United States v. Alandis Patterson ( 2018 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4786
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALANDIS D. PATTERSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Greenville. Bruce H. Hendricks, District Judge. (6:16-cr-00299-BHH-2)
Submitted: October 19, 2018 Decided: December 3, 2018
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, DIAZ and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Scarlet B. Moore, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Sherri A. Lydon, United
States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, Jamie Lea Nabors Schoen, Assistant United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
The district court sentenced Alandis D. Patterson to 240 months’ imprisonment
after Patterson pled guilty to conspiracy to commit commercial sex trafficking, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (2). On appeal, Patterson raises three challenges to
the district court’s Sentencing Guidelines calculations and further contends that his
sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm the district court’s judgment.
“We accord due deference to a district court’s application of the sentencing
guidelines.” United States v. Steffen, 741 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 2013). We review the
district court’s factual determinations for clear error. Id. However, “if the issue turns
primarily on the legal interpretation of a guideline term, the standard moves closer to de
novo review.” Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
First, Patterson contends that the district court erred in awarding one criminal
history point for his previous conviction for possessing marijuana. A defendant receives
one criminal history point for a prior sentence of less than 60 days’ imprisonment. U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.1(c). “The term ‘prior sentence’ means any
sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt . . . for conduct not part of the
instant offense.” USSG § 4A1.2(a). Section 4A1.1(c) is designed to include “sentences
of less than sixty days, probation, fines, and residency in a halfway house.” USSG
§ 4A1.1 cmt. background. Thus, the district court rightfully counted Patterson’s
conviction, even if the state court imposed no active jail sentence. See United States v.
Russell, 564 F.3d 200, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).
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Patterson next contends that the district court erred in applying a cross-reference to
calculate his base offense level. Section 2G1.1 provides that a court should apply USSG
§ 2A3.1 if the offense involved conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (b) or 18
U.S.C. § 2242. USSG § 2G1.1(c)(1). As relevant here, this cross-reference applies if the
offense conduct involved “using force against the victim [or] threatening or placing the
victim in fear that any person will be subject to death, serious bodily injury, or
kidnapping.” USSG § 2G1.1 cmt. n.4(A). The government bears the burden to prove a
cross-referenced offense by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Davis,
679 F.3d 177, 182 (4th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Chandia, 675 F.3d 329, 338-
39 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that “the due process clause does not require the district court
to find uncharged conduct by a heightened standard of proof before using it as a basis for
determining a defendant’s sentence” (internal quotation marks omitted)). *
We conclude that the district court correctly applied the cross-reference. While
Patterson argues that the victim voluntarily prostituted herself, he admitted at the Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 hearing that he used force on at least one occasion to compel the victim to
engage in a commercial sex act. “A defendant’s solemn declarations in open court . . .
carry a strong presumption of verity.” United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216, 221 (4th
Cir. 2005). Patterson does not contend that his plea was unknowing, and the information
alleged that Patterson used force to compel an individual to engage in a commercial sex
*
Accordingly, we reject Patterson’s argument that the Government should have
been required to establish the cross-referenced offense by clear and convincing evidence.
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act. And Patterson’s conclusory assertion that he did not routinely or severely beat the
victim is insufficient to rebut the numerous facts describing his offense conduct.
Patterson also argues that the district court erred in denying him a reduction for
acceptance of responsibility under § USSG 3E1.1. We review the district court’s denial
of the acceptance of responsibility adjustment for clear error, giving “great deference to
the district court’s decision because the sentencing judge is in a unique position to
evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.” United States v. Dugger, 485 F.3d
236, 239 (4th Cir. 2007) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). To earn a
reduction, “a defendant must prove to the court by a preponderance of the evidence that
he has clearly recognized and affirmatively accepted personal responsibility for his
criminal conduct.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A guilty plea does not
automatically entitle a defendant to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Id.We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in denying Patterson the
acceptance reduction. Patterson admitted in open court at the Rule 11 hearing that he
used force to coerce an individual to engage in a commercial sex act, but then vigorously
objected to the Guideline that corresponded to this offense conduct. Moreover, Patterson
denied that he routinely or severely beat the victim, when the evidence in the record
shows that he beat her every day and to the point that, on one occasion, she required
medical attention. Additionally, during Patterson’s allocution at sentencing, he attempted
to minimize the severity of his conduct.
Finally, Patterson argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because
his codefendant received a lesser sentence and his codefendant’s offense involved a
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minor. We review a defendant’s sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Having concluded that there
was no procedural error, we review Patterson’s sentence for substantive reasonableness,
“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51. “Any sentence that is
within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.”
United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). “Such a presumption can
only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id.Patterson’s argument fails to overcome the presumption of reasonableness
accorded to his within-Guidelines sentence. The district court rightfully concluded that
Patterson’s offense conduct was abhorrent—he found a vulnerable victim, introduced her
to prostitution and drugs, and then used her dependence on cocaine and heroin, along
with physical violence, to compel her to turn over all of her prostitution earnings to him.
While Patterson’s codefendant received a much shorter sentence than Patterson, Patterson
conceded that his codefendant did not use force against his victims. Moreover, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(6), which concerns unwarranted sentencing disparities, aims “to promote
national uniformity in sentencing rather than uniformity among codefendants in the same
case.” United States v. Parker, 462 F.3d 273, 277 (3d Cir. 2006); accord United States v.
Withers, 100 F.3d 1142, 1149 (4th Cir. 1996).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
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AFFIRMED
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