United States v. Levi Martinez Molina ( 2023 )


Menu:
  • USCA4 Appeal: 22-4403      Doc: 29         Filed: 06/07/2023    Pg: 1 of 6
    UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 22-4403
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    LEVI MARTINEZ MOLINA, a/k/a Levi Martinez-Molina, a/k/a Levi Josue
    Martinez Molina, a/k/a Levi Molina Martinez, a/k/a Levi Josue Martinez, a/k/a Levi
    Martinez, a/k/a Levie Martinez-Molina, a/k/a Levi Martinez-Godina,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
    Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:20-cr-00487-NCT-1)
    Submitted: May 19, 2023                                              Decided: June 7, 2023
    Before NIEMEYER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Dismissed in part, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per
    curiam opinion.
    ON BRIEF: George E. Crump, III, Rockingham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Veronica
    Lynn Edmisten, Assistant United States Attorney, Margaret McCall Reece, Assistant
    United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro,
    North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    USCA4 Appeal: 22-4403      Doc: 29          Filed: 06/07/2023     Pg: 2 of 6
    PER CURIAM:
    Levi Martinez Molina pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement to
    conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (b)(1)(A), 846;
    possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and illegal alien, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1), (g)(5), 924(a)(2); and reentering the United States without authorization
    following his removal as an aggravated felon, in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a), (b)(2).
    The district court sentenced Martinez Molina to 168 months’ imprisonment followed by
    five years of supervised release, and he now appeals. On appeal, counsel filed a brief
    pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), stating that there are no meritorious
    grounds for appeal but questioning whether the sentence imposed is substantively
    reasonable. Although informed of his right to do so, Martinez Molina has not filed a pro se
    supplemental brief. The Government has moved to dismiss Martinez Molina’s appeal
    based on the appeal waiver contained in the plea agreement. We grant the Government’s
    motion to dismiss in part, deny it in part, affirm Martinez Molina’s convictions, and vacate
    the sentence and remand for resentencing.
    We review the validity of an appeal waiver de novo, and “will enforce the waiver if
    it is valid and the issue appealed is within the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Adams,
    
    814 F.3d 178
    , 182 (4th Cir. 2016). A waiver is valid if it is “knowing and voluntary.” 
    Id.
    To determine whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary, we “consider the totality of the
    circumstances, including the experience and conduct of the defendant, his educational
    background, and his knowledge of the plea agreement and its terms.” United States v.
    McCoy, 
    895 F.3d 358
    , 362 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations marks omitted). Typically,
    2
    USCA4 Appeal: 22-4403       Doc: 29          Filed: 06/07/2023      Pg: 3 of 6
    “if a district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate rights during the
    [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant understood the
    full significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Moreover, an appellate waiver does not preclude our review of the validity of the
    plea colloquy. See 
    id. at 364
    . Because Martinez Molina did not move to withdraw his
    guilty plea in the district court, we review the validity of his plea for plain error. United
    States v. Sanya, 
    774 F.3d 812
    , 815 (4th Cir. 2014). “Under the plain error standard, [we]
    will correct an unpreserved error if (1) an error was made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the
    error affects substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
    public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Harris, 
    890 F.3d 480
    , 491
    (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the guilty plea context, a defendant
    establishes that an error affected his substantial rights by showing “a reasonable probability
    that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” United States v. Davila, 
    569 U.S. 597
    , 608 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    When accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a plea colloquy in
    which it informs the defendant of, and ensures that the defendant understands, the rights
    he is relinquishing by pleading guilty, the nature of the charges to which he is pleading,
    and the possible consequences of pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United
    States v. DeFusco, 
    949 F.2d 114
    , 116 (4th Cir. 1991). The court must also ensure that the
    plea is voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or promises extrinsic to the plea
    agreement and that a factual basis exists for the plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), (3). “[A]
    properly conducted Rule 11 plea colloquy raises a strong presumption that the plea is final
    3
    USCA4 Appeal: 22-4403       Doc: 29         Filed: 06/07/2023      Pg: 4 of 6
    and binding.” United States v. Walker, 
    934 F.3d 375
    , 377 n.1 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal
    quotation marks omitted); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 
    431 U.S. 63
    , 74 (1977) (“Solemn
    declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.”).
    Our review of the Rule 11 hearing confirms that Martinez Molina’s guilty plea was
    knowing and voluntary and that his appeal waiver is valid. The district court substantially
    complied with the requirements of Rule 11, ensuring that Martinez Molina was competent
    to plead guilty and was pleading guilty knowingly and voluntarily. Moreover, the court
    fully reviewed the appellate waiver at the Rule 11 hearing, and Martinez Molina averred
    that he understood and agreed to the waiver. In addition, the issue that Martinez Molina
    seeks to raise on appeal falls squarely within the scope of the valid waiver. We therefore
    grant the Government’s motion to dismiss in part and dismiss all issues that fall within the
    scope of the waiver.
    However, Martinez Molina’s criminal judgment listed 13 standard conditions of
    supervised release that the district court did not orally pronounce or incorporate by
    reference to the conditions listed in the presentence report (PSR), any standing order, or
    the Sentencing Guidelines.      Further, when announcing the one special condition of
    supervised release at the sentencing hearing, the district court did not mention that the
    condition required Martinez Molina to surrender to Immigration and Customs Enforcement
    within 72 hours of being placed on supervised release.
    A district court must announce all nonmandatory conditions of supervised release
    at the sentencing hearing. United States v. Rogers, 
    961 F.3d 291
    , 296-99 (4th Cir. 2020).
    This “requirement . . . gives defendants a chance to object to conditions that are not tailored
    4
    USCA4 Appeal: 22-4403       Doc: 29         Filed: 06/07/2023      Pg: 5 of 6
    to their individual circumstances and ensures that they will be imposed only after
    consideration of the factors set out in [18 U.S.C.] § 3583(d).” Id. at 300. In United States v.
    Singletary, we explained that a challenge to discretionary supervised release terms that
    were not orally pronounced at sentencing falls outside the scope of an appeal waiver
    because “the heart of a Rogers claim is that discretionary conditions appearing for the first
    time in a written judgment . . . have not been imposed on the defendant.” 
    984 F.3d 341
    ,
    345 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). In situations such as Martinez
    Molina’s, where the district court fails to announce or otherwise incorporate the
    discretionary conditions of supervised release, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the
    entire sentence and remand for a full resentencing hearing. See 
    id.
     at 346 & n.4. Therefore,
    we vacate Martinez Molina’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
    found no other meritorious grounds for appeal.          We thus affirm Martinez Molina’s
    convictions and dismiss the appeal as to any issues falling within the scope of the appeal
    waiver, but vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. This court requires that
    counsel inform Martinez Molina, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of
    the United States for further review. If Martinez Molina requests that a petition be filed,
    but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
    court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy
    thereof was served on Martinez Molina.
    5
    USCA4 Appeal: 22-4403         Doc: 29    Filed: 06/07/2023   Pg: 6 of 6
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
    decisional process.
    DISMISSED IN PART,
    AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART,
    AND REMANDED
    6