United States v. Felicia Douglas , 453 F. App'x 317 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4891
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
FELICIA DOUGLAS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District
Judge. (8:08-cr-00434-PJM-1)
Submitted: October 31, 2011 Decided: November 9, 2011
Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Susan A. Hensler, Staff
Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Stacy Dawson Belf, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Felicia Douglas appeals the fifty-one-month sentence
imposed by the district court following her guilty plea to bank
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006), and aggravated
identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), (c)(5)
(2006). On appeal, Douglas contends that the district court
erred in calculating the amount of loss attributed to her for
Sentencing Guidelines purposes and that the district court’s
sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
Finding no error, we affirm.
We review for clear error the district court’s
calculation of the amount of loss. United States v. Mehta, 594
F.3d 277, 281 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 279 (2010).
The Government bears the burden of “prov[ing] the amount of loss
by a preponderance of evidence.” United States v. Pierce, 409
F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 2005). “The [district] court need only
make a reasonable estimate of the loss . . . , [and] the court’s
loss determination is entitled to appropriate deference.” U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C) (2009). Upon
the record before us, we cannot conclude that the district court
clearly erred in estimating that the amount of loss was more
than $200,000.
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Douglas also argues that the district court’s sentence
was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. In reviewing a
sentence, we must first ensure that the district court did not
commit any “significant procedural error,” such as failing to
properly calculate the applicable Guidelines range, failing to
consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, or failing to
adequately explain the sentence. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The district court is not required to
“robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection.” United
States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). However,
the district court “must place on the record an ‘individualized
assessment’ based on the particular facts of the case before it.
This individualized assessment need not be elaborate or lengthy,
but it must provide a rationale tailored to the particular case
at hand and adequate to permit ‘meaningful appellate review.’”
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50) (internal footnote omitted)).
Upon review, we conclude that the district court fully complied
with the mandate of Carter and did not abuse its discretion in
imposing a sentence at the bottom of the advisory Sentencing
Guidelines range. See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576,
578 (4th Cir. 2010) (providing standard of review for properly
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preserved procedural sentencing error); see also Gall, 552 U.S.
at 46.
Once the court has determined there is no procedural
error, it must then consider the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the
circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If the sentence imposed
is within the appropriate Guidelines range, this court may
consider it presumptively reasonable. United States v. Mendoza-
Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). The presumption may
be rebutted by a showing “that the sentence is unreasonable when
measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v.
Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted). However, “[a] statutorily required
sentence . . . is per se reasonable.” United States v. Farrior,
535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th Cir. 2008).
Douglas’ sentence was comprised of a per se reasonable
statutorily mandated consecutive sentence on the identity theft
charge and a presumptively reasonable within-Guidelines sentence
on the bank fraud charge. Douglas fails to overcome the
presumption that her sentence on the bank fraud charge was
substantively reasonable based upon the totality of the
circumstances. Therefore, we conclude that the district court
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committed no substantive error in sentencing Douglas to fifty-
one months’ imprisonment.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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