United States v. Jeromey Mitchell ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4144
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JEROMEY KEITH MITCHELL, a/k/a Kaos,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville. James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (4:13-cr-00023-D-1)
Submitted: September 10, 2014 Decided: September 23, 2014
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jeromey Keith Mitchell appeals his sentence after
pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to possess with
intent to distribute 280 grams or more of cocaine base, six
counts of distributing cocaine base, and one count of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine base. On appeal, he contends
his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
We review a criminal sentence for reasonableness using
an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. McManus, 734
F.3d 315, 317 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). We first consider whether the district
court committed a significant procedural error, such as
improperly calculating the Guidelines range or inadequately
explaining the sentence imposed. United States v. Allmendinger,
706 F.3d 330, 340 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2747
(2013). If the sentence is procedurally reasonable, we then
consider whether it is substantively reasonable, taking into
account the totality of the circumstances and giving due
deference to the district court’s decision. Gall, 552 U.S. at
51. We presume that a sentence within or below a properly
calculated Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United
States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012).
In sentencing, the district court must first correctly
calculate the defendant’s Guidelines range. Allmendinger, 706
2
F.3d at 340. The court is next required to give the parties an
opportunity to argue for what they believe is an appropriate
sentence, and the court must consider those arguments in light
of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). Id.
When imposing a sentence, the court must make and place on the
record an individualized assessment based on the particular
facts of the case. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328,
330 (4th Cir. 2009). While a court must consider the statutory
factors and explain its sentence, it need not explicitly
reference § 3553(a) or discuss every factor on the record.
United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006).
The court “should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate
court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a
reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking
authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).
On appeal, Mitchell does not challenge the procedural
reasonableness of his sentence but contends that his 264-month
prison sentence is substantively unreasonable. We disagree.
The district court correctly calculated that his Guidelines
range was 292 to 365 months and reasonably determined that a
sentence of 264 months, 28 months below the low end of the
range, was appropriate based on its thorough, individualized
assessment of Mitchell’s case in light of his arguments and the
§ 3553(a) factors. Based on a totality of the circumstances, we
3
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion,
and we accord deference to its sentencing decisions. See United
States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 106 (4th Cir. 2012).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4