United States v. Dakota Davis ( 2023 )


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  • USCA4 Appeal: 22-4174      Doc: 30         Filed: 07/12/2023     Pg: 1 of 4
    UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 22-4174
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    DAKOTA REESE DAVIS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
    Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, District Judge. (3:20-cr-00105-FDW-DCK-1)
    Submitted: June 28, 2023                                          Decided: July 12, 2023
    Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, WYNN and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    ON BRIEF: J. Edward Yeager, Jr., Cornelius, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy
    Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    USCA4 Appeal: 22-4174      Doc: 30          Filed: 07/12/2023     Pg: 2 of 4
    PER CURIAM:
    Dakota Reese Davis pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to conspiracy
    to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(l), (b)(l)(A), 846, and
    possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l),
    (b)(1)(B). On appeal, Davis’ counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
    
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but
    questioning whether the district court erred by failing to orally announce the conditions of
    supervised release included in the written judgment. Although informed of his right to file
    a pro se supplemental brief, Davis has not done so. The Government has declined to file a
    response. * We affirm.
    A district court must announce all nonmandatory conditions of supervised release
    at the sentencing hearing. United States v. Rogers, 
    961 F.3d 291
    , 296 (4th Cir. 2020). “[A]
    district court may satisfy its obligation to orally pronounce discretionary conditions
    through incorporation—by incorporating, for instance, all Guidelines ‘standard’ conditions
    when it pronounces a supervised-release sentence, and then detailing those conditions in
    the written judgment.” 
    Id. at 299
    . “Express incorporation” is not only “a critical part of
    the defendant’s right to be present at sentencing” but “also provides [the court] with the
    crucial objective indication that a district court has undertaken the necessary individualized
    assessment and made a considered determination, at the time of sentencing, that an
    Because the Government does not seek to enforce the appeal waiver in Davis’ plea
    *
    agreement, we conduct a full review of the record under Anders. See United States v.
    Poindexter, 
    492 F.3d 263
    , 271 (4th Cir. 2007).
    2
    USCA4 Appeal: 22-4174      Doc: 30          Filed: 07/12/2023     Pg: 3 of 4
    identifiable set of discretionary conditions should be imposed on a defendant’s supervised
    release.” 
    Id. at 300
     (internal quotation marks omitted). “[S]o long as the defendant is
    informed orally that a certain set of conditions will be imposed,” “a later-issued written
    judgment that details those conditions may be construed fairly as a ‘clarification’ of an
    otherwise ‘vague’ oral pronouncement.” 
    Id. at 299
    . Generally, we review de novo the
    consistency of a defendant’s oral sentence with the written judgment. 
    Id. at 296
    . But
    where, as here, the defendant argues, for the first time on appeal, that the district court’s
    oral incorporation by reference of supervised release conditions was not sufficiently clear
    to pronounce the conditions included in the written judgment, we review the issue for plain
    error. United States v. Elbaz, 
    52 F.4th 593
    , 611-12 (4th Cir. 2022), petition for cert. filed,
    No. 22-1055 (U.S. May 1, 2023).
    At sentencing, the district court adopted the 23 standard conditions of supervision
    contained in the Western District of North Carolina’s standing order and announced one
    special condition: that Davis participate in a mental health evaluation and treatment
    program. Because the district court’s reference to the standing order was clear, see Rogers,
    961 F.3d at 299, the conditions of supervision from the standing order match the conditions
    listed in Davis’ written criminal judgment, and the court orally announced the one special
    condition as stated in the written judgment, we conclude that the district court did not err
    in its pronouncement of Davis’ supervised release conditions.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
    found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
    This court requires that counsel inform Davis, in writing, of the right to petition the
    3
    USCA4 Appeal: 22-4174         Doc: 30      Filed: 07/12/2023     Pg: 4 of 4
    Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Davis requests that a petition be
    filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
    in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
    a copy thereof was served on Davis.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 22-4174

Filed Date: 7/12/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/13/2023