United States v. Damon Penn ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4079
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DAMON PENN,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:08-cr-00554-CCB-1)
Submitted: March 24, 2011 Decided: August 18, 2011
Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ebise Bayisa, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellant. Paul Michael Cunningham, Assistant
United States Attorney, Rachel Miller Yasser, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Damon Penn appeals the 180-month sentence imposed
following his guilty plea 1 to possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).
On appeal, Penn argues that the district court erred by denying
his motion to suppress a firearm that officers seized from his
car after he was pulled over for a broken tail light and
arrested for driving with a suspended license. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
We review the factual findings underlying a district
court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for clear error and the
court’s legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Kelly, 592
F.3d 586, 589 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3374 (2010).
When evaluating the denial of a suppression motion, we construe
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the
prevailing party below. Id.
In enforcing the Fourth Amendment’s “guarantees of
sanctity of the home and inviolability of the person,” the
exclusionary rule operates to require the suppression of
evidence that is the fruit of unlawful police conduct. Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963). However,
1
Penn reserved his right to appeal the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress.
2
evidence obtained during a search conducted unlawfully but “in
reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the
exclusionary rule." Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419,
2429 (2011).
In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1981),
the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer does
not violate the Fourth Amendment when he searches the passenger
compartment of an automobile subsequent to a lawful custodial
arrest. In 2009, however, the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Gant,
129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), clarified Belton by holding that police
may conduct an automobile search incident to a lawful arrest
only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance
of the passenger compartment or when it is “reasonable to
believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found
in the vehicle.” 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
Here, the gun was seized pursuant to an unlawful
warrantless search of Penn's car under Gant; the search was
conducted after Penn was already detained and outside reaching
distance of the passenger compartment, and it was not reasonable
to believe the evidence of his license suspension would be found
in the car. Nonetheless, we hold that the district court did
not err in admitting the evidence. Police searched Penn's car
on July 1, 2008, over ten months before Gant was decided and
pursuant to this court's interpretation of Belton, which
3
authorized an automobile search incident to a recent occupant’s
arrest. See United States v. Milton, 52 F.3d 78, 80 (4th Cir.
1995). Thus, we hold that the exclusionary rule did not apply
to the evidence seized during the arrest.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 2
Because Penn is represented by counsel who has filed an
extensive brief on the merits, we deny his motion to file a pro
se supplemental brief. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a), (c). We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
2
In affirming the denial of a motion to suppress, "we are
not limited to evaluation of the grounds offered by the district
court to support its decision, but may affirm on any grounds
apparent from the record." United States v. Smith, 395 F.3d
516, 519 (4th Cir. 2005).
4