United States v. Willie Andre Jackson , 704 F. App'x 264 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4507
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIE ANDRE JACKSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:15-cr-00323-WO-1)
Submitted: November 16, 2017 Decided: November 28, 2017
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John D. Bryson, WYATT, EARLY, HARRIS & WHEELER, LLP, High Point, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, Acting United States Attorney, Terry M.
Meinecke, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Willie Andre Jackson appeals the 71-month sentence the district court imposed
after he pleaded guilty to distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (2012). He asserts that the district court imposed a substantively
unreasonable sentence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
We review a defendant’s sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Because Jackson does not
argue that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable, we review it for substantive
reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51. “Any
sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively
reasonable.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). “Such a
presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when
measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors.” Id.
Jackson contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable, arguing that the
district court erroneously relied on two circumstances—namely, the presence of firearms
during the commission of the crime and his criminal history—both to determine the
applicable Sentencing Guidelines range and as a basis for Jackson’s particular sentence.
This contention fails to overcome the presumption of reasonableness accorded Jackson’s
within-Guidelines sentence. We therefore discern no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s imposition of a 71-month sentence.
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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