United States v. Rances Amaya ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4418
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RANCES ULICES AMAYA, a/k/a Murder, a/k/a Blue,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga,
District Judge. (1:11-cr-00556-AJT-1)
Submitted: February 26, 2013 Decided: March 28, 2013
Before MOTZ, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Arif, Melissa M. Sanchez, ARIF & ASSOCIATES, PC,
Springfield, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United
States Attorney, G. Zachery Terwilliger, Michael J. Frank,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rances Ulices Amaya was convicted of conspiracy to
commit sex trafficking of a child, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006), and
three counts of sex trafficking of a child, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(2006). The charges related to Amaya’s participation in an
organization that recruited and prostituted underage girls for
profit. He received a within-Guidelines sentence of sixty
months for conspiracy and 600 months on each of the three § 1591
violations. The sentences run concurrently. Amaya now appeals,
claiming that his sentence is unreasonable. We affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). We first examine the sentence for “significant
procedural error.” Id. We then consider the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account the totality
of the circumstances. United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597
F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). If the sentence is within the
properly calculated Guidelines range, we may presume that the
sentence is reasonable. United States v. Go, 517 F.3d 216, 218
(4th Cir. 2008).
Amaya claims that his sentence exceeded the purposes
of sentencing and was greater than necessary under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006). Specifically, he contends that the district
court failed to consider what he maintains was his minimal role
2
in the conspiracy and the fact that other members of the
organization received significantly lower sentences.
We find Amaya’s claims to be without merit. The
district court provided a lengthy, comprehensive explanation of
the chosen sentence. The court found that Amaya’s role in the
offense was “essential if not dominating.” Among other things,
Amaya helped to recruit under-age girls for prostitution, had
sex with the girls “to test them out,” assisted in recruiting
their clients, supplied drugs, alcohol, and condoms to the
girls, and shared in the proceeds of the operation.
Additionally, Amaya served as the “muscle” in the conspiracy,
using force and intimidation to ensure that the victims complied
with the rules of the organization and carrying weapons in order
to ensure that clients behaved appropriately.
Among the factors to be considered when imposing
sentence is “the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)
(2006). We reject Amaya’s contention that his sentence is
unreasonable because it is disproportionate to the sentences of
others in the prostitution ring. At sentencing, the court
observed that Amaya was not comparable to Alonso Bruno Cornejo
3
and Alexander Rivas. * First, Amaya’s criminal history score
(category VI) was higher than that of both Cornejo (category I)
and Rivas (category V). Second, Amaya was older than Cornejo
and Rivas. Finally, while Amaya, Cornejo and Rivas performed
some of the same roles within the organization, Amaya had the
additional, unique and critical role of intimidating both
customers and workers. The district court correctly concluded
that Amaya was not similarly situated to Rivas and Cornejo. See
United States v. Chandia, 675 F.3d 329, 342 (4th Cir.)
(“comparing the sentences of other defendants with dissimilar
offenses, circumstances, and criminal histories is unavailing”),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 609 (2012).
Our review of the record establishes that Amaya’s
arguments on appeal are without merit and that his sentence is
procedurally and substantively reasonable. Accordingly, we
affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the
*
A third member of the organization, Henry Herrera, is not
an appropriate comparator because he was sentenced in state
court. See United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1102 (11th
Cir. 2009) (“Section 3553(a)(6) addresses unwarranted sentence
disparities among federal defendants who are similarly situated
instead of disparate federal and state sentences.”).
4
material before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5