Greatwide Dedicated Transport II, LLC v. United States Department of Labor ( 2023 )

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-1797
GREATWIDE DEDICATED TRANSPORT II, LLC,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW
BOARD; THEODORE HUANG,
Respondents.
On Petition for Review of an Order from the United States Department of Labor,
Administrative Review Board. (2019-0053)
Argued: January 26, 2023 Decided: June 30, 2023
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, HARRIS, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge Harris
and Judge Quattlebaum joined.
ARGUED: Renee Lynn Bowen, FRANKLIN & PROKOPIK, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Petitioner. Stephanie MacInnes, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Washington, D.C.; Christopher Thomas Staiti, STAITI LAW FIRM, INC., Millersville,
Maryland, for Respondents. ON BRIEF: Seema Namda, Solicitor of Labor, Elena S.
Goldstein, Deputy Solicitor of Labor, Edmund Baird, Associate Solicitor for Occupational
Safety and Health, Heather R. Phillips, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Washington, D.C., for Respondent Secretary of Labor.
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GREGORY, Chief Judge:
While Theodore Huang was employed as a truck driver at Greatwide Dedicated
Transport II, LLC (“Greatwide”), he witnessed certain drivers receive additional driving
assignments in violation of 49 C.F.R. § 395.3, which regulates the maximum driving time
for property-carrying vehicles. After collecting evidence related to the violations, Huang
submitted anonymous letters to management reporting his findings. Soon thereafter,
Huang revealed to management personnel that he was the author of the letters. The
following month, Huang was assigned to deliver two trailers filled with merchandise to
two Nordstrom store locations in Manhattan, New York and Paramus, New Jersey.
However, when Huang returned from this assignment, he was suspended for—what
Greatwide claimed to be—violations of company policy. Greatwide subsequently
terminated and dismissed Huang without a more explicit explanation.
Huang promptly filed a whistleblower complaint with the U.S. Department of
Labor’s (“DOL”) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”). Following
several lengthy delays, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) ruled in Huang’s favor,
ordering Greatwide to pay both backpay and emotional distress damages. The
Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) affirmed.
Greatwide now raises three primary arguments on appeal. First, it contends the
ARB improperly affirmed the ALJ’s conclusion that Huang was terminated due to his
protected activity. Second, the company argues that the ARB improperly held that the
company was not prejudiced by the DOL’s delays in scheduling the hearing and issuing its
decision and also considering Huang’s disclosures beyond the predetermined deadline.
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And third, Greatwide asserts that the ALJ erred in failing to find a valid and enforceable
settlement agreement between the parties. For the reasons that follow, we are unpersuaded
by Greatwide’s contentions and affirm the ARB’s decision.
I.
A.
Greatwide is a commercial motor-carrier company that transports goods for its
customers. The company has approximately fifty distribution centers and employs 3,500 to
4,000 drivers. Huang was one of those drivers, employed at the Upper Marlboro, Maryland
distribution center. Other Greatwide representatives and employees involved in this case
are: Brian Scott (“Scott”), Greatwide’s regional vice president who oversees six distribution
centers including the Upper Marlboro location, Aimee Price (“Price”), the regional safety
director at the Upper Marlboro terminal, responsible for all OSHA, Department of
Transportation (“DOT”), and Federal Motor Carrier Safety (“FMCS”) compliance, and
Richard Burnett (“Burnett”), a dispatcher for the Upper Marlboro terminal.
Huang alleged that two groups existed at the distribution center: “insiders” and
“outsiders”. J.A. 271. Dispatchers allowed “insiders” to drive over regulated hours in
violation of 49 C.F.R. § 395.3. 1 One day, after an “insider” informed Huang that he was
1
Under this regulation, a “driver may not drive without first taking 10 consecutive
hours off duty.” 49 C.F.R. § 395.3(a)(1). Nor may a driver “drive after a period of 14
consecutive hours after coming on-duty following 10 consecutive hours off-duty.” 49
C.F.R. § 395.3(a)(2). During that 14-hour period, a driver may only “drive a total of 11
hours.” 49 C.F.R. § 395.3(a)(3). Further, “driving is not permitted if more than 8 hours of
(Continued)
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going to “run”—or drive—illegally, Huang decided that he would expose the unlawful
conduct and collect evidence to support his discovery.
On March 27, 2012, in order to capture discussions concerning the alleged safety
violations, Huang duct-taped a digital voice recorder to a cubicle’s outer wall in the
distribution center’s “bullpen” area, 2 and recorded the dispatcher’s daily review and
assignment of drivers’ routes and hours. Huang deemed a brief portion of the recorded
conversation relevant to the safety violations and deleted the remainder. On the same day,
Huang also removed paperwork from the center’s lockbox belonging to one of the “insider”
drivers, Mark Peters (“Peters”). Management at the Upper Marlboro distribution center
required its drivers to deposit relevant documentation, including mileage or assigned store
routes, into the lockbox after returning from daily assignments. Although the parties
disagree over the material and structural integrity of the lockbox, it is uncontested that the
lockbox was a standard black box with a person-made slit on its top face for drivers to slip
their paperwork through.
Huang alleged that he easily slipped his hand through the lockbox’s opening, removed
Peters’ driver’s log from the lockbox (which demonstrated that Peters’ driving surpassed
permissible hours), took the paperwork home, made copies, and returned it two hours later.
The driver’s log supposedly included store numbers referencing the delivery locations,
driving time have passed without at least a consecutive 30-minute interruption in driving
status.” Id.2
The record indicates that the bullpen—which was in a Nordstrom packaging
warehouse—was an open floorplan area with desks and cubicle dividers. Huang alleged
that the bullpen was often busy, filled with foot traffic.
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delivery receipts and sheets, and a list of all drivers and runs. Greatwide contended that, on
this day, the lockbox was mysteriously damaged. Yet, Huang never admitted to damaging
the lockbox and Greatwide failed to provide evidence supporting the contrary.
On April 2, 2012, Huang sent practically identical anonymous letters to Scott and
Price relaying his findings on the safety violations. Scott and Price discussed the content
of the letters and pursued a company investigation. The following month, Huang confessed
to Scott that he was the author of the letters and emailed him an edited mp3 file and
transcription of the dispatchers’ bullpen conversation related to the safety concerns.
On May 17, 2012, Huang drew an assignment to drive a double trailer to Nordstrom
locations in Manhattan, New York and Paramus, New Jersey. The events surrounding this
double trailer drop remain hotly contested between the parties. Huang asserts that he
dropped 3 the trailer outside the Manhattan Nordstrom, secured it with a glad hand lock, and
parked a 3,000-pound converter dolly in front of it, preventing any person from breaking into
or stealing the trailer. While some Greatwide representatives claim Huang left that trailer in
Manhattan and proceeded to complete the New Jersey assignment, Huang maintains that he
brought both trailers to the New Jersey Nordstrom. Huang further contends that, in the past,
he had dropped trailers in a similar fashion on the same route without issue while he grabbed
a bite to eat nearby. Greatwide, on the other hand, posits that, per a Nordstrom employee’s
complaint, Huang dropped the trailer on a Manhattan street, off Nordstrom property,
3
“Dropping” is a colloquial term used in the trucking industry to reference
“disconnecting the trailer from the tractor” and leaving the trailer where it was dropped.
J.A. 358.
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unsecured and unlocked. However, Greatwide could not identify the Nordstrom employee
nor provide any proof of contact regarding this complaint.
Greatwide suspended Huang upon his return from the double trailer drop. A few
days later, he received notice that he was under investigation for an hours-of-service
violation. And a week after that, he was informed that he was being investigated for a
security issue.
On May 30, 2012, Huang met with Price, Trian Mirov (Greatwide’s Operations
Manager), and Jeff Lester (Greatwide’s Chief Risk Officer), to discuss his alleged conduct.
The following day, Huang received an official “Termination Request” which stated—
without further elaboration—that he was being terminated based on “[m]ultiple company
violations.” J.A. 781.
B.
Huang filed a complaint with OSHA on September 21, 2012, alleging that
Greatwide had violated the employee protection provisions found under the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act (“STAA”), 49 U.S.C. § 31105, by terminating his
employment in retaliation for reporting the company’s safety violations.
On January 8, 2016, over three years later, the agency dismissed Huang’s complaint
finding that his protected activity was not a contributing factor to his termination. Huang
promptly requested a hearing before an ALJ, who subsequently calendared a hearing for
September 2016 and issued notices of docketing and hearing and a pre-hearing order. The
ALJ directed the parties to provide initial disclosures, pre-hearing disclosures, and pre-
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hearing statements by a particular deadline. Huang failed to provide any of this
documentation prior to the hearing.
At the hearing, Huang informed the ALJ and Greatwide that his retained counsel
was unable to be present. The ALJ rescheduled the hearing for June 2017, allowing the
parties time to engage in potential settlement negotiations. Following the September 2016
hearing, Greatwide’s counsel discovered that Huang’s alleged counsel was not, in fact,
formally retained and, therefore, did not represent Huang.
On October 9, 2016, Huang told the ALJ that the parties had failed to reach a
settlement agreement but he was confident that would soon change. Shortly thereafter, in
the course of their phone- and email-based settlement discussions, Huang left the following
voicemail for Greatwide’s counsel:
Um, yeah, I think we’re gunna take the offer if it’s still available. Um, I
noticed that in the, uh, update to the judge you put, uh, in that you intended
to file for dismissal. Hopefully we won’t have to go there, um, now. I, my
cell phone is broken because I dropped it, so I probably can’t, you know,
receive any calls today. I’m gunna try to get it replaced um so hopefully we
can touch base at least tomorrow . . . .
J.A. 150. In response, Greatwide’s counsel wrote Huang an email confirming receipt of
his voicemail and stating that: “[t]his email will confirm that you have accepted our
settlement offer.” J.A. 160. A week later, Greatwide’s counsel followed up via email
attaching a Release, Settlement, and Confidentiality Agreement for Huang’s “review and
signature.” Id. The Agreement included Greatwide’s understanding of the parties’ agreed-
upon terms as well as Greatwide’s counsel’s standard employment release. Huang failed
to respond to either email.
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After formally retaining counsel in May 2017, Huang eventually submitted his pre-
hearing disclosures and a pre-hearing statement. Also, in a notice to Greatwide, Huang
indicated that the emailed settlement agreement contained additional material terms the
parties had not discussed, making the agreement an unenforceable counteroffer. Greatwide
filed a motion requesting that the ALJ enforce the settlement agreement. After the ALJ
refused Greatwide’s request, the parties proceeded to a pre-hearing telephonic conference
in June 2017. On that call, the ALJ indicated that he would grant a second continuance to
the hearing if both parties agreed and informed the parties that he did not possess the
equitable, Article III powers to enforce the settlement agreement.
Accordingly, Greatwide initiated a second motion for a continuance, and the hearing
was rescheduled to September 2017. The company also reiterated to the ALJ that Huang
failed to supplement his original pre-hearing disclosures or statement and did not provide
initial disclosures, or other disclosures, as required under 29 C.F.R. § 18.50(c)(1)(i). The
hearing eventually occurred in September and October 2017, where Huang, Burnett, Price,
and Scott all testified.
On March 27, 2019, the ALJ issued their Decision & Order (“D&O”) in Huang’s
favor, ordering Greatwide to pay $107,940.07 in backpay and $5,000 in emotional distress
damages. The forty-five-page decision held that: (1) Huang engaged in protected activity
when he wrote anonymous letters to Scott and Price, removed and copied documents from
the lockbox, and recorded a management conversation to support his allegations; (2) the
temporal proximity between Huang’s protected activity and termination was sufficient to
establish that Huang’s protected activity was a contributing factor in his termination; and
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(3) Greatwide had not established by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
terminated Huang absent his protected activity. See J.A. 987–1033. Greatwide appealed,
arguing that it was prejudiced by the DOL’s delays, that the ALJ erred in considering
evidence Huang failed to provide in his initial disclosures, and that the ALJ’s findings were
not supported by the record’s substantial evidence.
In a subsequent D&O, the ARB affirmed the ALJ’s decision. The ARB held first
that Greatwide was not prejudiced by the ALJ’s delay in issuing their D&O given its
detailed analysis of conflicting testimony. Specifically, it determined that the delay was
“not unreasonable.” J.A. 1160. The ARB further explained that, even with these alleged
“promptness violations” in mind, Greatwide failed to demonstrate that it was prejudiced
by any delay because Huang’s backpay was based on a limited timeline that was not
impacted by any delays, and because Huang promptly filed his complaint within three
months of being fired. Id. The ARB also agreed with the ALJ that Huang’s failure to file
initial disclosures was harmless given that he was not represented by counsel when they
were due and that Greatwide had ample time to conduct discovery following his late
submission. Next, the ARB affirmed the ALJ’s finding that Huang engaged in protected
activity which contributed to his termination, and that Greatwide could not show by clear
and convincing evidence that it would have terminated Huang absent his protected conduct.
Without much analysis, though, the ARB also sua sponte held that substantial evidence
supported the ALJ’s finding that the parties had not entered a settlement agreement. See
J.A. 1157–1169.
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Greatwide appeals the ARB’s decision, with the same claims presented—and
denied—before the ARB. In addition, the company raises a new argument concerning the
ALJ’s failure to enforce what Greatwide insists is a valid settlement agreement between
the parties. We have jurisdiction to review these claims pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 31105(d)
and 29 C.F.R. § 1978.112.
II.
“Under the scheme established by Congress, the Secretary of Labor makes final
determinations on [STAA] violations,” which are “subject to appellate court review.” Yellow
Freight Sys., Inc. v. Reich, 8 F.3d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
In reviewing the Secretary’s decision (which is, through delegation, the ARB’s D&O),
we must adhere to their “legal conclusions unless they are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). We are also bound by the Secretary’s “factual findings if they are supported
by substantial evidence.” Id. Similarly, the ARB reviews “the factual determinations of the
ALJ under the substantial evidence standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1978.110(b). Substantial evidence
is “evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular
conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less
than a preponderance.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966). This Court
must remain cognizant “of the deference due [to] the Secretary’s interpretation of a statute
Congress charged [them] with administering.” Calhoun v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 576 F.3d 201,
208 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Yellow Freight, 8 F.3d at 984).
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On appeal, Greatwide brings several primary claims: (1) the ARB improperly held
that substantial evidence supports that Huang could prevail on his 49 U.S.C. § 31105 claim;
(2) the ARB improperly concluded that Greatwide was not prejudiced by the Secretary’s
or Huang’s delays; and (3) the DOL erred in failing to find and enforce what the company
argues to be a valid settlement agreement between the parties. Taking each argument in
turn, this Court is persuaded by the ARB’s D&O and affirms on all grounds.
III.
Congress enacted the STAA “to assist in combating the ‘increasing number of deaths,
injuries, and property damage due to commercial motor vehicle accidents’” on U.S. roads and
freeways. Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 262 (1987) (citation omitted). The
STAA “was passed to ‘promote the safe operation of commercial vehicles,’ ‘to minimize
dangers to the health of operators of commercial motor vehicles,’ and ‘to ensure increased
compliance with traffic laws and with . . . commercial motor vehicle safety and health
regulations and standards.’” Calhoun, 576 F.3d at 208 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 31131(a)).
The STAA includes an “Employee Protections” provision which prohibits
discharging, disciplining, or discriminating against an employee “regarding pay, terms, or
privileges of employment, because” “the employee, or another person at the employee’s
request, has filed a complaint or begun a proceeding related to a violation of a commercial
motor vehicle safety or security regulation, standard, or order, or has testified or will testify
in such a proceeding.” 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a)(1)(A)(i).
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In 2007, Congress amended 49 U.S.C. § 31105 “to incorporate the legal burdens of
proof set forth in the whistleblower provision of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment
and Reform Act for the 21st Century, 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B) (‘AIR 21’).” Formella
v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 628 F.3d 381, 389 (7th Cir. 2010); see also 49 U.S.C. § 31105(b)
(stating that “[a]ll complaints initiated under this section shall be governed by the legal
burdens of proof set forth in section 42121(b)”).
Pursuant to the burdens of proof set forth in 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b), 4 complainants
must present a prima facie case demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(i) they engaged in protected activity, (ii) the employer knew of the protected conduct,
(iii) their employer took an unfavorable employment action against them, and (iv) the
protected activity was a contributing factor to the employer’s adverse employment action.
See Weatherford U.S., L.P. v. Dep’t of Lab., Admin. Bd., 68 F.4th 1030 (6th Cir. 2023).
Once established, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate, “by clear and
convincing evidence, that the employer would have taken the same unfavorable personnel
action in the absence of that protected behavior.” Id. at 1040 (cleaned up) (quoting 49
U.S.C. § 31105(b)); see also Maverick Transp., LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Admin. Rev.
Bd., 739 F.3d 1149, 1155 (8th Cir. 2014). This standard, as a result, is “more favorable to
4
The complaint must relate to a violation of a commercial motor vehicle safety
regulation. See Ulrich, Sr., v. Swift Transp. Corp., 2012 WL 1143327, at *2 (U.S. Dep’t.
of Lab. Mar. 27, 2012).
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the complaining employee.” Formella, 628 F.3d at 389 (citing Addis v. Dep’t of Lab., 575
F.3d 688, 690–91 (7th Cir. 2009)). 5
Before us, Greatwide argues that the ARB incorrectly allowed Huang to prevail on
this claim. Specifically, it challenges the ARB’s conclusion that there was substantial
evidence to support (1) that Huang showed by a preponderance of the evidence that he
engaged in protected activity, (2) that his protected activity was a contributing factor in his
termination, and (3) that Greatwide failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that it would have terminated Huang absent his protected activity.
A.
We begin with whether the ARB properly affirmed the ALJ’s finding that Huang
“engaged in protected activity when he sent letters reporting safety violations, removed
5
Relying on Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Reich, 27 F.3d 1133 (6th Cir. 1994), this
Court has long applied a burden-shifting analysis similar to Title VII’s McDonnell Douglas
test to claims arising under 49 U.S.C. § 31105. See Calhoun v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 576
F.3d 201, 209 (4th Cir. 2009); Heyward v. Dep’t of Lab., No. 21-2097, 2022 WL 17999659,
at *1 (4th Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (unpublished), Carter v. CPC Logistics, Inc., 800 F.
App’x 196, *196–97 (4th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (unpublished). Today, however, we take
this opportunity to clarify that that standard has been laid to rest. As indicated, Congress
amended the STAA in 2007 to “incorporate the burdens of proof set forth in [AIR 21].”
Weatherford, 68 F.4th at 1040. Due to this change in the law, the standard relied upon in
cases decided prior to the 2007 amendment—such as the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Yellow
Freight System—are no longer applicable. Recent Sixth Circuit precedent has indicated,
and clarified, that this analysis is now “the statutorily required test.” Id.
Thus, in looking ahead, we elucidate that the appropriate and proper legal standard
in STAA allegation cases is not the McDonnell Douglas-styled test we historically relied
upon, but rather the burdens of proof adopted by 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)—and therefore 49
U.S.C. § 31105.
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and copied documents, and recorded the dispatchers’ meeting.” 6 J.A. 1164. Finding that
substantial evidence supports this conclusion, we need not disturb the ARB’s decision.
1.
The ARB affirmed the ALJ’s conclusion that Huang’s recording of the dispatchers’
bullpen meeting is protected activity. In challenging that decision, Greatwide argues that
Huang’s recording was unlawful under Maryland wiretap laws and that, because Huang
failed to obtain consent from the dispatchers, his actions were a punishable criminal
offense. Not so.
To start, Maryland wiretap laws require that a party demonstrate “a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the intercepted oral communication.” Fearnow v. Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., 655 A.2d 1, 16 (Md. 1995). Under Maryland’s Wiretapping and
Electronic Surveillance law, protected oral communication is defined as “any conversation
or words spoken to or by any person in private conversation.” Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.
Proc. § 10-401(13)(i) (emphasis added).
Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the recorded conversation in
question does not qualify as an oral communication because it was not subject to a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Huang taped the recording device outside of a cubicle
wall in the distribution center’s bullpen area. This was an open space—on a warehouse
floor with only cubicle dividers—that Huang and any other employee could access.
6
Greatwide concedes that Huang’s anonymous letters were protected activity.
Opening Br. at 48. Thus, for purposes of this analysis, we solely consider the recorded
conversation and the removal and copying of Peters’ driver’s log.
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Though Greatwide claims that most meetings, including confidential information, occurred
in this area (and dispatchers would ask drivers passing by to leave in order to retain
privacy), it cannot deny the ease of access to the space. Huang also indicated that more
formal or private meetings were held in a room with a door on a different floor. At bottom,
because of the evidence in the record that the managers held this meeting in an open area
with little to no privacy, we find no error in the conclusion that Huang did not violate the
relevant wiretap laws by recording their conversation.
Instead, “the lawful taping of conversations to obtain information about safety-
related conversations is protected activity and should not subject an employee to any
adverse action.” See Hoffman v. NetJets Aviation, Inc., 2011 WL 1247208, at *5 (A.R.B.
Mar. 24, 2011). Greatwide posits that Huang “planted the recording device with the
expectation and intention of recording conversations related to which Nordstrom ‘stores
need[ed] which product and when’ and the routes that would be assigned based on that
need, not safety violations.” Opening Br. at 41 (citation omitted). In other words,
Greatwide believes Huang had no intent to record this management conversation in an
effort to gather information for the safety violation complaint, but rather, to access
confidential information. This argument fails.
Let’s consider the events surrounding the recorded conversation. On the same day
Huang set up the recorder, he also borrowed documentation from the lockbox belonging to
Peters, one of the “insider” drivers. The fact that these two events occurred on the same
day lends significant credibility to Huang’s narrative: he did all this to gather proof that
individuals at the distribution center were participating in safety violations.
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Even more, Huang was aware that this was the designated time when dispatchers
assigned driving routes. Although the conversation took place over a couple of hours,
Huang testified that he only sent a roughly three-and-a-half-minute portion to Scott—
which focused on what Huang claims was relevant discussion of the alleged safety
violations—and deleted the remainder of the recording. These facts provide substantial
evidence that Huang’s recording of the dispatchers’ conversation was protected activity. 7
2.
Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s finding that Huang engaged in
protected activity when he removed—and subsequently photocopied—an “insider”
driver’s paperwork from the distribution center’s lockbox.
After removing documents from the lockbox, Huang discovered that the driver’s log
submitted by one of the “insider” drivers—Peters—demonstrated driving hours beyond the
permissible maximum. Huang brought Peters’ driver’s log home, photocopied it, and returned
it to the lockbox two hours later. When Huang sent his anonymous letters to Price and Scott,
he attached the photocopied driver’s log as relevant evidence to support his discovery.
7
Greatwide’s reliance on Hoffman, 2011 WL 1247208, is misplaced. There, the
ARB determined that the employer reasonably suspected that some of the complainant’s
recordings were not protected activity because the complainant recorded approximately
750 conversations over the course of almost two years. Id. at *5. The facts before us paint
a contrasting picture. Huang recorded just one conversation between the dispatchers on a
particular morning because he was aware that they would likely discuss the unlawful
extended driving hours. As the ARB stated in Mosbaugh v. Georgia Power Co., Nos.
1991-ERA-001, -011, slip op. at 7–8 (Sec’y Nov. 20, 1995), “tape recording to gather
evidence of activities that are protected under the whistleblower statutes is [] protected.”
And that is exactly the course of action Huang pursued. This conclusion is bolstered by
Huang’s decision to edit the mp3 file to a three-and-a-half-minute recording that focused
on the safety-related concerns and dispose of the remainder.
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Greatwide insists that Huang’s conduct is not protected activity because the
documents in the lockbox were confidential under company policy. This argument is
unavailing. The company’s “Confidential Information” policy states that “[c]ustomer data,
employee data, capacity data pricing and marketing or strategic plans are examples of
Greatwide’s confidential information.” J.A. 710. The company’s handbook does not
classify drivers’ logs as confidential information or “employee data.” In fact, the handbook
fails to mention drivers’ logs altogether.
Regardless of the company’s policy, Huang’s sole intent in collecting and copying
Peters’ driver’s log was to support his safety violation allegations. Thus, his actions rise
to the level of protected activity. See Franchini v. Argonne Nat’l Lab., 2015 WL 5781072,
at *9 (A.R.B. Sept. 28, 2015) (determining that complainant’s recordings during his
employment constituted protected activity under the Energy Reorganization Act “because
he anticipated using the recordings in seeking resolution of problems he had identified”).
For these reasons, we conclude that Huang’s borrowing and photocopying of
Peters’ driver’s log constitutes protected activity. 8
B.
Because Greatwide does not contest its knowledge of Huang’s protected conduct
nor that its decision to terminate Huang was an adverse employment action, we continue
8
Greatwide also turns to BSP Trans, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 160 F.3d 38 (1st
Cir. 1998), for support. But, like the ARB, we find BSP Trans distinguishable because the
complainant there failed to ever submit a complaint alleging an STAA allegation. Id. at
48–49. That is wholly different from the case at bar, where Huang’s STAA allegation is
the foundation of these proceedings.
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to the next step in the test: whether Huang’s protected activity was a contributing factor in
Greatwide’s decision to terminate. We deem that it was.
A contributing factor is “any factor which, alone or in combination with other factors,
tends to affect in any way the outcome of the [adverse personnel] decision.” Beatty v. Inman
Trucking Mgmt., Inc., 2014 WL 2917587, at *5 (A.R.B. May 13, 2014). This step is viewed
as “broad and forgiving”; when introduced, it was “intended to overrule existing case law
[that] require[d] a whistleblower to prove that his protected conduct was a ‘significant’,
‘motivating’, ‘substantial’, or ‘predominant’ factor in a personnel action in order to overturn
that action.” Feldman v. L. Enf’t Assoc. Corp., 752 F.3d 339, 348 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted) (quoting Marano v. Dep’t of Just., 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
“Temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action is a
significant factor in considering a circumstantial showing of causation.” Id. (quoting Tice
v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 2006 WL 3246825, at *20 (A.L.J. Apr. 26, 2006)). The
closer the temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action, the stronger the inference of a causal connection becomes. Warren v. Custom
Organics, 2012 WL 759335, at *8 (A.R.B. Feb. 29, 2012).
The temporal proximity between Huang’s protected activity and his termination is
a vital part of this analysis. Huang sent the anonymous letters to Scott and Price on April
2, 2012. He disclosed to Scott that he was the author of the letters on May 14, 2012. He
was suspended on May 18, 2012, the day he completed the double trailer drop to Manhattan
and New Jersey, and was officially terminated on May 31, 2012. These events all occurred
in just under two months. See id. at *9 (collecting cases demonstrating temporal proximity
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between thirty days and eight months establishes causation nexus). Yet, although integral,
temporal proximity is “not necessarily dispositive,” but rather a piece of “evidence for the
trier of fact to weigh in deciding the ultimate question of whether a complainant has
prove[n] by a preponderance of the evidence that retaliation was a motivating factor in the
adverse action.” Clemmons v. Ameristar Airways, Inc., ARB No. 08-067, ALJ No. 2004-
AIR-011, slip op. at 6 (A.R.B. May 26, 2010) (quoting Dixon v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,
ARB Nos. 06-147, -160, ALJ No. 2005-SDW-008, slip op. at 13 (A.R.B. Aug. 28, 2008)).
Greatwide contends that the ARB erred in affirming the ALJ’s determination “that
Huang’s protected activity was a contributing factor in his termination solely on the
temporal proximity” of Huang reporting safety violations and his termination. Opening
Br. at 52. However, the ARB noted in their opinion that temporal proximity and
Greatwide’s knowledge of Huang’s protected activity were not sufficient to establish that
Huang’s protected activity contributed to his termination. Rather, the ARB took into
consideration additional facts demonstrating that Huang’s protected activity contributed to
his firing—most notably, that Greatwide admitted that it fired Huang in part because he
removed and copied documents and recorded employee conversations. Id.These facts—taken in tandem with the temporal proximity and employer
knowledge—are sufficient to establish that Huang’s protected activity was a contributing
factor to his termination. First, for reasons indicated above, the record’s substantial
evidence clearly indicates that recording the dispatcher’s conversation and borrowing and
photocopying Peters’ driver’s log were protected activities Huang relied upon to support
his report alleging safety violations. To boot, Greatwide asserts that Huang would have
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independently been fired for each of the questioned behaviors discussed herein. But that
argument proves too much. Because some of those actions are, indeed, protected activity,
Greatwide in essence concedes that it would have fired Huang for engaging in activity that
is safeguarded by federal law. Huang, once again, prevails.
C.
The burden now shifts to Greatwide to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that
Huang would have been terminated absent his protected activity. In accordance with the
ARB, we conclude that the record’s substantial evidence demonstrates Greatwide’s failure
to make such a showing.
1.
The ARB held that Greatwide failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
Huang damaged the lockbox and committed an infraction during the double trailer incident
and, assuming the truth of those allegations, that Greatwide would have terminated Huang
for either incident. We agree.
First, the lockbox. As indicated above, the events surrounding the lockbox’s damage
remain in dispute. Huang testified that he had not observed any damage to the lockbox and
that he was able to retrieve the relevant paperwork by reaching his entire hand through the
existing opening on the top. J.A. 279. By contrast, Burnett indicated at the hearing that the
damage “looked like a hammer or a maul hammer . . . punched a hole in the side or the side
of the lid, about the size of maybe a softball.” J.A. 432. Price, on the other hand, claimed
that the damage had been “to the actual slit of the lockbox.” J.A. 490. Moreover, Greatwide
asserts that Huang confessed to damaging the lockbox prior to his termination. But, beyond
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Burnett and Price’s inconsistent testimony, Greatwide has failed to submit any corroborating
evidence of the lockbox’s alleged damage or Huang’s alleged confession.
Further, Greatwide’s Employee Handbook does not provide explicit guidance on why
this alleged violation would result in termination. Among a non-exhaustive list of thirty
examples, the Handbook’s “Rules of Conduct” section states that “willful destruction of
Company property” is a serious policy violation which is grounds for “disciplinary actions
ranging from a verbal warning to immediate termination of employment.” J.A. 707
(emphasis added). Given the broad range of possible disciplinary grounds, and Greatwide’s
failure to demonstrate that the destruction of comparable company property typically leads
to termination, the company has not met the clear and convincing evidence standard that this
specific “serious policy violation” would have resulted in Huang’s termination.
Next, we consider the double trailer incident. Greatwide contends that Huang
allegedly “leaving a trailer unattended on a public street in violation of Greatwide policy
. . . is [] a legal, legitimate, and independent basis for termination.” Opening Br. at 46. It
also insists that whether Huang actually left the trailer is immaterial because he confessed
to Greatwide officials that he had committed this act and had done the same on previous
occasions. But, like the lockbox’s alleged damage, the circumstances surrounding the
double trailer drop continue to evade clarity.
Huang testified that during this assignment, he first went to the Manhattan
Nordstrom, where he dropped one trailer on a street, secured it with a glad hand lock, and
placed a parked convertor dolly in front of it, while the store unloaded the other trailer. He
specified that he never left the dropped trailer in Manhattan to attend to the second delivery
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in New Jersey and he instead brought both trailers with him to the New Jersey job. Huang
also indicated in his letter that, on multiple previous occasions, he had parked a trailer unit
at this Manhattan Nordstrom and went “out to the corner to buy food” without any security
issues. J.A. 535.
In stark contrast, Burnett testified that Huang dropped one trailer on a Manhattan
street leaving it “unattended, unlit and unlocked” while he continued on to the second store.
J.A. 439. A Nordstrom product receiver then called Greatwide, notifying the company of
the trailer’s location. Price testified next, stating that Huang had left the trailer unsecured on
a Manhattan street and not on Nordstrom property. After learning of the incident, Price said
she confronted Huang, and that he told her that “he felt it wasn’t a big deal since he had done
it before.” J.A. 494. This, she asserted, was itself grounds for termination. Finally, in his
testimony, Scott asserted that a trailer “was dropped on a public street in Manhattan . . .
Huang then left and drove to New Jersey with another trailer and left the trailer unattended
for that amount of time.” J.A. 579. Scott also stated that he communicated via email with
Nordstrom staff concerning the location of the dropped trailer.
This testimony notwithstanding, the record does not illustrate by clear and
convincing evidence that Huang dropped an unlocked trailer on a Manhattan street to
complete the New Jersey delivery. Apart from Huang’s denial, Burnett, Price, and Scott’s
testimonies were not consistent, particularly with regards to whether Huang left the trailer
unattended. Was it only briefly unattended for him to grab food, or did he leave the trailer
and Manhattan altogether en route to the New Jersey Nordstrom? The record does not
point us to a clear and convincing answer. Moreover, there is no record evidence
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documenting a complaint from Nordstrom staff nor any proof of the email exchange
between Scott and relevant Nordstrom personnel.
Notably, the Handbook is also silent on rules governing trailer dropping and any
related disciplinary conduct. Price testified that she assumed there was a policy
memorialized in the handbook concerning trailer abandonment, but “[i]f not, it would be
something that would be orally passed out at a safety meeting.” J.A. 546. Again, the record
does not corroborate this statement. Price also admitted that she was not aware of a
separate employee handbook specific to Nordstrom.
During his testimony, Scott stated that when new policies are added, they are
“normally” written down and handed to the drivers, then eventually they are supplemented
into the Employee Handbook. J.A. 563. He recounted that unattended trailer incidents had
happened in the past with other employees, which led the company to establish a
Nordstrom-specific policy. However, the record does not include—nor discuss—a
separate addendum or specific company policy related to Nordstrom drops for which
drivers were put on notice. Importantly, Scott did not reveal whether those past employees
who left trailers unattended faced immediate termination or other disciplinary measures.
Because the record is devoid of the Nordstrom-related policy Greatwide claims to have
implemented, we cannot determine that the company would have fired Huang for the
alleged Nordstrom trailer drop incident.
As a result, Greatwide has not adduced clear and convincing evidence that Huang
committed these acts, and even if he had, that the company would have fired Huang absent
his protected activity.
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2.
Finally, we grapple with Greatwide’s failure to provide Huang with a consistent
termination explanation. On January 26, 2017, Greatwide’s Vice President and General
Counsel, Jeffrey Stupp, submitted an affidavit claiming that Huang was terminated for
“breaking into the lockbox, stealing its contents, and secretly recording Greatwide’s
management’s telephone conversations and not due to any other reason.” J.A. 51
(emphasis added). However, at the official hearing, Price and Scott offered conflicting
explanations: Price testified that Huang was terminated for damaging company property
and dumping an unsecured trailer in Manhattan while Scott stated that Huang was fired for
recording management’s conversation, destroying company property, dropping a trailer,
and removing relevant paperwork from the company’s lockbox. Huang was also told, on
one occasion prior to his termination, that he was being investigated for violation of
company policies. But his termination letter was devoid of any official reason for the
company’s decision. These contradictions alone do enough damage to undermine
Greatwide’s capacity to overcome this step.
Because we agree with the ARB that Greatwide has failed to meet its burden, our
analysis ends here. Thus, Huang has successfully demonstrated an STAA allegation.
IV.
Like the ARB, we, too, reject Greatwide’s position that it was prejudiced by the delays
in the hearing process. The ALJ’s delay in issuing their D&O more than 120 days after the
hearing was not unreasonable given its detailed analysis of conflicting testimonies. Also,
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Huang’s backpay was based on a limited timeline, unimpacted by the delays. J.A. 1160–61.
Greatwide argues that these findings were improper given the record before the ARB.
Although we acknowledge that there were several delays on behalf of the DOL, we, ultimately,
conclude that the record does not support Greatwide’s contentions that it was prejudiced.
Under the STAA, the Secretary of Labor shall conduct an investigation, determine
whether a complaint has merit, and notify the person alleged to have committed the
violation and the complainant of the findings—in writing—no later than sixty days after
receiving the complaint. 49 U.S.C. § 31105(b)(2)(A). If the Secretary decides it is
reasonable to believe that a violation has occurred, they will issue a decision with their
findings and a preliminary order for relief. Id. Following this decision, the complainant
and the person accused of committing the violation has thirty days to object to the
Secretary’s findings and/or preliminary order and request a hearing. 49 U.S.C.
§ 31105(b)(2)(B). That “hearing shall be conducted expeditiously” with the Secretary
issuing their final order “[n]ot later than 120 days after the end of the hearing.” 49 U.S.C.
§ 31105(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added).
Yes, it is undisputed that there were several lengthy delays that occurred at different
stages of this adjudicative process, resulting in the ALJ’s issuing their D&O over six years
after Huang first promptly filed his complaint. Although we sympathize with Greatwide’s
frustration, there are instances where—as here—such delays do not amount to prejudice or
unreasonableness given the significant bandwidth the ALJ undertook to issue their D&O.
For support, we turn to the ARB’s reliance on our holding in Trans Fleet
Enterprises, Inc. v. Boone, 987 F.2d 1000 (4th Cir. 1992). There, Trans Fleet Enterprises
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argued that the ALJ violated the agency’s own law requiring a decision within thirty days
following the hearing when the ALJ issued their decision almost a year after the hearing.
Id. at 1004. However, this Court held that the delay was not unreasonable because the
“ALJ had to consider sharply-conflicting testimony, and the result was a lengthy and well-
reasoned decision.” Id.We find ourselves in a similar position here. Like the ALJ in Trans Fleet, the ALJ
before us was presented, and duly grappled, with deeply conflicting testimonies from a
handful of witnesses: Huang, Burnett, Price, and Scott. To illustrate the case’s complexity,
take the witnesses’ testimonies surrounding the lockbox incident. The ALJ considered and
discussed, at length, the examination of each witness, concerning their differing opinions
on the structural integrity and description of the lockbox, whether it was damaged, where
the damage was on the lockbox, whether a person could fit their hand easily into it, and
whether the lockbox contained confidential driver information. This level of analysis was
not isolated to the lockbox incident, but was accorded to each piece of testimony. The
ALJ’s in-depth D&O was presented in an extensive, forty-five-page decision, which spared
no minor detail. Given their attention afforded to the facts of this case, we do not hold that
the ALJ’s delay was unreasonable nor was Greatwide prejudiced by such.
Greatwide also asserts that it was prejudiced by the delay between the parties’
objections to the Secretary’s issuance of findings and the evidentiary hearing. Per 49
U.S.C. § 31105(b)(2)(C), “[a] hearing shall be conducted expeditiously” (emphasis added),
following the filing of objections. The record clearly demonstrates that, though the hearing
did not take place until September 2017—over a year after the objections were filed—the
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ALJ attempted to ensure the hearing proceeded with due haste. See J.A. 172 (ALJ stating
that “absent both parties agreeing to [a continuance of the hearing], given that this case has
been around for so long, given that the reason for the extended delay was Mr. Huang’s
conduct, I’m not going to continue the hearing unless both of you agree”). However, the
ALJ found it necessary to reschedule the hearing on two occasions: first, when Huang
believed he had retained counsel, but actually had not and, second, when both parties
agreed to reschedule given Huang’s new discovery requests and the parties’ efforts to
achieve a settlement. We do not believe that these delays were prejudicial to Greatwide.
However, we face a rockier path regarding the initial delay between Huang’s filed
complaint and the Secretary’s issuance of findings. As noted, Huang filed his complaint
in September 2012, shortly after his termination, and the Secretary did not issue their initial
findings until January 2016, completely bypassing the sixty-day statutory time limit. The
DOL’s briefing fails to address this issue explicitly and, at oral argument, counsel boiled
the delay down to staff deficiencies. Oral Argument at 43:03–59. Greatwide contends that
this delay, among the others, stymied its ability to prepare a defense. The company
specifically asserts that during the period of time between Huang’s filed complaint and the
evidentiary hearing, it “experienced changes in personnel, changes in document
management systems, loss of and inability to locate witnesses, and faded memories of those
witnesses who were able to testify at the hearing.” Opening Br. at 30–31. Although this
delay is substantial, Greatwide’s argument lacks merit. As the ARB noted, Greatwide
should have taken appropriate steps to preserve relevant evidence, such as witness
testimonies and statements, the moment Huang timely filed his whistleblower complaint
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back in 2012. If these steps were properly pursued, the relevant information Greatwide
claims to have lost would have withstood this lapse in time. Greatwide cannot argue that
they were prejudiced by their failure to act.
Even so, we would be remiss not to acknowledge that circumstances may arise
where an employer is prejudiced by vast DOL delays. We do not explore the extent of
those instances today. But even though “statutory time limits for agency action are usually
deemed directory,” Trans Fleet, 987 F.2d at 1005, and not mandatory, we urge the agency
to seek courses of action to avoid similarly prolonged delays in the future and to mitigate
concerns regarding “the inordinate amount of time involved in STAA actions.” Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Dole, 929 F.2d 1060, 1067 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Brock, 481 U.S. at 270–
71 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
Thus, with recognition of certain lengthy delays, we nonetheless conclude that
Greatwide was not prejudiced. 9
9
Greatwide further posits that the ARB improperly found that Huang’s failure to
file his initial disclosures was harmless. We disagree. A party must—without waiting for
a discovery request—provide the other parties relevant information of each individual
likely to have discoverable information which the disclosing party may use to support its
claims or defenses; a copy or description of all documents, virtually stored information, or
tangible items that the disclosing party has in its possession or control that it may use to
support its claims or defenses; and a computation of each category of damages claimed by
the disclosing party. See 29 C.F.R. § 18.50(c)(1)(i). If a party fails to provide this
information, it is not permitted to utilize that information to supply evidence on a motion
or at a hearing, unless the failure was harmless or substantially justified. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 18.57(c). However, as the ALJ noted in a pre-hearing conference call, “the ARB takes a
more paternalistic approach towards pro se complainants than federal courts do.” J.A. 171.
Meaning, those “who proceed pro se are afforded more leeway in an administrative context
than in a judicial one.” Highland Town Sch. Corp. v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dept. of Workforce
(Continued)
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V.
Finally, we briefly consider Greatwide’s request for us to enforce what the company
posits is a valid settlement agreement between the parties. We decline to accept this invitation.
At a pre-hearing telephonic conference, the ALJ determined that he was unable to
enforce the settlement agreement because he lacked the equitable powers to do so. Later,
during the official hearing, Greatwide’s counsel attempted to raise the settlement
agreement for a second time. The ALJ firmly reiterated that he would not “make any
findings as to whether there was an agreement.” J.A. 398.
Greatwide failed to raise its settlement agreement argument before the ARB. But
in analyzing Greatwide’s arguments concerning the proceeding’s delays, the ARB stated
that “substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that the parties did not enter into a
settlement agreement.” J.A. 1161. Before us at oral argument, Greatwide’s counsel
conceded that it failed to challenge the ALJ’s decision not to enforce the settlement
agreement before the ARB. However, Greatwide’s counsel insisted that its claim could be
addressed by this Court because the ARB’s D&O briefly addressed the alleged settlement
agreement. Oral Argument at 2:37–3:34.
While we agree with Greatwide that the ARB’s D&O did sua sponte mention the
settlement agreement in passing, we nonetheless conclude that this argument was not
properly raised and argued before the ARB. A “party desiring to seek review, including
Dev., 892 N.E.2d 652, 656 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Thus, we see no grounds for disrupting
the ARB’s finding that Huang’s failure was harmless as the raised conduct occurred while
he was unrepresented by counsel.
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judicial review, of a decision of the ALJ must file a written petition for review with the ARB.
The parties should identify in their petitions for review the . . . orders to which they object,
or the objections may be deemed waived.” 29 C.F.R. § 1978.110(a) (emphasis added).
Therefore, Greatwide has failed to preserve the settlement agreement claim and we
decline to address its validity and enforcement. See Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 279 (4th Cir.
2008) (concluding that appellant had forfeited “new arguments by failing to raise them before
the ARB”); Taylor v. U.S. Dep’t. of Lab., 440 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that appellants
forfeited their argument “by failing to raise it during the administrative proceedings”).
VI.
We conclude that Huang has prevailed under his STAA claim. Substantial evidence
supports the ARB’s conclusion that Huang engaged in protected activity, that his activity
was a contributing factor in his termination, and that Greatwide failed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that Huang would have been terminated absent his protected
conduct. Nor was Greatwide prejudiced by the proceeding’s delays. Finally, we decline
to enforce the alleged settlement agreement because the company failed to challenge the
ALJ’s decision before the ARB. For these reasons, the ARB’s D&O is thereby
AFFIRMED.
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