Zarshed Ergashov v. Global Dynamic Transportation , 680 F. App'x 161 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-1591
ZARSHED ERGASHOV; DJAMSHED ERGASHOV; KHURSHED ERGASHOV;
ALISHER KHAMROKULOV; FARHOD YAROV; BOBIR YAROV,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
GLOBAL DYNAMIC TRANSPORTATION, LLC; VALERI BIGANISHVILI; DAVID
CHKHARTISHVILI; BESIKI CHKHARTISHVILI; EIGHT P CPL, LLC; DOES
1-10; RAM JAVIA,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge.
(1:15-cv-01007-ADC)
Submitted: February 17, 2017 Decided: February 23, 2017
Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Dmitri A. Chernov, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellants. Robert W.
Taylor, Jr., BUTLER, MELFA & TAYLOR, P.A., Towson, Maryland; Judd
Garrett Millman, LUCHANSKY LAW, Towson, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants Zarshed Ergashov, Djamshed Ergashov, Khurshed
Ergashov, Alisher Khamrokulov, Farhod Yarov, and Bobir Yarov
appeal the district court’s orders granting the Appellees’ motion
to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissing
their complaint. They contend that the district court erred in
dismissing their claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2012), as they had adequately pleaded both
individual and enterprise coverage. Consequently, they argue, the
district court also erred in failing to retain jurisdiction over
their state-law claims. We affirm.
We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
Demetres v. East West Const., Inc., 776 F.3d 271, 272 (4th Cir.
2015). A plaintiff has the burden of establishing jurisdiction.
Id. “[W]hen a defendant asserts that the complaint fails to allege
sufficient facts to support subject matter jurisdiction, the trial
court must apply a standard patterned on Rule 12(b)(6) and assume
the truthfulness of the facts alleged.” Kerns v. United States,
585 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 2009). However, when a defendant
contends that the complaint’s jurisdictional allegations are
simply not true, then a court may go beyond the complaint, conduct
an evidentiary hearing, and resolve any disputed facts. Id.
2
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of an action
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim. Trejo v. Ryman Hosp. Props., Inc., 795 F.3d 442, 445-46
(4th Cir. 2015). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The FLSA requires employers to pay covered employees overtime
if they work more than 40 hours in a workweek. 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(a)(1) (2012). A covered employee is one who either “is
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce”
(known as “individual coverage”) or is employed in “an enterprise
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce”
(known as “enterprise coverage”). Id.
With respect to individual coverage, an employee “engaged in
commerce” is one who is “in the channels of interstate commerce,”
as opposed to merely affecting commerce. McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319
U.S. 491, 494 (1943). “The test is whether the work is so directly
and vitally related to the functioning of an instrumentality or
facility of interstate commerce as to be, in practical effect, a
part of it, rather than isolated local activity.” Mitchell v.
C.W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427, 429 (1955).
Based on our review of the Appellants’ complaint, which
emphasizes how little the Appellants were involved in interstate
3
commerce, we conclude the Appellants have failed to allege
individual coverage. For example, the Appellants allege that
“Plaintiffs were assigned by Defendants specific routes with
multiple retail locations, all, without exception, in the State of
Maryland.” (J.A. 16). Furthermore, “[n]one of the routes involved
deliveries to any location outside the State of Maryland or any
travel to any location outside the State of Maryland, by
Plaintiffs.” (J.A. 16).
The Appellants argue that they were engaged in commerce by
“deliver[ing] donuts in the Baltimore area to Dunkin Donuts stores,
a national franchise.” (Appellants’ Br. at 6). Yet the mere fact
that the stores to which they delivered donuts were part of a
national franchise is not enough by itself to establish that the
Appellants were engaged in interstate commerce, as opposed to
merely affecting it. See McLeod, 319 U.S. at 494; Mitchell, 349
U.S. at 429. Thus, we conclude the Appellants have not shown
individual coverage.
Turning next to enterprise coverage, an enterprise is
“engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce”
when it both has at least $500,000 in annual sales and “has
employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce” or “has employees handling, selling, or otherwise
working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced
for commerce by any person.” § 203(s)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
4
Insofar as the Appellants argue they have demonstrated
enterprise coverage because they were employees engaged in
commerce, we conclude they fail to show enterprise coverage for
the same reason they have failed to show individual coverage: the
complaint does not adequately allege enterprise coverage, and
delivering to stores that are part of a national franchise is not
enough to show that the Appellants were engaged in interstate
commerce, as opposed to merely affecting it. See McLeod, 319 U.S.
at 494; Mitchell, 349 U.S. at 429.
The Appellants also contend that they were required to fuel
their delivery trucks with fuel produced from out of state.
However, as the district court noted, this statement is not in the
Appellants’ complaint, and because the Appellees contended the
complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to support subject-
matter jurisdiction, the district court could not go beyond the
complaint. See Kerns, 585 F.3d at 193; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
Thus, because the Appellants have failed to show either individual
or enterprise coverage, we conclude the district court did not err
in ultimately dismissing the Appellants’ complaint.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5