United States v. Daniel Rowland ( 2023 )

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4076 Doc: 25 Filed: 04/19/2023 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4076
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DANIEL EUGENE ROWLAND,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Big
Stone Gap. James P. Jones, Senior District Judge. (2:21-cr-00002-JPJ-PMS-1)
Submitted: April 3, 2023 Decided: April 19, 2023
Before WILKINSON and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Dennis E. Jones, DENNIS E. JONES & ASSOCIATES, PC, Abingdon,
Virginia, for Appellant. Jennifer R. Bockhorst, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Daniel Eugene Rowland was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846; two counts of
distributing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(C);
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A); possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), (e); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); use of a communication facility in facilitating a
controlled substance offense, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), (d); and money
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). The district court sentenced
Rowland to 420 months’ imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release. On appeal,
Rowland’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
asserting that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether there is
sufficient evidence to support Rowland’s conviction for distributing methamphetamine as
alleged in count 2 and whether the sentence imposed is reasonable. Rowland was notified
of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not done so, and the Government has
declined to file a response brief. We affirm.
We review the denial of Rowland’s motion for judgment of acquittal de novo.
United States v. Millender, 970 F.3d 523, 528 (4th Cir. 2020). In assessing the sufficiency
of the evidence, we determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the
conviction when viewed in the light most favorable to the government. United States v.
Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 219 (4th Cir. 2018). “[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a
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reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of
a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Rodriguez-Soriano, 931
F.3d 281, 286 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir.
1996) (alteration in original). In making this determination, we may not resolve conflicts
in the evidence or evaluate witness credibility. Savage, 885 F.3d at 219. Moreover, “[a]
defendant who brings a sufficiency challenge bears a heavy burden, as appellate reversal
on grounds of insufficient evidence is confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is
clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In order to establish a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), the government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that “(1) [the] defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed
the controlled substance alleged in the indictment, and (2) at the time of such distribution
the defendant knew that the substance distributed was a controlled substance under the
law.” United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 526 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States
v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 689 (4th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original). “[T]he identification
of a criminal actor by one person is itself evidence sufficient to go to the jury and support
a guilty verdict . . . .” United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273, 274 (4th Cir. 1974). Further,
“[a] witness need not physically point out a defendant so long as the evidence is sufficient
to permit the inference that the person on trial was the person who committed the crime.”
United States v. Taylor, 900 F.2d 779, 782 (4th Cir. 1990). For example, where a witness
“testifie[s] extensively about his earlier contacts with [the defendant] and about purchasing
the drugs from [the defendant],” a jury can reasonably infer that the defendant is the person
who sold drugs to the witness. Id.3
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We conclude that there is substantial evidence to support Rowland’s conviction for
distributing methamphetamine as alleged in count 2. While the confidential informant was
unable to identify Rowland in the courtroom as the person who sold her the
methamphetamine, there is other evidence that, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Government, supports Rowland’s conviction. In particular, the confidential informant
identified Rowland’s voice from an audio recording of the controlled purchase and
communicated on Facebook with someone using the name Daniel Rowland, with a profile
photograph of Rowland. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that a jury
could reasonably find that Rowland distributed methamphetamine as alleged in count 2.
Turning to Rowland’s challenge to his sentence, we review “all sentences—whether
inside, just outside, or significantly outside the [Sentencing] Guidelines range—under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Torres-Reyes, 952 F.3d 147,
151 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “First, we ‘ensure that the district
court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider
the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or
failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.’” United States v. Fowler, 948 F.3d 663,
668 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). “If the sentence
‘is procedurally sound, [this] court should then consider the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence,’ taking into account the totality of the circumstances.” United States v.
Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). Any sentence
within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.
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United States v. Gillespie, 27 F.4th 934, 945 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 164 (2022).
A defendant can rebut the presumption only by showing that the sentence is unreasonable
when measured against the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306
(4th Cir. 2014).
We conclude that Rowland’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable.
The district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range, and while Rowland argued for
a sentence below the Guidelines range, the court rejected Rowland’s mitigation arguments,
concluding that a within-Guidelines sentence was appropriate given the nature and
circumstances of the offenses, Rowland’s criminal history, and the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities. Rowland fails to overcome the presumption of
reasonableness accorded to his within-Guidelines sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Rowland, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Rowland requests that a petition
be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state
that a copy thereof was served on Rowland.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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