In Re: Gina McCarthy v. , 636 F. App'x 142 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
December 9, 2015
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-2390
(5:14-cv-000390JBP)
In re: GINA MCCARTHY, in her official capacity as Administrator
of the United States Environmental Protection Agency
Petitioner
___________________________________
CORRECTED ORDER GRANTING WRIT OF MANDAMUS
___________________________________
Before the Court is the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA) petition for a writ of mandamus precluding the
deposition of EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy in the case Murray
Energy Corp. v. McCarthy, No. 5:14-cv-00039-JPB, in the Northern
District of West Virginia. On November 12, 2015, the district
court denied EPA’s motion for a protective order. For the reasons
set forth below, we grant EPA’s petition for mandamus.
Plaintiff energy companies brought this citizen suit alleging
that EPA had failed to comply with Section 321(a) of the Clean Air
Act (CAA), which provides: “[t]he Administrator shall conduct
continuing evaluations of potential loss or shifts of employment
1
which may result from the administration or enforcement of the
provision of this chapter and applicable implementation plans,
including where appropriate, investigating threatened plant
closures or reductions in employment allegedly resulting from such
administration or enforcement.” 42 U.S.C. § 7621(a). EPA moved
to dismiss on the ground that Section 321(a) is discretionary and
thus the district court lacked jurisdiction. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
On September 16, 2014, the district court ruled, as a matter of
first impression, that Section 321(a) creates a non-discretionary
duty and denied EPA’s motion to dismiss.
EPA then moved for summary judgment, relying on a set of
fifty-three documents to demonstrate its compliance with any non-
discretionary duty imposed by Section 321(a). These documents
included Regulatory Impact Analyses, Economic Impact Assessments,
white papers, and other reports. EPA conceded that it had
“completed no other evaluations of potential employment impacts of
the [CAA] at this time,” [Doc. 77 at 2], and that “[s]hould this
Court conclude that the documents do not satisfy the duty [in
Section 321(a)], then summary judgment should be entered against
EPA.” [Doc. 76 at 18]. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, including
EPA’s proffer that Plaintiffs be granted summary judgment if the
documents were found not to satisfy Section 321(a). Instead,
Plaintiffs requested that EPA’s motion be held in abeyance pending
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the completion of discovery, which the district court granted. On
October 7, 2015, Plaintiffs noticed the deposition of McCarthy.
It is well established that high-ranking government officials
may not be deposed or called to testify about their reasons for
taking official actions absent “extraordinary circumstances.”
See, e.g., Franklin Sav. Ass’n v. Ryan, 922 F.2d 209, 211 (4th
Cir. 1991); Simplex Time Recorder Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 766 F.2d
575, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1985); In re FDIC, 58 F.3d 1055, 1060 (5th
Cir. 1995). When such circumstances are not present, mandamus is
appropriate to prevent a district court from compelling an
official’s appearance. See, e.g., U.S. Bd. of Parole v. Merhige,
487 F.2d 25, 29 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974);
In re United States (Jackson), 624 F.3d 1368, 1372–73 (11th Cir.
2010); In re Cheney, 544 F.3d 311, 314 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Here, the district court found extraordinary circumstances to
exist because of an apparent conflict between EPA’s position in
its summary judgment motion and its position before Congress.
Since 2009, McCarthy, on behalf of EPA, has responded to various
questions from members of Congress about Section 321(a). 1 The
1 For example, in a letter dated June 22, 2011, McCarthy
responded to a question posed by Congressman Darrell Issa regarding
EPA’s Section 321(a) analysis of its greenhouse gas regulations,
stating:
The EPA has provided detailed regulatory impact
analyses for each of its major greenhouse gas
3
district court inferred from these responses that “EPA has never
made any evaluations of job losses under § 321(a).” [Doc. 164 at
18]. The court found this to be “directly contrary to the position
of the EPA in this case,” id., namely, EPA’s statement that it “is
entitled to summary judgment because it has conducted ‘continuing
evaluations of potential loss or shifts of employment which may
result from the administration or enforcement of the provision of
regulations that provide extensive information about the
economic impact of those rules. . . .
. . . .
Section 321 was added in the 1977 amendments to the
Clean Air Act. Both the House and Senate Committee
Reports for the 1977 amendments describe the purpose of
section 321 as addressing situations where employers
make allegations that environmental regulations will
jeopardize employment, possibly in order to stimulate
union or other public opposition to environmental
regulations. . . . The committee reports do not describe
the provision as applying broadly to all regulations or
implementation plans under the Clean Air Act.
In keeping with congressional intent, the EPA has
not interpreted section 321 to require the Agency to
conduct employment investigations in taking regulatory
actions. Conducting such investigations as part of
rulemakings would have limited utility since section
321(d) expressly prohibits the EPA . . . from “modifying
or withdrawing any requirement imposed or proposed to be
imposed under the Act” on the basis of such
investigations. As noted above, section 321 was instead
intended to protect employees in individual companies by
providing a mechanism for the EPA to investigate
allegations - typically made by employers - that
specific requirements, including enforcement actions, as
applied to those individual companies, would result in
layoffs. The EPA has not received any request for any
such investigation with regard to its [Greenhouse Gas]
regulations.
[Doc. 157, Ex. 10 at 7].
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this chapter and applicable implementation plans,’ as required by
Section 321(a) of the Clean Air Act.” [Doc. 76 at 1 (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 7621(a))].
Accepting arguendo the district court’s characterization of
McCarthy’s statements, we fail to see the contradiction. 2 EPA did
not claim that the documents submitted with its summary judgment
motion were prepared “under” or “pursuant to” Section 321(a), or
for the purpose of complying with that section. Indeed, EPA
explicitly conceded that “none of the documents upon which it
relies to demonstrate its performance of the duty in Section 321(a)
were prepared explicitly for that purpose or labeled as Section
321(a) evaluations.” [Doc. 88 at 11]. It is not contradictory
for EPA to argue that the documents nevertheless satisfy whatever
obligation is imposed by Section 321(a). Such a position seems
eminently reasonable in light of the fact that no court, including
the district court here, has ever explicated what Section 321(a)
requires. 3 Indeed, the district court may yet determine that EPA’s
documents satisfy Section 321(a).
In short, we see no contradiction in EPA’s positions that
would support the district court’s finding of an extraordinary
2 We express no view as to whether a contradiction, if present,
would constitute an extraordinary circumstance.
3 The district court has reserved judgment on the scope of
injunctive relief it may award.
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circumstance. We are similarly unpersuaded that there is no
alternative to deposing McCarthy because “only [she] can speak to
the dichotomy evidenced in her statements and EPA’s litigation
position.” [Pls.’ Resp. to Second Petition for Writ of Mandamus
23]. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a need for McCarthy’s
testimony beyond what is already in the public record, particularly
since the district court has authorized Plaintiffs to take a Rule
30(b)(6) deposition of the agency.
Finally, the district court found EPA’s “apparent refusal” to
comply with Section 321(a) to constitute prima facie evidence of
wrongdoing. [Doc. 164 at 19]. See Franklin Sav. Ass’n, 922 F.2d
at 211 (“Only where there is a clear showing of misconduct or
wrongdoing is any departure from this rule [that the judiciary may
not probe the mental processes of an executive or administrative
officer] permitted.”). We disagree. We see no clear misconduct
in EPA’s alleged failure to perform a duty that was not declared
to be mandatory until the district court so declared in this case. 4
Cf. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 200, 205, 208 (4th
Cir. 1964) (finding misconduct where there was prima facie evidence
that agency violated statute previously construed by multiple
4
Whether the district court properly found Section 321(a) to
create a mandatory duty is not before us, and we express no view
on that question.
6
courts of appeals (citing Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 327 F.2d
36 (4th Cir. 1963))).
For these reasons, EPA’s petition for a writ of mandamus is
granted.
Entered at the direction of the panel: Judge Motz, Judge
Gregory and Judge Floyd.
For the Court
/s/ Patricia S. Connor, Clerk
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