           Further, his supervised release
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    term   of   life    also   is    statutorily      authorized,      see   
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (k) (2000), and permissible under the guidelines, see U.S.
    Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5D1.2(b), (c) (2005).                 We note that
    § 5D1.2(c) provides: “(Policy Statement) If the instant offense of
    conviction is a sex offense . . ., the statutory maximum term of
    supervised release is recommended.”               Accordingly, Lewis’ sentence
    is presumptively reasonable.
    Lewis failed to rebut the presumption.              We note that, at
    sentencing, Lewis raised several arguments in favor of a release
    term of less than life. The district court considered and rejected
    Lewis’ arguments.      Notably, the court was not persuaded by Lewis’
    contentions that his previously spotless criminal record and the
    non-violent nature of the instant offense warranted a more lenient
    release term.       The court’s concern lay with the possibility of
    recidivism.        In this regard, the court was aware that Lewis
    committed the instant offense even though, only two months earlier
    in a separate investigation, authorities had seized his computer on
    suspicion    that    Lewis      had   used   it   to   send   or   receive    child
    pornography.
    We conclude that Lewis’ sentence was reasonable, and we
    affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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