Charles Young, Jr. v. City of Manassas ( 2023 )


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  • USCA4 Appeal: 21-2247      Doc: 15         Filed: 06/08/2023    Pg: 1 of 4
    UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 21-2247
    CHARLES A. YOUNG, JR.,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    CITY OF MANASSAS; BRYAN FOSTER, Deputy City Manager,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
    Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, Senior District Judge. (1:21-cv-00590-LO-TCB)
    Submitted: March 31, 2023                                            Decided: June 8, 2023
    Before WYNN, DIAZ, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    ON BRIEF: Alan S. Shachter, Manassas, Virginia, for Appellant. Heather K. Bardot,
    MCGAVIN, BOYCE, BARDOT, THORSEN & KATZ, P.C., Fairfax, Virginia, for
    Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    USCA4 Appeal: 21-2247       Doc: 15         Filed: 06/08/2023      Pg: 2 of 4
    PER CURIAM:
    Charles A. Young appeals the district court’s orders dismissing his complaint and
    denying reconsideration. In his complaint, Young alleged that he was an employee for the
    City of Manassas, Virginia (“the City”), and that the City and the Deputy City Manager,
    Bryan Foster, violated his procedural due process rights by suspending him for three days
    without pay. * On appeal, Young argues that the court erred in dismissing his complaint
    because he properly alleged violations of the Due Process Clause and state constitutional
    and statutory law. We affirm.
    We review de novo a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss under Fed.
    R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “accept[ing] the factual allegations of the complaint as true and
    constru[ing] them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Rockville Cars,
    LLC v. City of Rockville, 
    891 F.3d 141
    , 145 (4th Cir. 2018). “To survive a motion to
    dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
    to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). In other words, “a plaintiff must provide sufficient detail to
    show that he has a more-than-conceivable chance of success on the merits.” Upstate
    Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 
    887 F.3d 637
    , 645 (4th Cir. 2018)
    (cleaned up), vacated on other grounds, 
    140 S. Ct. 2736 (2020)
    .
    *
    Young initially filed suit in state court, but the City and Foster removed the case
    to the federal district court.
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    Young argues on appeal that his complaint properly alleged a procedural due
    process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. A plaintiff must adequately allege “three
    elements” to state a viable procedural due process claim. Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head,
    
    724 F.3d 533
    , 540 (4th Cir. 2013). First, a plaintiff “must demonstrate that he had a
    constitutionally cognizable life, liberty, or property interest.” 
    Id.
     “Second, he must show
    that the deprivation of that interest was caused by some form of state action.” 
    Id.
     (internal
    quotation marks omitted). “Third, he must prove that the procedures employed were
    constitutionally inadequate.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Here, Young admits that he withdrew from the City’s grievance process prior to its
    completion. Because Young failed to fully participate in the grievance process and his
    allegations did not suggest that the process was fundamentally unfair, he could not show
    that the challenged procedures were constitutionally deficient. See Zinermon v. Burch, 
    494 U.S. 113
    , 126 (1990) (noting that a due process violation “is not complete” when the
    deprivation of a protected right occurs; rather, it is only complete when the government
    “fails to provide due process”); Ashley v. N.L.R.B., 
    255 F. App’x 707
    , 710 (4th Cir. 2007)
    (per curiam) (“[T]o state a claim for failure to provide due process, a plaintiff must have
    taken advantage of the processes that are available to him or her, unless those processes
    are unavailable or patently inadequate.” (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki, 
    227 F.3d 107
    , 116 (3d
    Cir. 2000))). Accordingly, the district court correctly found that Young failed to allege a
    viable due process claim under federal law. Further, because the “due process guarantees
    of . . . the Constitution of Virginia are virtually identical to those of the United States
    Constitution,” the court properly determined that Young’s allegations were also
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    USCA4 Appeal: 21-2247      Doc: 15         Filed: 06/08/2023      Pg: 4 of 4
    insufficient to state a due process claim under state law. L.F. v. Breit, 
    736 S.E.2d 711
    , 721
    n.7 (Va. 2013). Finally, while Young argues that he adequately alleged a claim that the
    City’s grievance process violated Virginia statutory law and that the district court should
    have afforded him leave to amend his complaint, we have reviewed the record and conclude
    that the district court made no error in dismissing his complaint or denying leave to amend.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
    argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
    before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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