Robert Humphrey, Jr. v. Day & Zimmermann International , 589 F. App'x 135 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1108
ROBERT WAYNE HUMPHREY, JR.; CRYSTAL MARIE HUMPHREY,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
DAY & ZIMMERMANN INTERNATIONAL INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Timothy M. Cain, District Judge.
(6:12-cv-01458-TMC)
Submitted: September 30, 2014 Decided: January 2, 2015
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Blake A. Hewitt, John S. Nichols, BLUESTEIN, NICHOLS, THOMPSON &
DELGADO, Columbia, South Carolina; Gary W. Poliakoff, POLIAKOFF
& ASSOCIATES, P.A., Spartanburg, South Carolina, for Appellants.
Daniel B. White, Stephanie G. Flynn, GALLIVAN, WHITE & BOYD,
P.A., Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Humphrey (“Humphrey”) and his wife Crystal
Humphrey (collectively “Plaintiffs”) appeal the district court’s
order granting summary judgment for Day & Zimmermann
International (“Defendant”) on their state-law negligence
claims. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
judgment, viewing the facts and drawing all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Glynn v. EDO Corp., 710 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2013). Summary
judgment is properly granted “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a).
In light of the district court’s diversity
jurisdiction, South Carolina substantive law governs this
dispute. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
To establish a claim for negligence in South Carolina, a
plaintiff must show that: (1) defendants owed him a duty of
care; (2) defendants breached this duty by a negligent act or
omission; (3) defendants’ breach was the proximate cause of
their injuries; and (4) he suffered injury or damages. Dorrell
v. S.C. Dep’t of Transp., 605 S.E.2d 12, 15 (S.C. 2004).
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South Carolina has adopted the doctrine of comparative
negligence in assessing damages in tort actions. See Nelson v.
Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d 783 (S.C. 1991). A plaintiff’s
recovery is reduced by the percentage of fault proportioned to
the plaintiff, as long as the plaintiff’s fault is “not greater
than” that of the defendant. See id. at 784. While ordinarily
“[c]omparison of a plaintiff’s negligence with that of the
defendant is a question of fact for the jury to decide,” Creech
v. S.C. Wildlife & Marine Res. Dep’t, 491 S.E.2d 571, 575 n.1
(S.C. 1997), summary judgment is appropriate where “the sole
reasonable inference which may be drawn from the evidence is
that the plaintiff’s negligence exceeded fifty percent.” Bloom
v. Ravoira, 529 S.E.2d 710, 713 (S.C. 2000) (citing Creech, 491
S.E.2d at 575).
Plaintiffs argue that comparison of Humphrey’s
negligence to Defendant’s negligence is a question properly left
to the jury in this case. We disagree. Despite his knowledge
of the hazards of the chemical in question, Humphrey failed to
ensure that he used his protective equipment properly while
repairing the pipe damaged by Defendant’s negligence. After his
protective jumpsuit was covered in the chemical during the
repair work, Humphrey continued his work and exposed himself to
the chemical when he broke the seal on his face mask after
condensation appeared, rather than replace the mask with a
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properly fitted one. On these facts, the district court
properly concluded that the only reasonable inference from the
evidence here was that Humphrey’s negligence exceeded
Defendant’s as a matter of law.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the material before this
court and argument will not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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