Kenneth Fields v. Clifton T. Perkins Hospital , 605 F. App'x 200 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1671
KENNETH DUSHAUN FIELDS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CLIFTON T. PERKINS HOSPITAL,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
JOSHUA M. SHARFSTEIN,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:12-cv-03254-RDB)
Submitted: March 31, 2015 Decided: June 3, 2015
Before WYNN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Bruce M. Luchansky, LUCHANSKY LAW, Towson, Maryland, for
Appellant. Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General of Maryland,
Christopher A. Gozdor, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Kenneth DuShaun Fields appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to the Defendant, Clifton T. Perkins
Hospital (“Hospital”), on his claim for disability
discrimination under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C.A. § 794. Fields claimed that the Hospital failed to
provide him a reasonable accommodation by not reassigning him to
a position in the minimum-security wing of the facility where he
worked. The district court concluded that Fields failed to meet
his burden to present sufficient evidence that such a position
was available at the relevant time or that offering Fields such
a position would have been reasonable. We affirm.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo.” Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 775 F.3d 202, 207
(4th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists, we “constru[e] the evidence in the light most favorable
to . . . the non-movant . . . [and] draw all reasonable
inferences in [his] favor.” Walker, 775 F.3d at 207. We will
uphold a grant of summary judgment unless we conclude that “a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party
3
on the evidence presented.” Honor v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton,
Inc., 383 F.3d 180, 185 (4th Cir. 2004).
To establish a claim under the Rehabilitation Act for
failure to make reasonable accommodations, a plaintiff must show
that (1) he suffers a disability; (2) his employer had notice of
the disability; (3) with reasonable accommodations, he is
otherwise qualified to perform the employment position in
question; and (4) his employer refused to make such reasonable
accommodations. See Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337,
345 (4th Cir. 2013); 1 Sanchez v. Vilsack, 695 F.3d 1174, 1177
(10th Cir. 2012). “[R]easonable accommodation may include
reassignment to a vacant position.” EEOC v. Stowe-Pharr Mills,
Inc., 216 F.3d 373, 377 (4th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation
marks and ellipsis omitted); accord Sanchez, 695 F.3d at 1180.
However, if there is no vacant position for which the plaintiff
qualifies, then failure to reassign the employee does not
constitute a breach of the employer’s duty to reasonably
accommodate the employee’s disability, if possible, through
reassignment. See Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d
444, 457 (6th Cir. 2004); Winfrey v. City of Chi., 259 F.3d 610,
1
Wilson is a case arising under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012). “To
the extent possible, we construe the ADA and Rehabilitation Act
to impose similar requirements.” Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ.
Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 461 (4th Cir. 2012).
4
618 (7th Cir. 2001). “It is the plaintiff’s burden to show that
a vacant position exists for which []he was qualified.” Jackson
v. City of Chi., 414 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also McBride v. BIC Consumer
Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 2009).
Having reviewed the record on appeal, we conclude that
Fields presented insufficient evidence that a vacant position at
the Hospital was available and no evidence that he was qualified
for the positions he sought. Therefore, the district court
correctly determined that Fields failed to meet his burden of
production as to the existence of a vacant position at the
Hospital for which he was qualified, and properly concluded that
no genuine dispute remained as to whether the Hospital failed to
offer Fields a reasonable accommodation. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the
Hospital. 2
2
Fields also claimed that the Hospital violated the
Rehabilitation Act by failing to engage with him in an
interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation. The
district court correctly determined that such a claim would fail
unless Fields identified a reasonable accommodation that would
have been possible but for the Hospital’s failure to engage in
an interactive process. See Wilson, 717 F.3d at 347. Because
Fields failed to present sufficient evidence demonstrating that
a reasonable accommodation was possible, we conclude that the
district court correctly granted the Hospital summary judgment
on this claim as well.
5
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
6