United States v. Abdullah Mattocks ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5041
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ABDULLAH MATTOCKS, a/k/a Abdul-Nur Zaid, a/k/a Abdul Zaid,
a/k/a Abdul Nur, a/k/a Abdullah Ebin Zaid Mattocks,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
Judge. (1:08-cr-00387-GBL-1)
Submitted: July 29, 2011 Decided: August 5, 2011
Before SHEDD, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Daniel T. Lopez, BRIGLIA HUNDLEY NUTALL & KAY PC, Vienna,
Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States
Attorney, Michael P. Ben’Ary, Assistant United States Attorney,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Abdullah Mattocks appeals his convictions for
conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and possession of firearms
in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006). His sole contention on appeal is
that the district court erred in denying his motions to withdraw
his guilty plea and for reconsideration of that order. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
The Government suggests that Mattocks’ appeal be
dismissed as barred by the appellate waiver in Mattocks’ plea
agreement. Pursuant to a plea agreement, a defendant may waive
his appellate rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006). United
States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990). A waiver
will preclude appeal of a specific issue if the waiver is valid
and the issue is within the scope of the waiver. United States
v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005). Whether a
defendant validly waived his right to appeal is a question of
law that this court reviews de novo. Id. at 168. “The validity
of an appeal waiver depends on whether the defendant knowingly
and intelligently agreed to waive the right to appeal.” Id. at
169 (citation omitted).
Although the Government is correct that Mattocks
agreed to waive his right to appeal his conviction and sentence,
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where, as here, an appellant challenges the denial of his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that the plea was not
knowing or voluntary, an appeal waiver does not prevent this
court from hearing the appeal. United States v. Craig, 985 F.2d
175, 178 (4th Cir. 1993). We therefore decline the Government’s
invitation to dismiss the appeal.
Turning to the merits of Mattocks’ appeal, the
district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ubakanma,
215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000). “[A] defendant does not have
an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, even before
sentencing.” United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th
Cir. 1991). Instead, he must show a “fair and just reason” for
withdrawing his plea. Id. “[A] ‘fair and just’ reason . . .
is one that essentially challenges . . . the fairness of the
Rule 11 proceeding.” United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389,
1394 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
In determining whether Mattocks has carried his
burden, the court considers six factors:
(1) whether the defendant has offered credible
evidence that his plea was not knowing or not
voluntary, (2) whether the defendant has credibly
asserted his legal innocence, (3) whether there has
been a delay between the entering of the plea and the
filing of the motion, (4) whether the defendant has
had close assistance of competent counsel, (5) whether
withdrawal will cause prejudice to the government, and
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(6) whether it will inconvenience the court and waste
judicial resources.
Moore, 931 F.2d at 248. Although all the factors in Moore must
be given appropriate weight, the key in determining whether a
motion to withdraw should be granted is whether the Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 hearing was properly conducted. United States v.
Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995). This court closely
scrutinizes the Rule 11 colloquy and attaches a strong
presumption that the plea is final and binding if the Rule 11
proceeding was adequate. Lambey, 974 F.2d at 1394.
We have reviewed the Moore factors and conclude that
Mattocks has not carried his burden. The district court
substantially complied with the mandates of Rule 11 in accepting
Mattocks’ guilty plea, ensuring that Mattocks’ plea was knowing
and voluntary and supported by a sufficient factual basis.
United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir.
1991). Moreover, Mattocks informed the district court during
the plea colloquy that he had not been threatened or coerced to
plead guilty, and his statements at the plea hearing indicated
that he entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily. Blackledge
v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977); see Fields v. Attorney Gen.,
956 F.2d 1290, 1299 (4th Cir. 1992) (“Absent clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, a defendant is bound by the
representations he makes under oath during a plea colloquy.”).
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Despite Mattocks’ claims to the contrary, our review of the
record convinces us that Mattocks had close assistance of
counsel and was not coerced by counsel into pleading guilty.
Thus, Mattocks has not “offered credible evidence that his plea
was not knowing or otherwise involuntary.” Ubakanma, 215 F.3d
at 424.
Moreover, Mattocks has not credibly asserted his
innocence, there was a significant delay between the entry of
the plea and the motion to withdraw the plea, and both the
Government and the court would be burdened by allowing him to
withdraw his guilty plea. Based on our consideration of the
Moore factors, therefore, we conclude the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying either the motion to withdraw
the guilty plea or the motion for reconsideration.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal conclusions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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