United States v. Sylvester Walker ( 2023 )


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  • USCA4 Appeal: 21-4441      Doc: 22         Filed: 04/12/2023     Pg: 1 of 6
    UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 21-4441
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    SYLVESTER WALKER,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
    Wheeling. John Preston Bailey, District Judge. (5:20-cr-00033-JPB-JPM-1)
    Submitted: March 29, 2023                                         Decided: April 12, 2023
    Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    ON BRIEF: Robert G. McCoid, MCCOID LAW OFFICES, PLLC, Wheeling, West
    Virginia, for Appellant. Shawn Michael Adkins, Assistant United States Attorney,
    OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for
    Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    USCA4 Appeal: 21-4441      Doc: 22         Filed: 04/12/2023      Pg: 2 of 6
    PER CURIAM:
    Sylvester Walker pled guilty to distributing cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a
    protected location, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 860, and distributing
    cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1), (b)(1)(C). The district court sentenced
    Walker as a career offender to 120 months’ imprisonment. Counsel for Walker has filed a
    brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), stating that there are no
    meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Walker’s guilty plea is valid,
    whether the district court correctly denied Walker’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
    whether the court correctly denied Walker’s motion to suppress, and whether Walker’s
    sentence is reasonable. Although advised of his right to do so, Walker did not file a pro se
    supplemental brief. The Government declined to file a response brief. We affirm in part
    and dismiss in part.
    Beginning with the validity of Walker’s guilty plea, counsel questions whether the
    magistrate judge complied with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting
    Walker’s guilty plea and whether Walker was competent to enter an informed plea. A
    guilty plea is valid if the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently pleads guilty
    “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” United
    States v. Fisher, 
    711 F.3d 460
    , 464 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
    district court must also “ensure that the defendant is competent to enter the plea.” United
    States v. Nicholson, 
    676 F.3d 376
    , 382 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    “[A] properly conducted Rule 11 plea colloquy raises a strong presumption that the plea is
    final and binding.” United States v. Walker, 
    934 F.3d 375
    , 377 n.1 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal
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    quotation marks omitted). Because Walker moved in the district court to withdraw his
    guilty plea, we review the district court’s “acceptance of [the] guilty plea under the
    harmless error standard.” United States v. Williams, 
    811 F.3d 621
    , 622 (4th Cir. 2016).
    Here, the magistrate judge properly determined that Walker was competent and
    capable of entering a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. The magistrate judge also
    conducted a thorough plea colloquy that substantially complied with the requirements of
    Rule 11. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court’s misstatement of
    the applicable fine for the 
    21 U.S.C. § 860
     offense is harmless and that Walker’s guilty
    plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by a sufficient factual basis. Therefore,
    Walker’s guilty plea is valid.
    Regarding Walker’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, we review a district court’s
    denial of such motion for abuse of discretion. Nicholson, 
    676 F.3d at 383
    . “A defendant
    has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.” 
    Id. at 383-84
     (internal quotation marks
    omitted). Rather, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a “fair and just
    reason” supports his request to withdraw his plea. 
    Id. at 384
     (listing factors courts consider
    in making such determination). “[A] properly conducted Rule 11 guilty plea colloquy
    leaves a defendant with a very limited basis upon which to have his plea withdrawn.” 
    Id.
    (internal quotation marks omitted). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and the
    relevant legal authorities and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    denying Walker’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
    Counsel also questions whether the district court erred in denying Walker’s motion
    to suppress a confidential informant’s identification of Walker. However, a valid guilty
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    plea prevents a defendant from appealing “the constitutionality of case-related government
    conduct that takes place before the plea is entered,” including the validity of seizures and
    searches under the Fourth Amendment, unless he reserves the right to raise such a challenge
    in a plea agreement. Class v. United States, 
    138 S. Ct. 798
    , 805 (2018). Because Walker’s
    guilty plea was unconditional, his challenge to the district court’s denial of his motion to
    suppress “is not properly before us.” United States v. Fitzgerald, 
    820 F.3d 107
    , 113 (4th
    Cir. 2016).
    Finally, counsel questions whether Walker’s sentence is reasonable. We “review[]
    all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the [Sentencing]
    Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v.
    Torres-Reyes, 
    952 F.3d 147
    , 151 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). We first consider “whether
    the district court committed significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or
    improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing
    to consider the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous
    facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” United States v. Lester, 
    985 F.3d 377
    , 384 (4th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). When selecting a sentence, “a district court’s
    explanation should provide some indication that the court considered the § 3553(a) factors
    and applied them to the particular defendant, and also that it considered a defendant’s
    nonfrivolous arguments for a lower sentence.” United States v. Nance, 
    957 F.3d 204
    , 212-
    13 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).
    If there are no procedural errors, we then consider the substantive reasonableness of
    the sentence by evaluating “the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the
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    sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the
    standards set forth in § 3553(a).” Id. at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Any
    sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively
    reasonable,” and the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the sentence is
    unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. White, 
    810 F.3d 212
    , 230 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    We conclude that the district court afforded counsel an opportunity to argue for an
    appropriate sentence, allowed Walker to personally address the court, and correctly
    calculated Walker’s Guidelines range as 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment. At sentencing,
    Walker argued that the career offender enhancement was not intended to apply to low-level
    drug offenders like him. The district court imposed a significant downward variance but
    explained that it did not vary downwardly as far as Walker had requested because it found
    Walker’s criminal history especially troubling and noted that Walker’s offenses occurred
    shortly after his release from prison for similar conduct. Because the court sufficiently
    considered Walker’s individual circumstances and responded to his arguments for a lower
    sentence, Walker fails to overcome the presumption of reasonableness afforded his below-
    Guidelines-range sentence. Therefore, the sentence is reasonable, and the district court did
    not abuse its discretion.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
    found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore dismiss the appeal to the extent
    Walker seeks to appeal the denial of his suppression motion, see United States v. Bundy,
    
    392 F.3d 641
    , 645 (4th Cir. 2004), and affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
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    requires that counsel inform Walker, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court
    of the United States for further review. If Walker requests that a petition be filed, but
    counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
    court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy
    thereof was served on Walker. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would
    not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED IN PART,
    DISMISSED IN PART
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