United States v. Justin Stahmer ( 2018 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4141
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JUSTIN P. STAHMER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge. (2:17-cr-00123-RAJ-LRL-1)
Submitted: October 31, 2018 Decided: November 14, 2018
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, RICHARDSON and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Appellate Attorney,
Alexandria, Virginia, Keith Loren Kimball, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE
OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. G.
Zachary Terwilliger, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, Joseph Kosky,
Assistant United States Attorney, Brendan Gavin, Special Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
A federal grand jury indicted Justin P. Stahmer for communicating a false distress
message to the United States Coast Guard, in violation of 14 U.S.C. § 88(c) (2012), by
reporting a “man overboard” (Count 1) and calling “mayday” (Count 2); and for
threatening to assault a federal law enforcement officer, in violation of 14 U.S.C. § 89(a)
(2012); 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B), (c)(1) (2012) (Count 3). Stahmer pled not guilty. A
jury convicted him of Counts 1 and 3 but acquitted him of Count 2. The district court
sentenced Stahmer to a total of 56 months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay
$56,704.05—the total expenses the Coast Guard incurred in its search-and-rescue
response to Stahmer’s calls—in restitution. On appeal, Stahmer challenges his
convictions and the district court’s restitution award. We affirm.
Stahmer first contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress statements he made to the Coast Guard prior to being advised of his Miranda ∗
rights. In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review the
district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error,
construing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the Government. United
States v. Stover, 808 F.3d 991, 994 (4th Cir. 2015). “[L]aw enforcement [must] inform
individuals who are in custody of their Fifth Amendment rights prior to interrogation.”
United States v. Hashime, 734 F.3d 278, 282 (4th Cir. 2013). “Without a Miranda
warning, evidence obtained from the interrogation is generally inadmissible.” Id.
∗
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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The district court properly declined to suppress Stahmer’s statements. First, with
the exception of the threats, Stahmer was not in custody when he made the statements in
question. Stahmer admitted to a Coast Guard officer when a Coast Guard boat
approached Stahmer’s boat that there was no one in the water and that he had called for
help because he ran out of gas. At this point, the totality of the circumstances shows that
Stahmer’s “freedom of action was [not] curtailed to a degree associated with formal
arrest.” See id. (brackets omitted). The officers were responding to Stahmer’s distress
calls and had no reason to believe that he had committed a crime, officers were not yet
aboard Stahmer’s boat, no evidence showed that the officers’ tone was intimidating or
that they displayed weapons, there was no physical contact between the officers and
Stahmer, and Stahmer was not physically restrained. See id. at 283 (providing
nonexhaustive list of factors to consider in determining whether defendant is in custody).
Stahmer was also not in custody when he later admitted to making the mayday
call. Although two Coast Guard officers were aboard Stahmer’s boat at this point,
Stahmer had given them permission to board and conduct a standard safety inspection.
The officers had not yet handcuffed Stahmer, and the only physical contact they made
with Stahmer was when they helped him back on his boat. While Stahmer made the
admission in the middle of a sobriety test, the questioning officer testified that he did not
suspect that Stahmer had committed a crime, and no evidence indicates that the officer’s
questioning was threatening or unprofessional.
Further, the district court was justified in refusing to suppress Stahmer’s threats to
a Coast Guard officer. Although Stahmer was under arrest at that point, Miranda did not
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apply because he was not subjected to interrogation. Stahmer threatened the officer on a
20- to 30-minute boat ride, during which the only statement the officer made to Stahmer
was to inquire where Stahmer wanted his boat taken. Stahmer’s threats were unprovoked
and not in response to any questioning. Thus, the district court properly denied
Stahmer’s motion to suppress.
Stahmer next contests the district court’s admission of evidence relating to the
charge of threatening to assault a federal law enforcement officer. We review evidentiary
rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Cowden, 882 F.3d 464, 471 (4th Cir.
2018).
Stahmer first argues that the district court erred in admitting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)
evidence that, during a 2017 arrest for public intoxication, Stahmer was combative and
threatened to kill a police officer and his family, which the officer construed as a
legitimate threat. “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). However, “[t]his evidence may
be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b)(2). We apply a four-factor test to determine whether a district court abused
its discretion in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence:
(1) The evidence must be relevant to an issue, such as an element of an
offense, and must not be offered to establish the general character of the
defendant. In this regard, the more similar the prior act is (in terms of
physical similarity or mental state) to the act being proved, the more
relevant it becomes. (2) The act must be necessary in the sense that it is
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probative of an essential claim or an element of the offense. (3) The
evidence must be reliable. And (4) the evidence’s probative value must not
be substantially outweighed by confusion or unfair prejudice in the sense
that it tends to subordinate reason to emotion in the factfinding process.
Cowden, 882 F.3d at 472.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the 2017
incident. First, the evidence was relevant, as the 2017 incident was close in time and
highly similar to the incident at issue in this action. See id. Second, the evidence was
“necessary” to demonstrate that Stahmer had the requisite intent and that the threats
constituted true threats, as defense counsel argued at trial that the threats were not
serious. See 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) (providing elements of offense); United States v.
Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that threat must constitute true threat
to convict); see also Cowden, 882 F.3d at 473 (evidence of defendant’s prior use of
excessive force was necessary to prove intent “[i]n view of . . . conflicting testimony and
the government’s heavy proof burden. . . .”). With regard to the third factor, Stahmer
concedes that the evidence was reliable. Finally, in light of the district court’s limiting
instruction, the probative value of the 2017 incident was not substantially outweighed by
the risk of unfair prejudice. See United States v. Lespier, 725 F.3d 437, 448 (4th Cir.
2013) (“[A]ny risk of unfair prejudice was effectively mitigated by the court’s carefully
framed limiting instructions regarding proper consideration of such evidence.”).
Stahmer next asserts that the district court abused its discretion in admitting his
reference to an alleged race-based hate group in threatening the Coast Guard officer. He
claims that the probative value of such evidence was substantially outweighed by the risk
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of unfair prejudice. Under Fed. R. Evid. 403, the district “court may exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair
prejudice.” “We apply a highly deferential standard of review to such an issue, and a
[district] court’s decision to admit evidence over a Rule 403 objection will not be
overturned except under the most extraordinary circumstances. . . .” United States v.
Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 132 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed,
“relevant evidence should only be excluded under Rule 403 when there is a genuine risk
that the emotions of a jury will be excited to irrational behavior, and this risk is
disproportionate to the probative value of the offered evidence.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Stahmer’s reference to
the group or the Coast Guard officer’s belief that the group was a race-based hate group.
The fact that Stahmer referenced an alleged race-based hate group in threatening the
African-American officer is indicative of the seriousness of the threat and whether the
threat constituted a true threat. We conclude that the admission of such evidence did not
create “a genuine risk that the emotions of [the] jury [would] be excited to irrational
behavior.” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Stahmer fails to
demonstrate extraordinary circumstances warranting reversal.
Finally, Stahmer challenges the district court’s restitution award. Noting that the
jury acquitted him of making a false mayday call, Stahmer contends that he should not be
required to pay restitution for the total expenses the Coast Guard incurred in its response
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because, even without the man overboard call, the Coast Guard would still have deployed
resources in response to the mayday call.
We “review[] a district court’s restitution order for abuse of discretion.” United
States v. Stone, 866 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 2017). The Government bears “[t]he burden
of demonstrating the amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense”
by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e) (2012). A person convicted of
communicating a false distress message to the Coast Guard is “liable for all costs the
Coast Guard incurs as a result of the individual’s action.” 14 U.S.C. § 88(c)(3); see
United States v. Serafini, 826 F.3d 146, 151 (4th Cir. 2016).
We conclude that the district court’s restitution order was proper. Prior to
Stahmer’s mayday call, the Coast Guard had already deployed the boats and helicopter in
response to his man overboard call. Further, the record shows that, if the Coast Guard
had known that Stahmer was merely out of gas, it would have contacted commercial
assistance rather than deploying search-and-rescue resources. Thus, the district court’s
view that the Coast Guard incurred these costs as a result of Stahmer’s false man
overboard call “is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” See Stone, 866
F.3d at 227 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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