United States v. Tadarian Neal , 458 F. App'x 246 ( 2011 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 09-5043
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    TADARIAN RESHAWN NEAL,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    No. 09-5044
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    TADARIAN RESHAWN NEAL,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.     Frank D. Whitney,
    District Judge. (3:09-cr-00017-FDW-DCK-1; 3:04-cr-00073-FDW-1)
    Submitted:   December 13, 2011            Decided:   December 16, 2011
    Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Andrew B. Banzhoff, DEVEREUX & BANZHOFF, PLLC, Asheville, North
    Carolina, for Appellant.      Anne M. Tompkins, United States
    Attorney, Richard Lee Edwards, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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    PER CURIAM:
    In     these    consolidated       cases,     Tadarian    Reshawn       Neal
    appeals     both     the      168-month        sentence     imposed        after     his
    convictions on all counts of a four-count indictment, as well as
    the   twenty-four-month           consecutive      sentence    imposed       for    his
    violation    of    the     conditions     of   supervised     release      that     were
    imposed on his 2005 federal felon-in-possession conviction.                          We
    affirm.
    Neal first claims that his conviction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1) (2006) for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon
    is invalid because it is based on a 2005 felon-in-possession
    conviction        which      is      itself     infirm      under     our      recent
    jurisprudence.           Our review is de novo.             See Suter v. United
    States, 
    441 F.3d 306
    , 310 (4th Cir. 2006).
    Pertinent       to    this   appeal,    § 922(g)(1)      prohibits      the
    possession of a firearm by any person “who has been convicted in
    any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
    exceeding one year.”              
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1).         At the time of
    Neal’s conviction and sentence, we determined whether a prior
    conviction was punishable by more than a year’s imprisonment by
    considering       “the     maximum    aggravated     sentence       that    could    be
    imposed for that crime upon a defendant with the worst possible
    criminal history.”           United States v. Harp, 
    406 F.3d 242
    , 246
    (4th Cir. 2005).           After Neal was sentenced, however, Harp was
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    overruled    by     the      en    banc    decision    in     Simmons.         See    United
    States v. Simmons, 
    649 F.3d 237
    , 241 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
    Simmons held that a prior North Carolina offense was punishable
    for a term exceeding one year only if the particular defendant
    before the court had been eligible for such a sentence under the
    applicable statutory scheme, taking into account his criminal
    history and the nature of his offense.                            
    Id. at 247
    ; see also
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17(c)-(d) (2009) (setting forth North
    Carolina’s structured sentencing scheme).
    Neal      now    argues       that     both    of     the     North   Carolina
    convictions that served as the predicates for his 2005 felon-in-
    possession    conviction           are    not   “felonies”         under    the    rationale
    announced in Simmons.              (J.A. 878-79).          As a result, claims Neal,
    his 2005 felon-in-possession conviction is invalid.                                According
    to   Neal,     because            his     current    § 922(g)(1)           conviction    is
    predicated        on      the       now     infirm         2005     felon-in-possession
    conviction, his present § 922(g)(1) conviction cannot stand.
    Neal is mistaken.               This court squarely rejected this
    line of argument in United States v. Kahoe, 
    134 F.3d 1230
     (4th
    Cir. 1998), holding that any subsequently-realized invalidity of
    a predicate felony conviction is immaterial to a § 922(g)(1)
    prosecution, as long as the prior conviction was in effect on
    the date that the defendant possessed the firearm.                           Id. at 1235.
    In this case, there is no dispute that Neal’s 2005 felon-in-
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    possession conviction was both punishable by more than a year
    and was in effect on August 18, 2008, when he possessed the
    sawed-off shotgun that is the subject of his current § 922(g)(1)
    conviction.         As a result, his current § 922(g)(1) conviction is
    proper, notwithstanding the possible effects of Simmons on his
    previous conviction.
    Neal next asserts that, because Simmons suggests that
    his    2005    felon-in-possession               conviction      was     in    error,       the
    district      court      erred    in       imposing   a   prison      sentence       for    his
    violation of the conditions of supervised release attendant to
    that offense.            But, even assuming that Neal has not waived this
    strand of argument, it amounts to an attempt to collaterally
    attack his 2005 felon-in-possession conviction.                          Of course, “the
    validity      of    an    underlying        conviction    or    sentence       may    not    be
    collaterally         attacked         in     a   supervised          release    revocation
    proceeding         and    may    be    challenged      only     on    direct    appeal       or
    through a habeas corpus proceeding.”                      United States v. Warren,
    
    335 F.3d 76
    ,     78     (2d        Cir.     2003)     (collecting          cases).
    Consequently, we can only conclude that Neal’s present claims,
    which seek to elude the sentence imposed upon his violation of
    the conditions of supervised release by vacating the underlying
    2005   felon-in-possession              conviction,       are   not     properly      before
    this court.
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    Third, Neal attacks his convictions for obstruction of
    justice,       in    violation       of    
    18 U.S.C. § 1503
        (2006),      and   for
    witness    tampering,          in     violation        of    
    18 U.S.C. § 1512
    (b)(1)
    (2006), on the ground that the indictment failed to set forth
    sufficient          factual    allegations          regarding       the    nature       of   the
    offenses.       We agree with the Government that Neal waived these
    challenges to the indictment by failing to raise them in the
    district court prior to trial.                        See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(e);
    United States v. Robinson, 
    627 F.3d 941
    , 957 (4th Cir. 2010).
    Finally,       Neal    argues        that    his   punishments          for   both
    obstruction of justice and witness tampering violate principles
    of double jeopardy, given that they are predicated on the same
    underlying conduct.             We review questions of double jeopardy de
    novo.     See United States v. Brown, 
    202 F.3d 691
    , 703 (4th Cir.
    2000).     “Where the issue is solely that of multiple punishment,
    as opposed to multiple prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause
    does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing
    greater    punishment          than       the   legislature         intended.”           United
    States v. Studifin, 
    240 F.3d 415
    , 418 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal
    quotation       marks     omitted).             “The       same    conduct    can       support
    convictions and sentencing under two different federal statutes
    as long as each statute requires proof of an element that the
    other does not.”              United States v. Johnson, 
    219 F.3d 349
    , 358
    (4th    Cir.    2000).         Moreover,        “[i]f       the    elements       of   the   two
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    statutes do not necessarily overlap, then multiple punishments
    are presumed to be authorized absent a clear showing of contrary
    Congressional intent.”              
    Id. at 359
     (internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    In     this   case,    each      offense    of     conviction      requires
    proof    of    an    element      that   the      other   does    not.        See   United
    States v. LeMoure, 
    474 F.3d 37
    , 44 (1st Cir. 2007).                              Neal has
    made     no    showing      defeating       the    presumptive         availability     of
    multiple       punishments        for    these       separate      offenses.           His
    punishment under both § 1503 and § 1512 for the same underlying
    course of conduct therefore poses no double jeopardy concerns.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the district
    court.        We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions        are     adequately       presented     in     the    material
    before    the       court   and    argument       will    not    aid    the     decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
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