Jane Doe v. ABA Accredited University ( 2023 )


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  • USCA4 Appeal: 22-2186     Doc: 13        Filed: 04/24/2023   Pg: 1 of 4
    UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 22-1978
    JANE DOE,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    ABA ACCREDITED UNIVERSITY; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION;
    DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    No. 22-2186
    JANE DOE,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    ABA ACCREDITED UNIVERSITY; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION;
    DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
    Alexandria. Patricia Tolliver Giles, District Judge; John Foster Anderson, Magistrate
    Judge. (1:22-cv-00947-PTG-JFA)
    USCA4 Appeal: 22-2186      Doc: 13         Filed: 04/24/2023    Pg: 2 of 4
    Submitted: April 20, 2023                                         Decided: April 24, 2023
    Before KING and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Jane Doe, Appellant Pro Se.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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    USCA4 Appeal: 22-2186      Doc: 13         Filed: 04/24/2023     Pg: 3 of 4
    PER CURIAM:
    Jane Doe appeals the district court's orders denying her motions for leave to proceed
    in forma pauperis, for a temporary restraining order, and to proceed under a pseudonym.
    For the following reasons, we affirm in part and dismiss in part.
    Turning first to the district court’s denial of Doe’s motion for leave to proceed in
    forma pauperis, we have jurisdiction over this portion of the appeal because an order
    denying a motion to proceed in forma pauperis is an appealable interlocutory order.
    Roberts v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 
    339 U.S. 844
    , 845 (1950) (per curiam). We have reviewed the
    record and discern no reversible error on this point.
    Next, Doe argues that the district court erred in denying her motion for a temporary
    restraining order. Absent exceptional circumstances, the denial of a motion for a temporary
    restraining order is considered interlocutory and is not appealable. See Office of Personnel
    Mgmt. v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 
    473 U.S. 1301
    , 1303-04 (1985). Exceptional
    circumstances exist where the denial effectively decides the merits of the case. See
    Virginia v. Tenneco, Inc., 
    538 F.2d 1026
    , 1029-30 (4th Cir. 1976). Upon a review of the
    record, we conclude that no such exceptional circumstances are present in this case.
    Therefore, we dismiss this portion of Doe’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    Finally, Doe argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to proceed
    under a pseudonym. We review the court’s decision on this issue for an abuse of discretion,
    recognizing that “proceeding by pseudonym is a rare dispensation.” Doe v. Pub. Citizen,
    
    749 F.3d 246
    , 273 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have identified
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    USCA4 Appeal: 22-2186      Doc: 13        Filed: 04/24/2023     Pg: 4 of 4
    several factors for district courts to consider in determining whether a party should be
    allowed to proceed under a pseudonym:
    Whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid
    the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve
    privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature; whether
    identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the
    requesting party or even more critically, to innocent nonparties; the ages of
    the person whose privacy interests are sought to be protected; whether the
    action is against a governmental or private party; and, relatedly, the risk of
    unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action against it to proceed
    anonymously.
    
    Id.
     Upon review of the record, we conclude that the district court properly considered the
    relevant factors, and we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of Doe’s
    motion.
    Accordingly, we affirm in part, dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in part, and deny as
    moot Doe’s motion to expedite. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED IN PART,
    DISMISSED IN PART
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