Ronald Starleper v. Mercantile Mortgage, LLC , 669 F. App'x 105 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-1061
RONALD W. STARLEPER; CONSTANCE M. STARLEPER,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
MERCANTILE MORTGAGE, LLC; WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; WELLS
FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC.; FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:15-cv-02402-JFM)
Submitted: September 9, 2016 Decided: September 29, 2016
Before NIEMEYER, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ronald W. Starleper, Constance M. Starleper, Appellants Pro Se.
Virginia Wood Barnhart, Justin E. Fine, Sarah E. Meyer, Douglas
Brooks Riley, TREANOR, POPE & HUGHES, PA, Towson, Maryland, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ronald and Constance Starleper appeal the district court’s
orders dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim
and denying reconsideration. We affirm the district court’s
orders.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of an action
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), accepting factual allegations in
the complaint as true and “draw[ing] all reasonable inferences
in favor of the [nonmoving party].” Kensington Volunteer Fire
Dep’t v. Montgomery Cty., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted). To survive a motion to
dismiss, the complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and
sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570
(2007).
Confining our review to the issues raised in Appellants’
opening brief, see 4th Cir. R. 34(b), we discern no error in the
district court’s orders. While a district court must liberally
construe a pro se complaint, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007), this does not excuse the Starlepers from meeting the
required pleading standards. See Giarratano v. Johnson, 521
F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (concluding that “Erickson
[did not] undermine Twombly’s requirement that a pleading
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contain more than labels and conclusions” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). The Starlepers’ contention that their mortgage
is defective because the deed of trust and mortgage note were
assigned separately “is not[] the law.” See Horvath v. Bank of
N.Y., N.A., 641 F.3d 617, 624 (4th Cir. 2011); Svrcek v.
Rosenberg, 40 A.3d 494, 507 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013).
Moreover, to the extent that the Starlepers challenge Appellees’
failure to identify “Fannie Mae REMIC Trust 2010-122,” the
Starlepers have waived appellate review of this claim by failing
to raise it before the district court. See In re Under Seal,
749 F.3d 276, 285, 292 (4th Cir. 2014).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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