United States v. Jeffrey Sparks ( 2015 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 15-4046
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    JEFFREY NATHAN SPARKS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of North Carolina, at Statesville.          Richard L.
    Voorhees, District Judge. (5:11-cr-00073-RLV-DSC-31)
    Submitted:   September 15, 2015           Decided:   November 4, 2015
    Before WILKINSON, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Robert C. Carpenter, ADAMS, HENDON, CARSON, CROW & SAENGER,
    P.A., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant.  Amy Elizabeth
    Ray,   Assistant  United  States  Attorney,  Asheville,  North
    Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Jeffrey    Nathan        Sparks    pled        guilty       to    conspiracy         to
    distribute, possess with intent to distribute, and manufacture a
    controlled     substance        in    violation       of    21    U.S.C.      §   841(a)(1)
    (2012).      The court imposed a 63-month sentence.                      Sparks’ counsel
    filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
       (1967),   stating        that,    in       counsel’s      view,       there   are   no
    meritorious      issues      for     appeal,       but     questioning        whether      the
    district court denied Sparks the opportunity to allocute prior
    to imposing sentence and whether Sparks was denied the effective
    assistance of trial counsel.               Sparks was informed of his right
    to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done so.
    For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    Based on Sparks’ stipulation as to the quantity of drugs
    reasonably foreseeable to him and the evidence provided by law
    enforcement agents, the district court determined that Sparks’
    base offense level was 32.                The court appropriately increased
    Sparks’ offense level for possession of a firearm in furtherance
    of    the   offense    and   substantial           risk    of    harm    to    human    life.
    After       reducing      the        offense        level        for     acceptance         of
    responsibility, Sparks’ advisory Guidelines range was 168 to 210
    months’ imprisonment.            The court departed downward to level 25
    and    an   advisory    Guidelines        range       of    63    to    78    months,      and
    announced Sparks’ sentence as 63 months.
    2
    Only after imposing sentence did the district court ask
    Sparks if he wished to say anything with regard to his sentence.
    Sparks responded, expressing his appreciation to the court and
    apologizing for his bad decisions.            On appeal, Sparks contends
    that he was denied the opportunity to allocute prior to the
    court’s imposition of sentence.
    A defendant has a due process right to address the court
    and provide a statement in mitigation of sentencing.                  Fed. R.
    Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii); Green v. United States, 
    365 U.S. 301
    ,
    304 (1961); Ashe v. North Carolina, 
    586 F.2d 334
    , 336 (4th Cir.
    1978).    Because he failed to object at sentencing, our review is
    for plain error.         United States v. Muhammad, 
    478 F.3d 247
    , 248-
    49 (4th Cir. 2007).         We find that the district court, by first
    announcing    Sparks’      sentence     and   then   allowing   Sparks     the
    opportunity to allocute, did not commit plain error.                See United
    States v. Engle, 
    676 F.3d 405
    , 425 (4th Cir. 2012) (“‘[W]hen a
    judge announces a sentence before hearing an allocution, it is
    fair to assume that such a sentence is tentative and that the
    judge will consider the defendant’s statements before imposing a
    final sentence.’”) (quoting United States v. Burgos–Andujar, 
    275 F.3d 23
    , 30 (1st Cir. 2001)), petition for cert. filed (June 12,
    2015); see also United States v. Boose, 
    403 F.3d 1016
    (8th Cir.
    2005)    (finding   no    denial   of   allocution   when   court    announced
    tentative sentence before allowing defendant to allocute).
    3
    Additionally, in light of the district court’s significant
    downward departure, Sparks cannot show that he was prejudiced by
    not allocuting prior to the imposition of sentence.                              See United
    States v. Lewis, 
    10 F.3d 1086
    , 1092 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding no
    prejudice to defendant by the denial of the right to allocute
    when there was no possibility of defendant receiving a lesser
    sentence).
    Sparks    also     contends       that       he   was    denied      the      effective
    assistance of counsel with respect to his entry of a guilty
    plea, counsel’s failure to object to and challenge sentencing
    enhancements,      and      counsel’s         incorrect       advice      as   to     whether
    Sparks    should   testify        at    sentencing.            We   decline         to    reach
    Sparks’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.                             Unless an
    attorney’s ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the face of
    the   record,    ineffective        assistance          claims      are    not      generally
    addressed on direct appeal.               United States v. Benton, 
    523 F.3d 424
    , 435 (4th Cir. 2008).              Instead, such claims should be raised
    in a motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012), in
    order to permit sufficient development of the record.                                    United
    States    v.   Baptiste,      
    596 F.3d 214
    ,     216   n.1    (4th      Cir.      2010).
    Because    there       is    no     conclusive          evidence          of   ineffective
    assistance of counsel on the face of the record, we conclude
    that these claims should be raised, if at all, in a § 2255
    motion.
    4
    In   accordance    with    Anders,    we   have   reviewed   the   entire
    record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
    appeal.     We therefore affirm Sparks’ conviction and sentence.
    This court requires that counsel inform Sparks, in writing, of
    the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
    further review.      If Sparks requests that a petition be filed,
    but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
    then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
    representation.      Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
    was served on Sparks.          We dispense with oral argument because
    the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
    materials   before    this   court   and   argument     would   not   aid   the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    5