James Durham v. Robert Jones , 737 F.3d 291 ( 2013 )


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  •                                PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-2303
    JAMES DURHAM,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    SHERIFF ROBERT N. JONES,
    Defendant-Appellant,
    and
    SOMERSET COUNTY,
    Defendant,
    and
    SOMERSET COUNTY, MARYLAND; HEBRON SAVINGS BANK,
    Garnishees.
    −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−---------
    THE NATIONAL FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE,
    Amicus Supporting Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Baltimore.   William M. Nickerson, Senior District
    Judge. (1:10-cv-02534-WMN; 1:12-cv-02757-WMN)
    Argued:   October 30, 2013                 Decided:   December 10, 2013
    Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Davis wrote the opinion in
    which Judge Motz and Judge Gregory joined.
    ARGUED:   Julia Doyle Bernhardt, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.          Howard
    Benjamin Hoffman, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellee.   ON BRIEF:
    Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General of Maryland, John B.
    Howard, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
    GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Steven
    H. Goldblatt, Director, Nilam A. Sanghvi, Supervising Attorney,
    Rita K. Lomio, Supervising Attorney, Jeffrey P. DeSousa, Student
    Counsel, Robyn R. English, Student Counsel, Lindsey Oken,
    Student   Counsel,  Appellate  Litigation   Program,  GEORGETOWN
    UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Larry H.
    James, Christina L. Corl, CRABBE, BROWN & JAMES, LLP, Columbus,
    Ohio, for Amicus Curiae.
    2
    DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
    This appeal arises from a $1.1 million jury award in favor
    of   a    terminated      employee      on   a    claim      of   retaliation        for   the
    exercise of his First Amendment rights.
    A veteran deputy sheriff used pepper spray and physical
    force      to    subdue    a    motorcyclist          fleeing     from    a     fellow     law
    enforcement officer. The deputy duly prepared his report of the
    incident and submitted the report to his superiors, who in turn
    passed     it    along     to   their    superiors.          Alarmed     that    a   damages
    lawsuit against the Office of the Sheriff might result from the
    deputy’s actions, officers in the upper echelon of the chain of
    command authorized detectives to interrogate him aggressively,
    while ordering him to revise his incident report. The deputy
    opposed this order as factually and legally unwarranted. After
    the deputy broadly publicized to numerous public officials, the
    media, and others, what he described as corrupt and unlawful
    practices occurring in the Office of the Sheriff, the Sheriff
    terminated his employment.
    The    sole    issue   presented        in   this    appeal     is   whether      the
    district court erred in failing to grant qualified immunity to
    the Sheriff. For the reasons stated within, we hold that the
    district        court    did    not   err    and      accordingly,       we     affirm     the
    judgment.
    3
    I.
    To a significant extent, the cardinal facts underlying this
    appeal    are   undisputed   but,    as    always   in      an   appeal    from   a
    district court’s denial of a motion for judgment, we summarize
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
    in the district court. Sloas v. CSX Transpo., Inc., 
    616 F.3d 380
    , 392 (4th Cir. 2010).
    Appellee    James   “Troy”     Durham,   who     had    worked   in   public
    safety and law enforcement for nearly twenty years, was employed
    as one of about twenty deputy sheriffs in the Somerset County,
    Maryland, Sheriff’s Office (SCSO). On August 21, 2008, while on
    routine patrol, Durham used pepper spray and physical force to
    detain a suspect in the course of assisting a Maryland state
    trooper     arresting    a   man    fleeing    from      the     trooper    on    a
    motorcycle. Shortly after the incident, as Durham was preparing
    his report, 1 Captain Bill Lewis of the SCSO came into Durham’s
    office to confirm that he was preparing a report. Captain Lewis
    “slammed his fist down on [Durham’s] desk, and in a very loud,
    rude manner, he said, ‘Good, because Mr. Pitts, the suspect, has
    been transported to the hospital, claiming that he is injured.’”
    J.A. 104.
    1
    Durham’s incident report consisted of a narrative account
    of the incident and a separate “use of force” document.
    4
    Durham’s   report     included     the   following   statements
    explaining his use of force on the suspect:
    Based on DFC[2] Durham’s training, knowledge, and
    experience, in self-defense, DFC Durham delivered two
    forearm blows to the ridge area under the suspect’s
    nose, in an effort to gain control of the suspect and
    to overcome the resistance that the suspect was
    putting up.
    ***
    DFC Durham then delivered two knee blows to the left
    side of the suspect’s body in an effort to gain
    control of the suspect and to overcome the resistance
    that the suspect was putting up.
    J.A. 453. Durham provided copies of his report to his immediate
    supervisors. Despite Durham’s use of the terms “self-defense”
    and “resistance” in describing the need for force against the
    suspect,   Durham   has   unfailingly   insisted   throughout   these
    proceedings that he regarded his role in the encounter as merely
    one of assisting the pursuing state trooper in detaining the
    fleeing suspect. The suspect did not assault Durham and, from
    Durham’s perspective, he had no basis whatsoever to charge the
    suspect with a criminal offense. 3
    2
    Durham’s official title with the SCSO was as a Deputy
    First Class.
    3
    After the suspect had been subdued, the state trooper
    immediately assumed custody of the suspect and transported him
    to the nearby barracks.
    5
    The next day, August 22, 2008, although Durham’s immediate
    supervisors had approved his reports, Captain Lewis asked Durham
    to complete another Use of Force report using a different form.
    Captain     Lewis     also    asked     Durham        if     he    needed    to   go    to    the
    hospital, suggesting obliquely that Durham surely must require
    medical attention as a result of the incident the day before.
    Durham      stated    that     he    was    not       hurt    or    in    need    of   medical
    attention. Durham added a follow-up report to his initial report
    explaining this exchange with Captain Lewis.
    Four days later, on August 26, 2008, Durham’s supervisors
    explicitly ordered him to charge the suspect with assaulting
    Durham and resisting arrest. The supervisors further told Durham
    that if he failed to do so, Durham himself would be charged with
    assaulting the suspect. Durham then spoke with other supervisory
    officers, and based on those consultations, he decided he would
    not    place    charges       against      the       suspect.      Durham     also     detailed
    these exchanges in a second follow-up report.
    On    August     27,    2008,       Durham      received       a     memorandum       from
    Captain Lewis, advising him that Detective Sergeants Renny Miles
    and George Nelson, two specially-trained criminal investigators
    with     the    SCSO,     would       supervise         Durham       in     correcting       the
    “deficiencies” in his report. At this time, Durham contacted his
    attorney       through    his       collective        bargaining         organization,       the
    Fraternal Order of Police, giving him copies of his original
    6
    report and the memorandum. Again, Durham detailed the exchange
    with Captain Lewis in a third follow-up report.
    Upon       reporting          for   duty    on    August      29,   2008,     Durham    was
    escorted          into    an    interrogation           room   by    Detectives       Miles    and
    Nelson, where they aggressively questioned him about his use of
    force report. 4 Durham asked to have his attorney present. Miles
    refused to permit Durham to contact his attorney, had Durham
    read and sign a document containing the Miranda 5 warnings, and
    continued to question him with increasing aggressiveness. Durham
    then       told    Miles       and    Nelson      that    he   had     already      retained    an
    attorney      and        given   his       attorney      a   copy    of    Durham’s     original
    police report and the follow-up reports. Miles insisted that
    Durham must revise his original police report and delete the
    follow-up reports; if Durham did not, he would be charged both
    internally          and        criminally         with       assault       on   the     suspect.
    Specifically,            Miles       instructed         Durham      to     remove     the   facts
    4
    Durham testified that, in addition to the tenor and tone
    of the overall encounter, Miles pulled his chair so close to
    Durham’s chair at the initiation of the interrogation that he
    was able to place his leg between Durham’s legs and press up
    against them. Miles ignored Durham’s protests over this
    maneuver.
    5
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    (1966).
    7
    concerning his use of force against the suspect. 6 Miles also
    instructed Durham to delete the follow-up reports as they each
    reported    how    superior       officers        had    asked      him   to    change      his
    reports.
    Durham did not believe that he should revise any of his
    previous     reports;        as      he     later        testified,        it       was     his
    understanding       that    when     any    law     enforcement       officer        signs    a
    report    “you’re    swearing       under        oath   and   swearing         to   God    that
    that’s the truth, that’s the facts of the case.” J.A. 108. As
    the interrogation continued, Miles threatened to take Durham’s
    gun and badge if he did not change his report.
    Durham       theorized       that     the    reason      the    superior        officers
    wanted him to revise his report, and charge the suspect with
    assault    and    battery     and    resisting          arrest,     was   to    “cover      the
    Sheriff’s     office.”        J.A.        109.     Durham      suspected            that    the
    supervisors anticipated the suspect would file a complaint of
    excessive force (and perhaps a lawsuit), and “wanted to have
    everything lined up in case that event happened[.]” 
    Id. 7 6
           This included “[t]he inner forearm that [Durham] used as a
    compliance move against [the suspect] in order to get him to
    comply. And the knee strikes[.]” J.A. 125.
    7
    The record before us contains no indication that such a
    complaint (or lawsuit) was ever filed. Nor does the record
    reflect what if any charges were placed against the suspect by
    the arresting state trooper.
    8
    Durham persisted in his refusal to revise the report, and
    eventually Miles demanded Durham’s gun, ID, and badge, which he
    deposited    in    an    evidence    bag.       After   this,   Durham    decided    to
    revise the reports because he did not want to “lose everything.”
    J.A. 112. Using a computer terminal in the interrogation room,
    Durham made the revisions and deletions Miles demanded that he
    make. After first refusing to return Durham’s service weapon,
    ID, and badge, Miles eventually returned the items to Durham. As
    Durham left the interrogation room (after more than two hours)
    Miles “patted [Durham] on the back, and . . . said [Durham] was
    a good boy, a good guy, and that none of this happened.” J.A.
    114. SCSO supervisors gave Durham the afternoon off with pay and
    he   went   home,    emotionally      and       psychologically    shaken      by   the
    experience. 8
    Within      days    after     his   interrogation,         Durham    filed     an
    internal    grievance      with     his   superiors,      requesting      an   outside
    investigation into the matter. On the same day that Durham filed
    his grievance, Appellant, Sheriff Robert N. Jones, demoted him
    from DFC to Deputy. On September 10, 2008, Durham was suspended
    with pay pending further investigation. The parties spar over
    8
    Durham testified that he was so disturbed by the
    experience in the interrogation room that he could not pin his
    badge back on his uniform shirt when Miles returned it; Miles
    had to do it for him.
    9
    the precise circumstances and sequence of events surrounding the
    means       Durham      originally        chose       to       pursue    his        grievance.
    Apparently, Durham first invoked Somerset County human relations
    remedies,       but     soon     County       officials         seemingly       deferred       to
    proceedings within the purview of the Sheriff’s Office.
    In     any    event,    after    receiving          a   letter    from      the    County
    Administrator          informing        him    that        the    grievance         would      be
    investigated by the very officials in the SCSO against whom the
    grievance had been made in the first place, Durham decided to
    take proactive measures of a highly public nature. Specifically,
    he prepared a cover letter to a set of documents, which included
    a memorandum summarizing the events arising from his August 21,
    2008    encounter       with    the     suspect,      addressed         to   his     immediate
    supervisor; his original police report; the deleted follow-up
    reports;       the    “false”      police      report          Durham    created         on   the
    computer       during    his     interrogation         by      Miles    and     Nelson;       the
    signed Miranda form; a copy of the grievance Durham filed; and
    his suspension paperwork. Durham sent this packet of materials
    to: (1) the Somerset County State’s Attorney; (2) the Governor
    of Maryland; (3) the Police Academy where he had been trained;
    (4)     the    Maryland        Police     Training         Commission;        and    (5)      the
    Maryland State Police. In addition, he sent the packet to a
    number of media outlets, such as the local newspaper, The Daily
    10
    Times of Salisbury, Maryland, and two local television stations,
    WBOC TV 16 and Fox 21 News.
    In the correspondence to which the internal SCSO documents
    were attached, Durham stated that he believed Sheriff Jones and
    others had “broke public trust and abused their power.” J.A.
    141. Durham testified that he sent these materials to the news
    media “to expose and to alert the public . . . on what had taken
    place    involving     falsifying      reports,        deleting        reports,    placing
    false charges on an innocent person, violating county policy,
    violating    my    rights,     me    being    assaulted.”          J.A.     143.    Durham
    explained that he sent these materials to the Maryland State
    Police because they are an “independent, unbiased, outside law
    enforcement agency. And as a citizen, I was making a complaint.
    I was the victim in a complaint and of a crime.” J.A. 144.
    Durham    continued     to     send       these     materials        to    various
    political    officials,       including       a    Senator        in    Virginia,       until
    Jones issued a “gag order” against him on September 28, 2008.
    Durham testified, and Jones agreed, that in the internal SCSO
    documents, Durham did not reveal any confidential interrogation
    methods,     special     police      tactics,          or   the        identity    of    any
    confidential        informants.         During          the        ensuing        internal
    investigation, Durham told investigators that he had sent out
    these    materials     “to    expose    and       to   alert      the    public     of   the
    corruption that had taken place.” J.A. 157.
    11
    In May 2009, Durham was departmentally charged pursuant to
    the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (“the LEOBR”), Md.
    Code, Pub. Safety § 3–101, et seq. (West 2013), with assorted
    misconduct, including dissemination of departmental information
    and unbecoming conduct. 9 In July 2009, the LEOBR Trial Board,
    consisting      of      three    law     enforcement        commanders       from     other
    counties,       conducted       a    two-day        evidentiary      hearing     on    the
    charges. The Trial Board acquitted Durham of all the charges
    except    the     two    relating      to    the     dissemination     of    information
    outside     the       agency    without        authorization.        The    Trial     Board
    recommended       a     punishment      of    five     days’   suspension      for    each
    charge,     totaling           ten     days’        suspension.      Jones     initially
    recommended a penalty of thirty days’ suspension for each of the
    charges, totaling sixty days’ suspension.
    After the Trial Board issued its decision, Jones sent a
    letter to Durham, informing him that, pursuant to the LEOBR, he
    (Jones) was considering a possible increase in the sanction. He
    invited Durham to appear for a penalty hearing on September 16,
    2009. The       day     after    Durham      and    his   attorney    appeared      before
    9
    Other charges included failure to obey a lawful order,
    failure to show respect for a fellow employee, failure to be
    courteous to the public, failure to carry out responsibilities
    in a competent manner, failure to take appropriate action,
    submission of a false report, use of excessive force, and
    failure to conform to law.
    12
    Jones for the penalty consideration, Durham received notice of
    his termination.
    II.
    Durham       sued    Jones     in   his      individual    capacity          under     42
    U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was terminated in retaliation
    for     exercising          his     free     speech     rights        under      the     First
    Amendment. 10 Jones moved to dismiss Durham’s case under Federal
    Rule    of     Civil       Procedure       12(b)(6)     on    grounds       of    qualified
    immunity. The district court denied the motion and the case went
    to trial.
    Durham and Jones both testified at length. Durham testified
    to the incidents leading up to his termination, including his
    interactions         with     Jones    and     Miles.    Jones    explained          that     he
    terminated         Durham’s       employment     because     Durham     had      “undermined
    the Sheriff’s office . . . . [Durham’s public disclosures were]
    full of all kinds of comments about people in my office, me, and
    everybody else. We were a joke. It was an embarrassment. We
    spent       time    tracking       down    witnesses     .    .   .    it     was      just   a
    nuisance[.]” J.A. 304-05. Jones also testified that if Durham
    had not disseminated the information he did, he “probably” would
    not have been terminated. J.A. 314. Jones testified that he felt
    10
    Additional claims Durham asserted against Jones                                     and
    against other defendants are not before us in this appeal.
    13
    that Durham had “stabbed [him] in the back,” and that Durham’s
    allegations amounted to calling him a “crook.” J.A. 348.
    After Durham presented his case, Jones moved for judgment
    as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a),
    again   on    grounds    of   qualified      immunity.    The   district   court
    denied the motion. Jones did not present an affirmative case,
    and the matter was submitted to the jury. The jury found in
    favor of Durham, awarding him $1,112,200 in combined economic
    and non-economic damages.
    Jones timely renewed his motion for judgment pursuant to
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), once again presenting
    arguments on qualified immunity. The district court denied the
    motion. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 1291.
    III.
    We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 50(b) motion
    de novo. 
    Sloas, 616 F.3d at 380
    . As to qualified immunity, as
    with any claim or defense, we view the evidence adduced at trial
    “in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,” 
    id., and, in
    circumstances such as those here, we reverse only if “the
    evidence favoring the [plaintiff] is [not] legally sufficient to
    overcome the defense.” Ortiz v. Jordan, 
    131 S. Ct. 884
    , 889
    (2011).      In   our   de   novo   review    of   the   denial   of   qualified
    14
    immunity       on   the   record   here,   we   are   mindful      of   the   Supreme
    Court’s recent admonishment:
    Once the case proceeds to trial, the full record
    developed in court supersedes the record existing at
    the time of the summary judgment motion. A qualified
    immunity defense, of course, does not vanish when a
    district court declines to rule on the plea summarily.
    The plea remains available to the defending officials
    at trial; but at that stage, the defense must be
    evaluated in light of the character and quality of the
    evidence received in court.
    
    Id. IV. Jones
    contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity,
    which    shields      government    officials      “who   commit    constitutional
    violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could
    reasonably believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v.
    Purnell, 
    652 F.3d 524
    , 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citing
    Saucier v. Katz, 
    533 U.S. 194
    , 206 (2001)). “The burden of proof
    and persuasion with respect to a defense of qualified immunity
    rests     on    the    official    asserting       that   defense.”      Meyers   v.
    Baltimore Cnty., Md., 
    713 F.3d 723
    , 731 (4th Cir. 2013). “To
    prevail under qualified immunity, [Jones] has to show either
    that there was no constitutional violation or that the right
    violated was not clearly established.” Gregg v. Ham, 
    678 F.3d 333
    , 341 n.7 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing 
    Henry, 652 F.3d at 531
    ).
    Jones argues first that there was no violation of Durham’s First
    Amendment rights, and second, even if there was a violation, the
    15
    right was not clearly established. We consider each issue in
    turn.
    A.
    Jones   contends     that   it    was   not    a   violation      of    Durham’s
    First Amendment rights to terminate him for his publication of
    documents from Durham’s internal grievance proceedings. If he is
    correct, then he is entitled to qualified immunity. Chavez v.
    Martinez,    
    538 U.S. 760
    ,   766    (2003)     (plurality    opinion)        (“In
    deciding whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity,
    we must first determine whether the officer’s alleged conduct
    violated a constitutional right . . . . If not, the officer is
    entitled to qualified immunity.”) (internal citations omitted).
    We   evaluate    the   exercise     of    First       Amendment    rights     by
    public    employees   differently       from       their    exercise        by   other
    citizens; we must balance the interests of an employee who, as a
    citizen, comments upon matters of public concern, on the one
    hand, and the interests of a governmental employer, which must
    maintain an effective workplace, on the other. Connick v. Myers,
    
    461 U.S. 138
    , 142 (1983) (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 
    391 U.S. 563
    , 568 (1968)). To determine if a public employee has a
    cognizable First Amendment claim for retaliatory discharge, we
    apply a three-part test:
    First, we consider whether the public employee was
    speaking as a citizen upon a matter of public concern
    or as an employee about a matter of personal interest.
    16
    Second, even if the employee spoke upon a matter of
    public   concern,  we   must   determine  whether   the
    employee's interest in speaking upon the matter of
    public concern outweighed the government’s interest in
    managing the working environment. And finally, if the
    employee’s   claim  satisfies   both  of  these   legal
    criteria, the court turns to the factual question of
    whether the employee’s speech was a substantial factor
    in the employee’s termination decision.
    Brooks v. Arthur, 
    685 F.3d 367
    , 371 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal
    citations and quotation marks omitted).
    Jones    does    not     dispute     that       Durham’s    speech      was    a
    substantial   factor     in    his      decision      to    terminate       Durham’s
    employment. Thus, we are concerned solely with the first two
    prongs of Durham’s retaliation claim.
    Matter of Public Concern
    Jones first argues that Durham’s speech was not on a matter
    of public concern, as he was simply publicizing his internal
    grievances.    The    trial     record        does    not    bear     out     Jones’
    contention.
    The   Supreme    Court   has    instructed       courts    to   look    to    the
    “content, form, and context of a given statement” to determine
    whether it addresses a matter of public concern. 
    Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48
    . “Speech involves a matter of public concern when
    it involves an issue of social, political, or other interest to
    a community.” Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, 
    388 F.3d 440
    , 446
    (4th Cir. 2004). This does not include “personal complaints and
    grievances    about     conditions       of      employment.”        Campbell      v.
    17
    Galloway, 
    483 F.3d 258
    , 267 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Stroman v.
    Colleton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 
    981 F.2d 152
    , 156 (4th Cir. 1992)).
    While Jones is correct that personal grievances are not matters
    of   public   concern,     he     mischaracterizes       Durham’s     actions     and
    misapprehends     the   focus     of    Durham’s    communications      to    public
    officials and the media.
    As   the   district       court    correctly      ruled,     Durham    is   not
    claiming First Amendment protection for the materials he filed
    in the internal grievance proceedings (including the attachments
    to his letters), or for his filing of an internal grievance.
    Rather, Durham is claiming First Amendment protection for his
    publicizing      of     those     materials        in    connection     with      his
    overarching allegations of serious and pervasive law enforcement
    misconduct in the SCSO. To be sure, it cannot be denied on this
    record that the misconduct alleged came to light mainly because,
    or perhaps only because, Durham himself became a victim of the
    misconduct. Nevertheless, that circumstance does not undermine
    the conclusion that his allegations rose to the level of speech
    on a matter of public concern. We have no hesitation in holding
    that the trial evidence amply supported the district court’s
    determination     that      the     content    of       Durham’s     communication
    strongly militated in favor of finding it was on a matter of
    public concern.
    18
    Unlike in Connick, Durham did in fact “seek to inform the
    
    public,” 461 U.S. at 148
    , of how his superiors were instructing
    him   to   revise    his       reports   in    a    way    that    he,   as   the   only
    percipient witness to the events, knew and believed to be false.
    Durham     sought        “to    bring    to        light    actual       or   potential
    wrongdoing,” 
    id., on the
    part of his superiors, calling for an
    external investigation and media coverage. In his explanatory
    letter included with the other materials, Durham outlined the
    circumstances       of    his   superiors      asking      him    to   falsify   police
    reports and submit unwarranted charges against the suspect in
    the August 21, 2008 incident, on the unmistakable pretextual
    basis that doing so would pretermit a citizen complaint or a
    damages lawsuit. As we held in Maciariello v. Sumner, 
    973 F.2d 295
    , 300 (4th Cir. 1992), “an allegation of evidence tampering
    by a high-ranking police officer is a matter in which the public
    should be interested.” Durham was disturbed by the misconduct he
    saw in the SCSO, and which he experienced first-hand, and he
    felt that it needed public attention in order to be remedied. 11
    11
    At oral argument before us, Jones argued strenuously that
    Durham was simply mistaken in his belief that he lacked probable
    cause to place charges against the suspect, and that his
    supervisors were entitled to take corrective action. We need not
    and do not venture into that thicket. If the supervisory
    officials in the SCSO genuinely believed that, despite his many
    years of law enforcement experience, Durham required additional
    or remedial training, then clearly that avenue was open to them.
    What was not shielded from public scrutiny, however, were
    (Continued)
    19
    In addition to the content of his statements, the form and
    context   of   their    dissemination        confirm   that    they    were      on   a
    matter    of   public   concern.   Durham       did    not    keep    the   written
    materials internal, but instead sent them to a broad audience:
    state and law enforcement offices including the Somerset County
    State’s Attorney, the Governor of Maryland, the Police Academy,
    the   Maryland   Police      Training    Commission,     the     Maryland        State
    Police, as well as a number of media outlets, such as The Daily
    Times of Salisbury, Maryland, WBOC TV 16, and Fox 21 News. As an
    insider   in   the   SCSO,    Durham    was   uniquely       positioned     to    have
    knowledge of its practices. Moreover, Jones testified that if
    the SCSO engaged in a cover-up, the public would be “concerned”
    and “upset,” J.A. 290, and noted that he had given at least one
    interview to the news media about Durham’s termination. The fact
    that the issue was one which interested the media indicates that
    it was of public interest, as we noted in Robinson v. Balog, 
    160 F.3d 183
    (4th Cir. 1998). There, we found that statements made
    at a public meeting were protected speech, and a factor in our
    consideration was that the meeting led to local press coverage.
    
    Id. at 188-89.
    aggressive and corrupt attempts to ward off lawsuits through the
    falsification of law enforcement records.
    20
    In sum, the district court correctly concluded, as a matter
    of   law,       see   
    Connick, 461 U.S. at 148
      n.7,   that   Durham’s
    communications were on a matter of public concern, given their
    content, form, and context.
    Balancing Speech Rights Against Effective Work Environment
    Jones argues that even if Durham was addressing a matter of
    public concern, the SCSO’s interest in maintaining an efficient
    and effective law enforcement agency outweighed Durham’s rights
    under     the    First   Amendment. 12   Again,    however,     we   discern   no
    substantial evidence in the trial record supporting this claim.
    12
    Durham argues, unpersuasively, that Jones is generally
    estopped from arguing the reasonableness of his decision to
    terminate Durham, as the Maryland Court of Special Appeals has
    ruled   that  the   termination  decision  was   “arbitrary  and
    capricious.” Durham v. Jones, No. 1382, at *16 (Md. Ct. Sp. App.
    Aug. 1, 2012) (unreported). This argument badly misses the mark.
    Durham sought judicial review of Sheriff Jones’ administrative
    decision in the Circuit Court for Somerset County pursuant to
    the provisions of the LEOBR. Although the lower court sustained
    the Sheriff’s decision to terminate Durham, finding that he had
    not deviated from the discretion granted to him by statute, the
    Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the Sheriff’s
    decision to increase Durham’s penalty from a ten-day suspension
    to termination was “so extreme and egregious that it constituted
    an arbitrary and capricious action.” 
    Id. at *16.
    The court’s
    decision did not, however, examine whether the Sheriff had
    violated Durham’s First Amendment rights; in fact, the court
    expressly declined to review the termination on those grounds,
    finding that Durham had failed to properly preserve the issue in
    the trial court. 
    Id. Durham argues
    that this decision collaterally estops Jones
    from “relitigating” whether the decision to terminate Durham was
    reasonable. Durham mistakes the issue in this appeal. The
    question before this panel is not whether Jones had sufficient
    (Continued)
    21
    “The   efficient   functioning      of   government   offices   is   a
    paramount public interest.” 
    Balog, 160 F.3d at 189
    . Police are
    the most restrictive in this regard as they are “paramilitary –
    discipline   is   demanded,   and    freedom    must   be   correspondingly
    denied.” 
    Maciariello, 973 F.2d at 300
    (internal quotation marks
    and   citations   omitted).   We    consider   a   number   of   factors   in
    determining “the extent to which [the protected speech] disrupts
    the operation and mission of the agency.” McVey v. Stacy, 
    157 F.3d 271
    , 278 (4th Cir. 1998).
    Factors relevant to this inquiry include whether a
    public employee’s speech (1) impaired the maintenance
    of discipline by supervisors; (2) impaired harmony
    among   coworkers;    (3)   damaged    close   personal
    relationships; (4) impeded the performance of the
    public employee's duties; (5) interfered with the
    operation of the institution; (6) undermined the
    mission of the institution; (7) was communicated to
    the public or to coworkers in private; (8) conflicted
    with the responsibilities of the employee within the
    institution; and (9) abused the authority and public
    accountability that the employee’s role entailed.
    evidence to justify his termination of Durham in the exercise of
    his discretion under the LEOBR, as the Court of Special Appeals
    considered. Rather, the question before this panel is whether,
    even assuming some sanction could be imposed upon Durham for his
    dissemination   of  internal   SCSO  documents,  Jones  violated
    Durham’s First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for
    speaking on a matter of public concern, under circumstances in
    which Durham’s interest outweighed the Sheriff’s interest in an
    efficient and orderly law enforcement agency. There has been no
    “relitigation” of that issue, which the Court of Special Appeals
    specifically declined to review.
    22
    Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 
    447 F.3d 292
    , 317
    (4th Cir. 2006) (citing 
    McVey, 157 F.3d at 278
    ).
    Tellingly,      Jones    presented        no   evidence       at    trial    of    any
    actual     disruption      in        the    SCSO       resulting          from     Durham’s
    communications, other than vague references to Durham’s actions
    “undermining the public trust.” J.A. 316. While Jones is correct
    that     “concrete     evidence”       of     an      actual     disruption        is     not
    required, there must still be a reasonable apprehension of such
    a disruption. 
    Maciariello, 973 F.2d at 300
    . At trial, Jones paid
    lip service to ostensible damage to office morale, relationships
    between colleagues, and the function of the office generally,
    but he was unable to articulate any way in which the office
    would    have   been    different      or     was     actually       different      due    to
    Durham’s    statements.        Had    Jones      imposed       the   relatively         brief
    (ten-day) suspension recommended by the LEOBR Trial Board, there
    is evidence in the record that deputies and supervisors in the
    SCSO were still amenable to working with Durham, including Jones
    himself, who had actually rehired Durham when he had earlier
    left the SCSO for what he thought might be a better opportunity,
    only to return to the SCSO.
    It is useful to compare this situation with the one in
    
    Stroman, 981 F.2d at 152
    . In Stroman, a teacher wrote letters to
    his colleagues regarding wage grievances and proposed a “sick-
    out” during exam week to send a message to administrators. 
    Id. 23 at
    158-59. The potential for disruption in such a situation is
    obvious:     the     school        could    not       be   functional       without     its
    teachers,     who       are   essential      in       providing     its     services.   In
    contrast,     when       Jones      was     asked       whether     Durham’s       actions
    “hamper[ed] the ability of the Somerset County Sheriff’s Office
    to protect the public,” Jones responded he “[didn’t] know, but
    [he] wouldn’t think so.” J.A. 318.
    This is not to say that there was no impact felt in the
    SCSO whatsoever. Jones testified that officers had to spend time
    on the investigation, and there was office conversation about
    Durham and the entire incident. But it is not enough that there
    is some disruption; the amount of disruption has to outweigh the
    importance of the speech and its concern to the public. See
    
    Connick, 461 U.S. at 152
    ;    see    also     
    McVey, 157 F.3d at 279
    (Murnaghan,       J.,    concurring)        (“A       stronger    showing     of   public
    interest in the speech requires a concomitantly stronger showing
    of government-employer interest to overcome it.”).
    Whatever artful affidavits might have suggested at summary
    judgment, we examine here the trial record, not a hypothetical
    rumination    on    what      could   have       or    might   have    transpired.      See
    
    Ortiz, 131 S. Ct. at 889
    . Serious, to say nothing of corrupt,
    law enforcement misconduct is a substantial concern that must be
    met with a similarly substantial disruption in the calibration
    of the controlling balancing test. Given Jones’ inability to
    24
    show at trial how Durham’s actions had an adverse impact on the
    proper    functioning    of    the       SCSO   in    some    serious          manner,    the
    balance between Durham’s rights as a private citizen under the
    First Amendment and Jones’ interest in ensuring an efficient and
    effective work environment tilts heavily in favor of Durham and
    his entitlement to enjoy protected speech. Accordingly, we find
    that the district court was right to conclude, on the present
    record, that Durham’s interests outweighed those on the other
    side;    Durham   proved,     as    the    jury      found,      that     he    suffered    a
    constitutional injury.
    B.
    Having found that Jones violated Durham’s First Amendment
    rights, we must now look to whether, at the time of Durham’s
    termination,      Durham’s    rights       were      “clearly      established”          such
    that a “reasonable person would have known” the termination of
    his   employment     would     be    violative        of     the    First       Amendment.
    
    Ridpath, 447 F.3d at 313
    . “[A] constitutional right is clearly
    established when ‘its contours [are] sufficiently clear that a
    reasonable    official      would    understand           that     what    he    is   doing
    violates that right.’” 
    Id. (quoting Hope
    v. Pelzer, 
    536 U.S. 730
    , 739 (2002)).
    Jones   argues    that       the    right      in    question       here    was     not
    clearly established because there was not a bright line rule to
    address Durham’s situation, and there is “scant guidance on the
    25
    boundaries         of       public    employee         speech        rights”      in    the    Fourth
    Circuit. App. Br. 32. Jones is incorrect. We have been clear
    that    where          public    employees         are     speaking         out   on     government
    misconduct, their speech warrants protection. 
    Balog, 160 F.3d at 189
    .    Of    course,         not     every       situation          involving      a    government
    employee speaking about some workplace dispute qualifies – as we
    pointed out in Balog. 
    Id. at 189-90.
    But just as in Balog, the
    situation here is “no ordinary workplace dispute.” 
    Id. at 190.
    Nor    is    this       a    situation       in    which       Durham’s      accusations           were
    buried       in    a    “rambling”         letter       full     of    other      incidents        and
    accusations. See 
    Campbell, 483 F.3d at 271
    (granting qualified
    immunity          as    no    reasonable          person    would       have      known       that    a
    “rambling thirteen-page memo . . . which focused overwhelmingly
    on personal grievances and vague gripes about fellow officers
    not    being       very      nice     to   her,     touched       on    a    matter      of    public
    concern[.]”).
    The    incidents          at    issue      here     rise      far    above       an   ordinary
    workplace          dispute.         Durham     accused          several      high-ranking            law
    enforcement            officials,      in     positions         of     authority        within       the
    SCSO, of falsifying law enforcement reports and with authorizing
    aggressive threats against a member of their own agency if he
    persisted         in    his     opposition        to     such    a    practice.         As    we   have
    indicated         above,        Durham’s      honest       belief,         even    if    it    was     a
    mistaken belief, that his use of force was both justified to
    26
    assist in the apprehension of the suspect, but (at the same
    time) did not arise out of any contemporaneous criminal act by
    the suspect, might call for retraining or some other response
    from   his    supervisors.         That    is    their     call.      But    the     use    of
    coercion and threats against him as shown in this record and
    accepted      as    accurate       by     the    jury      goes    far      beyond        such
    permissible bounds. Durham was being coerced to lie under oath
    insofar as they demanded that he revise his reports in a way
    contrary to his honestly-held beliefs; he testified that, as
    when any law enforcement officer signs a police report, “you’re
    swearing under oath and swearing to God that that’s the truth,
    that’s the facts of the case.” J.A. 108. This is especially
    important to the function of law enforcement, as such reports
    “become a piece of evidence that could later on be used in court
    to prosecute somebody, to possible even send them to jail, so it
    has to be truthful and accurate of the facts.” 
    Id. In short,
    it was clearly established in the law of this
    Circuit      in    September    2009      that       an   employee’s        speech    about
    serious governmental misconduct, and certainly not least of all
    serious misconduct in a law enforcement agency, see Andrew v.
    Clark, 
    561 F.3d 261
    , 269 (4th Cir. 2009), is protected. The mere
    fact that Jones may have had an independent basis to impose some
    lesser     disciplinary        sanction         on    Durham      short     of     outright
    termination,       such   as   a   short    suspension         from    duty,       does    not
    27
    muddle the clarity of that legal principle. Jones’ arguments to
    the contrary are unavailing.
    V.
    For the reasons set forth, the judgment of the district
    court is
    AFFIRMED.
    28