United States v. Ladarrius Walker , 705 F. App'x 192 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4217
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LADARRIUS O’BRIAN WALKER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, Chief District Judge. (1:16-cr-00239-TDS-1)
Submitted: November 16, 2017 Decided: December 6, 2017
Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Seth A. Neyhart, STARK LAW GROUP, PLLC, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, Acting United States Attorney, John M. Alsup, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ladarrius O’Brian Walker appeals his 90-month prison sentence after pleading
guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. The district court sentenced him above his
advisory Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months. On appeal, Walker raises the issue of
whether his variance sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
“We review the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) using an
abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of ‘whether [the sentence is] inside, just outside,
or significantly outside the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Lymas, 781 F.3d 106,
111 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). We “must
first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as
failing to . . . adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any
deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If the sentence is
procedurally reasonable, we consider its substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into
account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the
Guidelines range.” Id. If the sentence is outside the Guidelines range, we “may consider
the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference to the district court’s decision
that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Id.
The district court “must make an individualized assessment based on the facts
presented when imposing a sentence, apply[ing] the relevant § 3553(a) factors to the
specific circumstances of the case and the defendant, and must state in open court the
particular reasons supporting its chosen sentence.” Lymas, 781 F.3d at 113 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “In imposing a variance sentence, the district
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court must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is
significantly compelling to support the degree of the variance.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Although “[w]e must defer to the district court and affirm a
reasonable sentence, even if we would have imposed something different,” we will vacate
a variance sentence if the district court’s “stated reasoning is inadequate or if it relies on
improper factors.” United States v. Bolton, 858 F.3d 905, 915 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in sentencing Walker, and his sentence is substantively reasonable. Taking
into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of the variance, the
district court provided adequate reasoning for its sentence and did not rely on improper
factors. We therefore give due deference to the district court’s decision.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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