United States v. Harold Hall, Jr. ( 2018 )


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  •                                     UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 18-4259
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    HAROLD HALL, JR.,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
    Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:14-cr-00629-JFA-1)
    Submitted: November 20, 2018                                 Decided: December 3, 2018
    Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    William N. Epps, III, EPPS, EPPS & PERKINS, Anderson, South Carolina, for
    Appellant. Sherri A. Lydon, United States Attorney, Benjamin Neale Garner, Assistant
    United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia,
    South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    A federal jury convicted Harold Hall, Jr. of possession of a firearm by a felon, in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1) (2012); possession with intent to distribute marijuana,
    in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a) (2012); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
    drug trafficking offense, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) (2012). The district court
    sentenced Hall to 360 months of imprisonment and he timely appealed. On appeal, Hall
    challenged the district court’s admission of his prior convictions for possession of
    marijuana and possession with intent to distribute marijuana and raised several
    sentencing issues.   We determined that the district court had erroneously admitted
    evidence of Hall’s prior convictions under Fed. R. Crim. P. 404(b) and that the error was
    not harmless, and therefore declined to reach Hall’s remaining claims. United States v.
    Hall, 
    858 F.3d 254
     (4th Cir. 2017). We thus reversed the district court’s decision to
    admit the prior convictions, vacated Hall’s convictions, and remanded to the district court
    for proceedings consistent with the opinion. 
    Id. at 288
    .
    On remand, the Government obtained superseding indictments charging Hall with
    conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    (2012), and again charging Hall with the original three counts. Hall moved to dismiss the
    latter three counts, asserting that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred his retrial on those
    counts because this court had determined that there was insufficient evidence to support
    those convictions. The district court disagreed and denied Hall’s motion. The court later
    determined that it had the authority to review the sufficiency of the evidence, discounting
    the improperly-admitted convictions, and concluded that there was sufficient evidence of
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    Hall’s guilt of the offenses to preclude entering a judgment of acquittal for Hall. The
    court thus ordered that a retrial be scheduled. Hall appealed, challenging the court’s
    denial of his motion on double jeopardy grounds and the court’s interpretation of this
    court’s mandate.
    On appeal, Hall first argues that this court determined in the prior opinion that
    there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate his possession of the marijuana and the
    firearms and, therefore, he may not be retried on those charges. “We review de novo
    whether a defendant will be subject to double jeopardy by retrial on a criminal charge.”
    United States v. Ford, 
    703 F.3d 708
    , 710 (4th Cir. 2013). “The Double Jeopardy Clause
    forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to
    supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding.” Burks v. United States,
    
    437 U.S. 1
    , 11 (1978). Therefore, when a defendant’s conviction has been reversed on
    appeal “solely for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict,” the Double
    Jeopardy Clause prohibits retrial.    Ford, 703 F.3d at 710 (internal quotation marks
    omitted). This is so because “[a] reversal based on the legal insufficiency of evidence is,
    in effect, a determination that the government’s case was so lacking that the trial court
    should have entered a judgment of acquittal rather than submitting the case to the jury.”
    United States v. Akpi, 
    26 F.3d 24
    , 25 (4th Cir. 1994).
    However, “the Double Jeopardy Clause allows retrial when a reviewing court
    determines that a defendant’s conviction must be reversed because evidence was
    erroneously admitted against him, and also concludes that without the inadmissible
    evidence there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction.” Lockhart v. Nelson,
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    488 U.S. 33
    , 38, 40 (1988). Double jeopardy concerns do not apply to the retrial of a
    defendant whose conviction was overturned on appeal but where all the evidence,
    including that erroneously admitted, would have been sufficient to sustain the guilty
    verdict because, had the erroneously-admitted evidence been properly excluded, the
    government would have had the opportunity to offer evidence sufficient to satisfy its
    burden. 
    Id. at 34, 42
    ; see also United States v. Ellyson, 
    326 F.3d 522
    , 534 (4th Cir. 2003)
    (if evidence properly excluded at trial, government could have presented other evidence
    to meet burden of proof).      Therefore, in determining whether there was sufficient
    evidence to support a conviction, a reviewing court must consider all the evidence at the
    trial, including the erroneously-admitted evidence. Lockhart, 
    488 U.S. at 40-42
    .
    Here, we did not previously determine that there was insufficient evidence to
    support the convictions. Initially, Hall did not raise that issue in his prior appeal. While
    Hall’s failure to raise the issue would not foreclose our consideration thereof, our prior
    ruling was confined to the Rule 404(b) issue. Our observations regarding the quantum of
    evidence offered by the Government on the possession element were made in the context
    of analyzing whether the admission of Hall’s prior convictions was improper and whether
    any such error was harmless. We did not undertake a separate, sua sponte analysis of the
    sufficiency of the evidence. Cf. United States v. Simpson, 
    910 F.2d 154
    , 156-59 (4th Cir.
    1990) (finding trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence and error was not
    harmless, but rejecting defendant’s claim that evidence was insufficient to support the
    convictions). In addition, our prior opinion merely vacated the convictions and remanded
    to the district court for further proceedings; it did not direct a judgment of acquittal for
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    Hall based on insufficiency of the evidence. See Burks, 
    437 U.S. at 17-18
     (where
    appellate court finds “evidence legally insufficient, the only ‘just’ remedy available for
    that court is the direction of a judgment of acquittal”). The district court did not err,
    therefore, in concluding that retrial of Hall on the vacated convictions would not violate
    the prohibition against double jeopardy.
    Hall next argues that the district court contravened this court’s mandate in
    considering whether there was sufficient evidence without the evidence of his prior
    convictions and determining that there was. “We review de novo the district court’s
    interpretation of the mandate.” United States v. Susi, 
    674 F.3d 278
    , 283 (4th Cir. 2012).
    “The mandate rule governs what issues the lower court is permitted to consider on
    remand—it is bound to carry out the mandate of the higher court, but may not reconsider
    issues the mandate laid to rest.” 
    Id.
     Therefore, the mandate rule forecloses relitigation of
    issues expressly or impliedly decided by the appellate court. 
    Id.
    Hall’s assertion that the district court misconstrued this court’s mandate is based
    upon his assertion that we held in the prior opinion that there was insufficient evidence to
    support the convictions. As we did not so hold in the prior opinion, the district court did
    not incorrectly interpret the mandate.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders.          We dispense with oral
    argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
    materials before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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