United States v. Gregory Johnson ( 2023 )

USCA4 Appeal: 21-4439 Doc: 27 Filed: 03/30/2023 Pg: 1 of 4
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-4439
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GREGORY JOHNSON, a/k/a Little Greg,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Peter J. Messitte, Senior District Judge. (8:02-cr-00178-PJM-1)
Submitted: September 29, 2022 Decided: March 30, 2023
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, WYNN, Circuit Judge, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Eugene Gorokhov, Michael T. Collins, BURNHAM & GOROKHOV, PLLC,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Erek L. Barron, United States Attorney, Baltimore,
Maryland, Ellen E. Nazmy, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Gregory Johnson appeals the district court’s second amended criminal judgment
resentencing him to 489 months’ incarceration after granting his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion
in part and vacating one of his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions for using a firearm during
and in relation to kidnapping. On appeal, Johnson challenges the sentence as procedurally
and substantively unreasonable, and he argues that the court failed to explain the
discretionary supervised release conditions. We affirm.
When, as here, the district court reviews a sentence under § 2255 and determines
that it is unlawful, the court shall vacate and set aside the sentence and must order “(1) the
prisoner’s release, (2) the grant of a future new trial to the prisoner, (3) or a new sentence,
be it imposed by (a) a resentencing or (b) a corrected sentence.” United States v. Hadden,
475 F.3d 652, 661 (4th Cir. 2007); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). Here, the court conducted
a resentencing hearing, and we review Johnson’s resulting sentence for reasonableness
under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51
(2007). We first examine the sentence for procedural error, which includes “failing to
calculate (or improperly calculating) the [Sentencing] Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Id.
Only if we find the sentence procedurally reasonable do we consider its substantive
reasonableness. United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019).
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In pronouncing a sentence, “[a] district court is required to provide an individualized
assessment based on the facts before the court, and to explain adequately the sentence
imposed to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair
sentencing.” United States v. Lewis, 958 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “The court’s explanation should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate
court that it has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising
its own legal decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Lozano, 962 F.3d 773, 782
(4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). “We do not evaluate a [district] court’s sentencing statements
in a vacuum.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 213 (4th Cir. 2020). “Instead, we
look at the full context, including the give-and-take of a sentencing hearing” and “may
infer from that discussion that specific attention has been given to [the defendant’s]
arguments.” Id. Moreover, “[a]ny sentence that is within or below a properly calculated
Guidelines range is presumptively [substantively] reasonable. Such a presumption can
only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014)
(internal citation omitted).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and the relevant legal authorities and
conclude that the sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district
court actively engaged with the parties during their arguments, responding to those
arguments and explaining why the court accepted or rejected them and weighing them
against the statutory factors. The court therefore sufficiently addressed Johnson’s
arguments in mitigation and explained its reasons for the sentence imposed. Furthermore,
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we conclude that Johnson has failed to overcome the presumption of reasonableness
attached to his within-Guidelines-range sentence.
With respect to the conditions of supervised release, we review “special conditions
of supervised release for abuse of discretion, recognizing that district courts have broad
latitude in this space.” United States v. Hamilton, 986 F.3d 413, 419 (4th Cir. 2021)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “The [district] court may impose any special condition
that is reasonably related to the statutory sentencing factors . . . .” United States v.
Douglas, 850 F.3d 660, 663 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). A court must specifically explain the bases for a discretionary
condition of supervised release unless (1) the reasons are “self-evident,” (2) the defendant
did not raise any nonfrivolous objections to the condition, and (3) the court provided an
adequate explanation for the sentence as a whole. United States v. Boyd, 5 F.4th 550, 559
(4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Having reviewed the record, we
conclude that reasons for imposing the special conditions of supervised release here are
self-evident and that the district court did not err in imposing them.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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