Allen Dyer v. MD State Board of Education , 685 F. App'x 261 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-1862
ALLEN R. DYER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MARYLAND STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION; JAMES H. DEGRAFFENREIDT,
JR., Member, Maryland State Board of Education; CHARLENE M.
DUKES, Former Member, Maryland State Board of Education;
MARY KAY FINAN, Former Member, Maryland State Board of
Education; S. JAMES GATES, JR., Member, Maryland State Board
of Education; LUISA MONTERO-DIAZ, Former Member, Maryland
State Board of Education; SAYED M. NAVED, Former Member,
Maryland State Board of Education; MADHU SIDHU, Member,
Maryland State Board of Education; GUFFRIE M. SMITH, JR.,
Member, Maryland State Board of Education; LINDA EBERHART,
Former Member, Maryland State Board of Education; CARNEY,
KELCHAN, BRESLER, BENNETT & SCHERR, LLP; JUDITH S. BRESLER,
Esquire,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. James K. Bredar, District Judge.
(1:15-cv-03699-JKB)
Submitted: March 29, 2017 Decided: April 21, 2017
Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Allen R. Dyer, Appellant Pro Se. Brian E. Frosh, Attorney
General of Maryland, Elizabeth M. Kameen, Derek S. Simmonsen,
Assistant Attorneys General, Baltimore, Maryland; Alvin I.
Frederick, Lauren E. Marini, ECCLESTON & WOLF, P.C., Hanover,
Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Allen Ray Dyer appeals the district court’s dismissal of
his lawsuit requesting declaratory relief and damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) and the Maryland Constitution. Dyer served
on the Howard County Board of Education (County Board) in
Maryland in 2011, when the County Board invoked against him the
Maryland State Board of Education’s (State Board) removal
process under Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 3-701(g) (2007). After
Dyer received notice and a hearing, but before he received a
decision, he lost his bid for reelection and his term ended in
December 2012. That same month, the Administrative Law Judge
who had presided over the hearing recommended Dyer’s removal
from the County Board for misconduct in office. The State Board
proceeded to review the recommendation and issued an opinion
that Dyer had committed misconduct in office.
Dyer then sued the State Board, nine of its current and
former members, and the attorney and law firm who had
represented the County Board in the state administrative
proceedings, requesting that the district court declare the
removal process illegal and seeking damages for violations of
his free speech, due process, and equal protection rights. We
review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss.
See Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir.
2010); Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir.
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1999). Because we conclude that both declaratory relief and
damages are unavailable in this case, we affirm the district
court’s judgment.
Declaratory relief applies only to cases or controversies.
See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126 (2007)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)(2012)). A “case or controversy”
requires a concrete and substantial dispute such that
declaratory relief would not amount to an advisory opinion. Id.
Because Dyer lost his bid for reelection, declaring the State
Board’s removal process illegal would not have a concrete,
remedial effect. Thus, we conclude that declaratory relief is
inappropriate in this case.
We further conclude that Dyer cannot seek damages from
either the State Board Defendants or the law firm Defendants.
The district court properly ruled that sovereign immunity and
absolute, quasijudicial immunity protects the State Board
Defendants from suit. The Eleventh Amendment bars the damages
suit against the State Board and its members in their official
capacities. See Lytle v. Griffith, 240 F.3d 404, 408 (4th Cir.
2001). For the claims against the State Board members in their
individual capacities, absolute, quasijudicial immunity applies
because the State Board performs essentially judicial functions;
a strong need exists to ensure that the State Board members can
remove County Board members for misconduct without undue
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harassment from suit; and Maryland law adequately safeguards
individuals subject to removal proceedings. See, e.g.,
Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 249 (4th Cir. 1999); Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513-14 (1978). Contrary to Dyer’s
argument on appeal, the district court did not prematurely
evaluate immunity given the information available in the
pleadings.
Finally, Dyer cannot sue the law firm Defendants for
damages under either § 1983 or the Maryland Constitution because
they do not qualify as state actors or government agents,
respectively. Section 1983 applies only to persons who act
“under color of state law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A person acts
under color of state law “only when exercising power possessed
by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” Polk
Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317–18 (1981) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A law firm and attorney who represent a public
school board, like the law firm Defendants did here, do not
become state actors under § 1983 by providing legal services to
the board, a power not possessed by virtue of state law.
Moreover, the law firm Defendants only represented the
County Board in the state administrative and judicial
proceedings. They did not perform legally-required State
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functions on behalf of the State as the defendant did in West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 51 (1988).
For the same reasons, the law firm Defendants did not act
as “government agents” under the Maryland Constitution. See
Manikhi v. Mass Transit Admin., 758 A.2d 95, 111 (Md. 2000)
(“Maryland Constitutional provisions have the more narrow focus
of protecting citizens from certain unlawful acts committed by
government officials. Indeed, only government agents can commit
these kinds of Constitutional transgressions.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
also deny Dyer’s “Motion to approve/authorize Supplement Brief
with Attachments.” We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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