Larone Elijah v. Richard Dunbar ( 2023 )

USCA4 Appeal: 21-7352 Doc: 39 Filed: 04/21/2023 Pg: 1 of 11
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-7352
LARONE F. ELIJAH,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
RICHARD S. DUNBAR, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Beaufort.
Joseph Dawson, III, District Judge. (9:20-cv-03040-JD)
Argued: March 9, 2023 Decided: April 21, 2023
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, WYNN, Circuit Judge, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Vacated and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote
the opinion, in which Judge Wynn and Judge Floyd joined.
ARGUED: Sophia E. Evans, Holl M. Chaisson, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL
OF LAW, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Andrew Robert de Holl, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: J. Scott Ballenger, Catherine E. Stetson, Appellate Litigation Clinic,
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW, Charlottesville, Virginia, for
Appellant. Adair F. Boroughs, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
USCA4 Appeal: 21-7352 Doc: 39 Filed: 04/21/2023 Pg: 2 of 11
GREGORY, Chief Judge:
This appeal stems from the district court’s dismissal of Larone F. Elijah’s (“Elijah”)
petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. An incarcerated person at
Federal Correctional Institution Williamsburg, Elijah alleged that the Bureau of Prisons
had miscalculated his release date by not retroactively applying the First Step Act to his
previous sentence and crediting the resulting good conduct time to his release date. After
the Warden moved for summary judgment, a magistrate judge issued a report and
recommendation (“R&R”) concluding that Elijah’s petition should be dismissed. Elijah
objected to the recommendation in detail; nonetheless, the district court did not review the
R&R de novo because Elijah had only “reargue[d] his case.” J.A. 137. After reviewing
for clear error, the district court adopted the R&R and dismissed Elijah’s petition.
On appeal, Elijah first submits—and the Warden concedes—that the district court
erred by failing to review the R&R de novo. Elijah further requests that we proceed to the
merits of his habeas petition and consider the retroactive applicability of the First Step Act.
Finally, Elijah asks this Court to recall its previous mandate dismissing his 2015 appeal of
his revocation sentence.
We agree with Elijah that his grounds for objection were clear and thus should have
prompted a de novo review of the magistrate’s R&R. Because the district court only
reviewed the R&R for clear error, we vacate and remand with directions to review Elijah’s
grounds for objection de novo. We decline, however, to consider the merits of Elijah’s
petition or recall our previous mandate.
2
USCA4 Appeal: 21-7352 Doc: 39 Filed: 04/21/2023 Pg: 3 of 11
I.
On October 25, 2007, Elijah pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute
eight grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Because his § 841(a)(1)
conviction qualified him as a Class B felon under 18 U.S.C. § 3559, Elijah was sentenced
to 108 months’ imprisonment. In May of 2014, Elijah completed his custodial sentence,
and began a five-year term of supervised release.
On July 11, 2015, Elijah was arrested by federal authorities for possession with
intent to distribute methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin in violation of his supervised
release terms, which the district court subsequently revoked. Notably, since his sentencing,
Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372,
2372, which demoted Elijah’s original 2007 charge from a class B to a class C felony. 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (creating sentencing scheme for drug possession); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3559 (classifying felonies). Nevertheless, the district court sentenced Elijah as a class B
felon under § 3583(e)(3) and imposed a thirty-six-month revocation sentence.
In November of 2015, Elijah appealed his revocation sentence to this Court, arguing,
in part, that the district court should have treated him as a class C felon under presently
controlling law. However, the appeal came two months after the filing deadline, and in a
sealed order, was dismissed as untimely.
Two years into his revocation sentence, in March of 2017, Elijah pleaded guilty to
possession with intent to distribute based on the facts of his 2015 arrest, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C). He was sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment to run
consecutively with his revocation sentence, followed by three years’ supervised release.
3
USCA4 Appeal: 21-7352 Doc: 39 Filed: 04/21/2023 Pg: 4 of 11
In 2019, while Elijah was serving his second possession sentence following the
completion of his revocation sentence, the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391,
132 Stat. 5194, amended 18 U.S.C. § 3624 to increase the maximum good conduct time
(“GCT”) available to prisoners from forty-seven to fifty-four days per year of their imposed
sentence. Pursuant to this amendment, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) credited an
additional seven days of GCT for each year of Elijah’s revocation sentence and his second
possession sentence towards his release date. In October of 2019, Elijah filed a request
with the BOP asking that it retroactively apply the First Step Act’s expansion to his original
possession sentence, which would give him an additional sixty-three days towards his
release date. 1 The Administrator of National Inmate Appeals denied Elijah’s BOP
complaint in July of 2020, exhausting the administrative remedies available to Elijah.
Proceeding pro se, Elijah filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus.
In his petition, he argued (1) his supervised release constituted “official detention,” and
thus should be credited towards his release date; (2) the BOP erred by not retroactively
applying the First Step Act to his original possession sentence; and (3) the Supreme Court
had invalidated 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) in United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369
(2019). 2 The Warden moved for summary judgment. Elijah filed a response, wherein he
expanded on his original arguments.
1
Elijah additionally argued that his supervised release should qualify as “official
detention time,” and be credited towards his sentence. J.A. 28.
2
In Haymond, the Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) was
unconstitutional because it “closely resemble[d] the punishment of new criminal offenses,
(Continued)
4
USCA4 Appeal: 21-7352 Doc: 39 Filed: 04/21/2023 Pg: 5 of 11
On July 29, 2021, a magistrate judge issued an R&R concluding that the petition
should be summarily dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.
Elijah filed a timely objection, again advancing his three claims in the same manner as
before but developing his arguments with new case law and discussion.
The district court found that because Elijah was attempting to “reargue his case,”
his objection was “nonspecific.” J.A. 137. The court thereby applied clear error review,
concluded that the magistrate did not clearly err in her analysis, and adopted the
magistrate’s recommendation to dismiss Elijah’s petition. Elijah appealed that dismissal
to this Court.
II.
Elijah first argues that because his objection clearly identified the grounds on which
he disagreed with the magistrate’s R&R, the district court should have reviewed the
grounds of his objection de novo. The Warden concedes this point, and we agree.
A.
The Federal Magistrates Act (“FMA”) allows district courts to delegate pretrial
matters to a magistrate judge, who then issues a recommendation as to how to resolve those
matters. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). In response to a recommendation, “any party may
serve and file written objections” whereupon “[a] judge of the court shall make a de novo
but without granting a defendant the rights, including the jury right, that attend a new
criminal prosecution.” Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2386 (Breyer, J., concurring) (plurality
opinion). Section 3583(e) sets out how a court may modify a sentence after revoking
supervised release.
5
USCA4 Appeal: 21-7352 Doc: 39 Filed: 04/21/2023 Pg: 6 of 11
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. § 636(b)(1)(C) (emphasis added). See
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (“The district judge must determine de novo any part of the
magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.”). Further, magistrate
recommendations are merely proposals, and hold no presumptive weight. Mathews v.
Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976).
The authority of magistrate judges is narrowly limited by Article III; in fact, the
constitutionality of the FMA sits precariously on the requirement that “ultimate
decision[s]” be made solely by the district court, not the magistrate. United States v.
George, 971 F.2d 1113, 1118 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S.
667, 683 (1980)). Magistrate judges were not intended to replace Article III judges, but to
increase the efficiency of the court by providing a neutral “preliminary evaluation” for the
judge’s consideration. Mathews, 423 U.S. at 271.
Mandatory de novo review of litigants’ objections protects the FMA’s otherwise
precarious position and “advances Congress’s intent that district judges bear ‘primary
responsibility for supervision of federal magistrates’ functions.’” United States v. De
Leon-Ramirez, 925 F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Schronce, 727
F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1984)). Thus, such review may only be foregone when the parties do
not object to the magistrate’s recommendation. See, e.g., Diamond v. Colonial Life &
Accident Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory
committee’s note to 1983 addition).
6
USCA4 Appeal: 21-7352 Doc: 39 Filed: 04/21/2023 Pg: 7 of 11
To trigger de novo review, an objecting party “must object to the finding or
recommendation on that issue with sufficient specificity so as reasonably to alert the district
court of the true ground for the objection.” United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 622
(4th Cir. 2007). “Just as a complaint stating only ‘I complain’ states no claim, an objection
stating only ‘I object’ preserves no issue for review.” Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015,
1019 (7th Cir. 1988). District courts are not expected to relitigate entire cases to determine
the basis of a litigant’s objection. See Midgette, 478 F.3d at 622. If a litigant objects only
generally, the district court reviews the magistrate’s recommendation for clear error only.
See, e.g., Diamond, 416 F.3d at 315.
Importantly, objections need not be novel to be sufficiently specific. 3 In Martin v.
Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 245–46 (4th Cir. 2017), this Court exemplified the specificity analysis
by looking solely to whether the grounds for objection were clear. There, an objection
which merely “restated all of [the] claims” was sufficiently specific because it “alerted the
district court that [the litigant] believed the magistrate judge erred in recommending
dismissal of those claims.” Id. at 246. 4 If the grounds for objection are clear, district court
judges must consider them de novo, or else run afoul of both § 636(b)(1) and Article III.
3
Aside from needlessly curtailing litigants’ access to an Article III judge, such a
requirement could leave litigants with no available arguments, as district court judges are
not required to consider new arguments posed in objections to the magistrate’s
recommendation. Samples v. Ballard, 860 F.3d 266, 275 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing United
States v. George, 971 F.2d 1113, 1118 (4th Cir. 1992)).
4
Despite the intervening and binding rule of Martin, many district courts have
continued to rely on Abou-Hussein v. Mabus, No. 2:09-1988-RMG-BM, 2010 WL
4340935 at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2010), aff’d 414 Fed. App’x 518 (4th Cir. 2011), wherein
(Continued)
7
USCA4 Appeal: 21-7352 Doc: 39 Filed: 04/21/2023 Pg: 8 of 11
Finally, pro se filings must be construed liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007), “so as to do substantial justice.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(f). “[A] pro se complaint,
‘however inartfully pleaded,’ must be held to ‘less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (citation
omitted); accord Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. Thus, when reviewing pro se objections to a
magistrate’s recommendation, district courts must review de novo any articulated grounds
to which the litigant appears to take issue. See Martin, 858 F.3d at 245–46. Such a
requirement advances district courts’ obligation to liberally construe pro se objections
while maintaining constitutional limitations on a magistrate’s authority.
Thus, we review the sufficiency of a litigant’s objection de novo. See generally
Diamond, 416 F.3d 310.
B.
Elijah’s objections satisfied—and exceeded—the sufficiency standard. Elijah
objected by way of three enumerated, detailed legal claims disagreeing with the magistrate’s
recommendation. First, he argued that he was in “official detention” while in supervised
this Court affirmed by unpublished opinion a district court’s determination that objections
could not merely “rehash” previous arguments. See, e.g., Bennett v. Zydron, No.
2:17CV92, 2017 WL 4176972, at *1 (E.D. Va. Sept. 21, 2017); Rowland v. Kijakazi, No.
5:20-cv-02689-TMC, 2022 WL 203075, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 24, 2022); Johnson v. Saul, No.
8:18-cv-03223-TMC, 2020 WL 881033, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 24, 2020); Butler v. Berryhill,
No. 4:16-cv-03209-JMC, 2018 WL 1556188, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2018); Nichols v.
Colvin, 100 F. Supp. 3d 487, 497 (E.D. Va. 2015); Godfrey v. Kijazaki, No. 6:20-cv-2504-
TMC, 2022 WL 951620, at *1 (D.S.C. March 30, 2022); Weaver v. United States Postal
Serv., No. 1:19-cv-2700-JMC, 2020 WL 3603773, at *1 (D.S.C. July 1, 2020); Li v. Xu,
No. 1:20-cv-241, 2021 WL 8444697, at *2 (E.D. Va. May 12, 2021). This opinion and
Martin, not Abou-Hussein, are controlling law.
8
USCA4 Appeal: 21-7352 Doc: 39 Filed: 04/21/2023 Pg: 9 of 11
release; therefore, his time in supervised release should be credited towards his current
sentence. J.A. 131–34. Second, citing United States v. Ward, 770 F.3d 1090 (4th Cir. 2014),
he asserted that the BOP should retroactively apply the First Step Act to his original sentence
and reduce his current sentence based on the GCT he would have earned for his original
sentence. Id. Finally, he argued that Haymond invalidated 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Id.The district court concluded that because Elijah repeated his previous arguments,
he did not object with sufficient specificity to warrant de novo review. However, Martin
clearly instructs us that Elijah’s objection was sufficiently specific because it “alerted the
district court that he believed the magistrate judge erred in recommending dismissal of
those claims.” Martin, 858 F.3d at 246. Even if we did not apply the liberal construction
provided to pro se litigants, Elijah “reasonably alert[ed] the district court of the true ground
for the objection.” Midgette, 478 F.3d at 622. At bottom, we must recognize that the pro
se construction owed to Elijah makes his grounds even clearer.
Because Elijah alerted the district court to the grounds on which he objected, the
court was obligated to review Elijah’s objections de novo. See Martin, 858 F.3d at 245–
46. It is immaterial that his objections resembled arguments he had made previously;
district courts must solely consider the specificity, not the novelty, of objections to
magistrate recommendations. By adopting the recommendation after only clear error
review, the district court improperly elevated the magistrate’s opinion and failed to satisfy
its obligations under § 636(b) and Article III. See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 668.
9
USCA4 Appeal: 21-7352 Doc: 39 Filed: 04/21/2023 Pg: 10 of 11
C.
Because “we generally don’t reach factual or legal questions in a magistrate judge’s
report that were not first subject to de novo review by the district court,” we decline Elijah’s
invitation to consider the merits of his habeas petition. De Leon-Ramirez, 925 F.3d at 181;
see also Aluminum Co. of Am. v. U.S. Envt’l. Prot. Agency, 663 F.2d 499, 502 (4th Cir.
1981). Instead, we remand to the district court to review the magistrate’s recommendation
de novo. Proceeding to the merits would needlessly abridge Elijah’s access to judicial
review, but by remanding, we ensure appropriate district court review while leaving the
door open for future appeals.
III.
Finally, we decline Elijah’s request to recall our 2016 mandate dismissing his 2015
appeal and to reopen the certificate of appealability.
Inherently, circuit courts have the discretion to recall their own mandates. Calderon
v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 549 (1998) (citing Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 463 U.S.
1323, 1324 (1983)). “[H]owever, the power can be exercised only in extraordinary
circumstances. . . . The sparing use of the power demonstrates it is one of last resort, to be
held in reserve against grave, unforeseen contingencies.” Id. (citation omitted). While
what may rise to a “grave, unforeseen contingency” has never been clearly outlined,
“[a]lleged erroneous rulings of law are generally not held to be sufficiently unconscionable
to justify reopening a judgment not void when issued.” Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
10
USCA4 Appeal: 21-7352 Doc: 39 Filed: 04/21/2023 Pg: 11 of 11
483 F.2d 963, 964 (1st Cir. 1973); accord Hines v. Royal Indem. Co., 253 F.2d 111 (6th
Cir. 1958); Iverson’s Est. v. Comm’r, 257 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1958).
Here, Elijah asks this Court to recall its mandate dismissing his case for untimeliness
for fear that we overlooked the merits of his argument. Although we sympathize with
Elijah’s position it is, in essence, an argument that the Court came to the wrong conclusion.
As noted, such claims fall short of “grave, unforeseen contingencies.” See In re Brown, 95
F. App’x 520 (4th Cir. 2004) (declining to recall mandate when petitioner argued this Court
had applied the wrong standard); accord Powers, 483 F.2d at 964; Hines, 253 F.2d at 113–
14; Iverson’s Est., 257 F.2d at 409.
Accordingly, we leave our decision dismissing Elijah’s 2015 appeal undisturbed.
IV.
Because the district court erred by reviewing the magistrate’s recommendation for
clear error, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to apply
de novo review.
VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
11