LeRose v. United States , 285 F. App'x 93 ( 2008 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 07-1256
    JOHN STEVEN LEROSE; REBECCA LAUREN LEROSE-SWEENEY;       FRANK
    GIGLIOTTI; EUGENE FRANCIS CONNELLY; RONALD AMATI,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Defendant - Appellee,
    and
    WILLIAM D. COGER, JR.,
    Defendant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
    District of West Virginia, at Charleston.  John T. Copenhaver,
    Jr., District Judge. (2:03-cv-02372)
    Argued:   March 18, 2008                    Decided:   July 10, 2008
    Before MICHAEL and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and David R. HANSEN,
    Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
    the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    Affirmed by unpublished opinion.       Judge Gregory wrote the
    opinion, in which Judge Michael and Senior Judge Hansen joined.
    ARGUED: Eric Bruce Snyder, BAILEY & GLASSER, L.L.P., Charleston,
    West Virginia, for Appellants.   Fred B. Westfall, Jr.,   OFFICE
    OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for
    Appellee.   ON BRIEF: Benjamin L. Bailey, BAILEY & GLASSER,
    L.L.P., Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellants.    Charles T.
    Miller, United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for
    Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    2
    GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
    John    LeRose,       Rebecca          LeRose-Sweeney,           Frank       Gigliotti,
    Eugene Connelly and Ronald Amati (“Plaintiffs”) filed a suit
    against the United States of America (“United States”) under the
    Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1346
    , 2671 et
    seq.,     asserting       that        the    United      States        negligently        hired,
    retained,      and     supervised           William      Coger    (“Coger”),         a    former
    federal correctional officer, who extorted, inter alia, money
    from    the    Plaintiffs.              Plaintiffs        also     assert       a    vicarious
    liability      claim      against       the    United      States       based       on    Coger’s
    alleged    misconduct.            The       district      court    granted          the   United
    States’s       motion      to     dismiss          for    lack     of        subject       matter
    jurisdiction based on the discretionary function exception to
    the FTCA.      On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the district court
    erred     by   shifting         the    burden       of    proof     to       them    that    the
    discretionary function exception did not apply.                              Plaintiffs also
    argue that the district court incorrectly held that under West
    Virginia law, Coger’s alleged conduct was outside the scope of
    employment.          We    disagree          and    affirm       the     district         court’s
    decisions.
    I.
    Plaintiffs       asserted        negligent         hiring,        supervision,        and
    retention      claims      under       the     FTCA      against       the    United      States
    3
    arising from events that allegedly transpired at FCI Morgantown,
    a   federal        prison,    and     involved    Coger,    a    former      correctional
    officer       at    FCI    Morgantown.      Plaintiffs          contended     that    Coger
    inflicted          intentional        emotional     distress          upon     them     “by
    attempting to extort and extorting money and other property from
    each     of    them.”         Coger     allegedly    demanded        a     truck,    money,
    employment outside the prison, and football tickets among other
    things.
    The     United        States     denied    Plaintiffs’         allegations       and
    contended that Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed on summary
    judgment and/or lack of subject matter jurisdiction.                          The United
    States    argued      that     Plaintiffs’       theories       of   negligent      hiring,
    supervision,         and     retention    were    barred    by       the   discretionary
    function exception to the FTCA.                  In addition, the United States
    asserted that it was not vicariously liable for Coger’s alleged
    misconduct because he had clearly acted beyond the scope of his
    employment as a correctional officer and had engaged in improper
    actions for his own purely personal motives.
    The district court granted the United States’s motion to
    dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the
    discretionary function exception to the FTCA found in 
    28 U.S.C. § 2680
    (a) and dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claims for negligent
    hiring, supervision, and retention against the United States.
    The district court also granted the United States’s motion for
    4
    summary      judgment    with     regard    to     Plaintiffs’            claim      based    on
    vicarious      liability     because       Coger    acted          purely      in    his     own
    personal interests and outside the scope of his employment with
    the United States and Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”).                          (J.A. 720-67.)
    Plaintiffs       subsequently       filed    a    notice          of    appeal      with
    regard to the district court’s order.                   We dismissed that appeal,
    ruling      that   Plaintiffs’     did     not   appeal        a    final      order    or    an
    otherwise      appealable    interlocutory         or    collateral            order.        The
    district court entered a final judgment in favor of the United
    States pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b).
    Plaintiffs then filed a notice of appeal.
    II.
    On    appeal,     Plaintiffs      contend        that       the    district      court
    erred:      (1) by placing the burden of proof on them to establish
    that the discretionary function exception, 
    28 U.S.C. § 2680
    (a)
    did    not     deprive      the    district        court           of     subject       matter
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1346
    (b)(1) of the FTCA; (2) by
    improperly granting the United States’s motion to dismiss for
    lack   of     subject    matter    jurisdiction;          and       (3)       by    improperly
    granting the United States’s motion for summary judgment on the
    Plaintiffs’ vicarious liability claim.                    We address each of the
    Plaintiffs’ claims below seriatim.
    5
    A.
    Plaintiffs argue the district court improperly placed the
    burden       on   them        to     prove      that        the    discretionary       function
    exemption under the FTCA did not apply.                                The FTCA creates a
    limited      waiver      of       the   United      States’s        sovereign    immunity      by
    authorizing damage actions for injuries caused by the tortious
    conduct of federal employees acting within the scope of their
    employment,       when        a    private      person       would    be   liable     for    such
    conduct under state law.                      See 
    28 U.S.C.A. § 1346
    (b)(1).                  This
    waiver of sovereign immunity, however, is subject to exceptions.
    “The     most      important            of     these        [exceptions]        ...    is     the
    discretionary       function            exception,”         McMellon    v.    United   States,
    
    387 F.3d 329
    , 335 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 
    544 U.S. 974
    , 
    125 S.Ct. 1828
     (2005), which provides that the United
    States    is      not    liable         for    “[a]ny       claim    ...     based    upon    the
    exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
    discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency
    or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion
    involved be abused,” 
    28 U.S.C.A. § 2680
    (a).
    The    discretionary             function        exception     “marks    the    boundary
    between Congress’ willingness to impose tort liability upon the
    United States and its desire to protect certain governmental
    activities        from       exposure         to    suit      by    private     individuals.”
    United    States        v.    S.A.      Empresa        de   Viacao    Aerea    Rio    Grandense
    6
    (Varig Airlines), 
    467 U.S. 797
    , 808 (1984).                            Congress enacted
    this     exception        “to       prevent        judicial        second-guessing        of
    legislative      and     administrative            decisions       grounded   in    social,
    economic, and political policy through the medium of an action
    in tort ... [and] to protect the Government from liability that
    would seriously handicap efficient government operations.”                               
    Id. at 814
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    In Welch v. United States, 
    409 F.3d 646
     (4th Cir. 2005), we
    ruled that the plaintiffs bore the burden of proof to show an
    unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity exists and to show that
    none of the FTCA’s waiver exceptions apply.                          However, Plaintiffs
    in    this   case   attempt         to   get   around        our    clear    precedent    by
    arguing that because Welch was decided in the context of the due
    care   exemption,        it    is   distinguishable           from    their    case   which
    concerns the discretionary function exemption.                              We find their
    argument unpersuasive because our holding in Welch clearly dealt
    with all FTCA exemptions.                See also Williams v. United States,
    
    50 F.3d 299
    , 304 (4th Cir. 1995) (“plaintiff bears the burden of
    persuasion          if          subject             matter           jurisdiction         is
    challenged...because ‘the party who sues the United States bears
    the     burden      of        pointing     to...an       unequivocal          waiver      of
    immunity’”).
    7
    B.
    Next, Plaintiffs contend that the district court improperly
    granted      the        United    States’s         motion       to     dismiss         for     lack    of
    subject       matter       jurisdiction            because       the      Plaintiffs          did     not
    establish         that    the     discretionary            function         exemption          did    not
    apply.       We review a grant of dismissal under Federal Rules of
    Civil    Procedure          Rule       12    (b)(1)       for     lack      of       subject    matter
    jurisdiction de novo.                  Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 
    166 F.3d 642
    ,
    647 (4th Cir. 1999).                   As we stated above, plaintiffs have the
    burden       in    an    FTCA     case       to    prove     an       unequivocal        waiver        of
    sovereign          immunity        and       the        existence         of     subject        matter
    jurisdiction.            Welch, 
    409 F.3d at 650-51
    .
    To    determine          whether      conduct           by    a     federal      agency        or
    employee fits within the discretionary function exception, we
    must first decide whether the challenged conduct “involves an
    element of judgment or choice.”                         Berkovitz v. United States, 
    486 U.S. 531
    , 536, 
    108 S.Ct. 1954
     (1988); see 
    Id.
     (explaining that
    “the    discretionary            function         exception          will      not    apply     when    a
    federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a
    course       of    action        for    an    employee          to     follow”        because        “the
    employee          has     no     rightful          option       but       to     adhere        to     the
    directive”).             If the conduct does involve such discretionary
    judgment, then we must determine “whether that judgment is of
    the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed
    8
    to shield,” i.e., whether the challenged action is “based on
    considerations of public policy.”                
    Id. at 536-37
    .       This inquiry
    focuses “not on the agent’s subjective intent in exercising the
    discretion . . ., but on the nature of the actions taken and on
    whether they are susceptible to policy analysis.”                     United States
    v. Gaubert, 
    499 U.S. 315
    , 325 (1991).                Thus, “a reviewing court
    in the usual case is to look to the nature of the challenged
    decision in an objective, or general sense, and ask whether that
    decision is one which we would expect inherently to be grounded
    in considerations of policy.”                 Baum v. United States, 
    986 F.2d 716
    ,     720-21     (4th     Cir.1993).          Moreover,     when    a   statute,
    regulation, or agency guideline permits a government agent to
    exercise discretion, “it must be presumed that the agent’s acts
    are    grounded      in     policy     when    exercising      that    discretion.”
    Gaubert, 
    499 U.S. at 324
    .
    The BOP’s decisions regarding the hiring, supervision and
    retention of Coger are precisely the type of decisions that are
    protected       under     the    discretionary      function    exception.          We
    previously        decided       that   government     employers’       hiring      and
    supervisory       decisions      are   discretionary    functions.         Suter    v.
    United States, 
    441 F.3d 306
    , 312 n.6 (4th Cir. 2006).                              The
    hiring     of      an     employee      involves     several      public     policy
    considerations including the weighing of the qualifications of
    candidates,        weighing       of    the     backgrounds      of     applicants,
    9
    consideration     of    staffing    requirements,       evaluation      of   the
    experience   of    candidates,      and    assessment      of   budgetary    and
    economic considerations.       Because this process is multi-faceted,
    it is precisely the type of decision that Congress intended to
    shield   from     liability    through      the    discretionary        function
    exception.        The    district      court      properly      dismissed    the
    Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring, supervision and retention claim.
    C.
    Finally,     Plaintiffs   argue      the   district     court    improperly
    granted summary judgment on their vicarious liability claim.                  We
    review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
    Howard v. Winter, 
    446 F.3d 559
    , 565 (4th Cir. 2006).                 Under West
    Virginia law, an employer cannot be held vicariously liable for
    an employee’s misconduct if the employee engaged in criminal
    misconduct for his or her own purpose and interest.                  In Foodland
    v. State, 
    532 S.E.2d 661
     (W. Va. 2000), the Supreme Court of
    Appeals of West Virginia defined the term “scope of employment”
    under West Virginia law:
    “Scope of employment” is a relative term and requires
    a    consideration   of    surrounding  circumstances,
    including the character of the employment, the nature
    of the wrongful deed, the time and place of its
    commission and the purpose of the act.
    In general terms, it may be said that an act is within
    the course of employment, if:     (1) It is something
    fairly and naturally incident to the business and (2)
    it is done while the servant was engaged upon the
    master’s business and is done, although mistakenly or
    10
    ill-advisedly, with a view to further the master’s
    interests, or from some impulse or emotion which
    naturally grew out of or was incident to the attempt
    to perform the master’s business, and did not arise
    wholly from some external, independent and personal
    motive on the part of the servant to do the act upon
    his own account.
    In Foodland, a store employee stole money from “WIC”, a special
    supplemental nutrition program for women, infants and children.
    The   Supreme     Court    of     Appeals       of    West        Virginia    found     that
    “[e]mployee theft [was] certainly not naturally incident to the
    owner’s business and even though the act was done while the
    cashier was engaged in the owner’s business, the theft was not
    done with a view to further the owner’s interests.                             The theft
    arose from a personal motive on the part of the cashier to
    further   her     own    interests.         Under          these    circumstances,       the
    employee theft from the WIC program simply does not fit within
    her scope of employment.”             Foodland, 532 S.E.2d at 665.
    The alleged misconduct in this case was clearly for Coger’s
    own   personal     interests.           His     demand        for     a   truck,      money,
    employment      outside     the       prison,        and     football      tickets      were
    obviously based on his personal motives and were an attempt to
    derive benefits for his own personal gain.                         His threats and acts
    of intimidation were not designed to further the management and
    operation    of   the     BOP   but    rather        his    own    personal    interests.
    Because   this    type     of   conduct     was       specifically        barred   by    the
    BOP’s rules of conduct, was obviously for Coger’s own personal
    11
    gain, and was not intended to benefit the BOP or the United
    States, the district court correctly concluded that the United
    States   cannot   be   vicariously    liable   for   such   misconduct.
    Coger’s actions were beyond the scope of his employment with the
    BOP and thus could not be imputed to the United States.            The
    district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the
    United States on the Plaintiffs’ vicarious liability claim.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
    decisions.
    AFFIRMED
    12